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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis examined decision making in the context of forced-choice 
situations, as characterised by high-risk consequences and time-limited 
conditions, within an experimental decision paradigm. By mapping onto basic 
decision-making stages relating to evaluation, deliberation and implementation 
of a choice, this research looks at how environmental conditions (emotion) and 
information (advice) affect cognitive processing in forced-choice or “do or 
don’t” scenarios. In order to identify these variations on a more fundamental 
level, a methodological framework was developed, which incorporates 
neurocognitive, behavioural and qualitative measures.  
 
Results identified the distinct sequence of cognitive processes as predicted 
from basic decision-making models. When individuals lacked any meaningful 
information to assist in solving the tasks, their responses varied based on the 
consequential conditions they faced, leading to an accelerated engagement with 
the decision and faster response, the riskier the outcome. On the other hand, 
when information was available during the task, differences in responses 
followed predictions about information processing and cognitive effort required 
for the different levels of clarity. Here, the consequential conditions did not 
affect performance, as individuals prioritised the information available. Further, 
when solving a task lacking any meaningful information on which to base their 
choice, individuals still engaged in redundant deliberation. Taken together, the 
research suggests that outcome uncertainty and task ambiguity have a 
demonstrable effect on the decision-making process. 
 
This research, incorporating neurocognitive measures, showed a robust 
framework to advance current understanding about the interplay of affecting 
factors and basic decision-making processes. Providing an additional reference, 
this approach contributes to a more in-depth picture of underlying processes. 
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From thinking about acting,  
to doing so 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One of the most-challenging characteristics of decision making in so-called 
critical incidents is that it often requires choosing between to equally unattractive 
options. This is done in environments of high ambiguity about the information 
available, while at the same time dealing with uncertain outcomes. Individuals in 
these settings are faced with high performance expectations, operational pressures, 
limited time available and mostly dealing with highly consequential situations, due 
to the high-risk nature of the problems. This translates to the potential for negative 
outcomes and a heightened emotional state. The main goal of this thesis is to identify 
– through the application of techniques and methodologies from the fields of social 
psychology and neuroscience – the individual cognitive processes during key stages 
of decision making, and how these are affected by factors relating to situational 
settings and information available. 
 
The main aim of this research is to further advance the knowledge from the 
emerging fields of social neuroscience and neuroeconomics, to include specific 
operational conditions identified within naturalistic and real-life decision making 
environments. By reference to the cognitive substrates and behavioural correlates of 
decision making, the goal is to understand how individuals process task demands and 
information. In particular we are interested in experimental settings characterised by 
naturalistic high stake situations. 
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            While simple decision-making environments allow for clear constraints and 
the assignation of values for the available alternatives, more challenging ones 
demand high operational competency from individuals under extreme conditions. 
This translates into additional task pressures and factors influencing the whole 
decision-making process. Leading on from a naturalistic decision making (NDM) 
perspective, the challenge here has focused on identifying key factors, which 
characterise unstructured problems, and incorporate those in basic decision-making 
tasks. The aim has been to develop experimental paradigms which mirror 
fundamental pressures of particular environments, in order to isolate individual 
decision-making processes, with a view to identifying the stages of evaluation, 
deliberation and implementation of choices. 
 
            Our focus here is on forced-choice environments, as encountered in situations 
of high risk and uncertainty. The prime challenge during critical incidents lies in the 
need to choose between two equally (un)attractive options, under conditions of high 
time pressure and significant risk. The goal is to combine neurocognitive, 
behavioural and qualitative measures, to further identify the particular decision 
making processes that individuals engage in when solving tasks under those 
conditions. This insight will contribute to the fundamental understanding of the 
interplay between performance pressures and information, and how these affect 
individuals’ response. 
 
1.1 Problem of Choice 
 
 The most fundamental action any individual performs has a key preceding 
condition: the decision to perform said action. Sometimes individuals operate within 
environments where the need to make a choice is not so much voluntary or optional, 
but prescribed by the operational conditions and the particular pressures of the 
situation – these are what we regard as “do or don’t” moments. These decisions are 
often characterised by limitations in terms of the available courses of actions an 
individual can consider, with limited or no information available on which to base 
decisions.  
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Furthermore, these environments are often characterised by time constrains, 
and involve a high degree of risk and negative consequence as potential outcomes. 
These can include pilots in emergency situations, missile operators needing to 
reassess launch settings, or operators faced with an unexpected system shut-down. It 
is not only the sheer complexity of these environments, but the notion that individual 
steps are needed to gain clarity and an overview of the situation. It is these forced-
choice decision-making environments that are of interest here, as the aim is to 
describe if, and how, individuals’ decision making is affected by these particular 
operational settings. The goal is to trace the neurocognitive processing during the 
decision-making process, with particular emphasis on the final commitment to a 
choice, which requires both deliberation (evaluation of alternatives) and 
implementation (commitment to a course of action). 
 
1.2 Decision Making 
 
Decision making has been defined as “the process commonly portrayed as 
occurring early in the ‘problem-solving process’ - the sensing, exploration, and 
definition of problems or opportunities - as well as the generation, evaluation, and 
selection of solutions” (Huber & McDaniel, 1986; p.576). All of these dynamic and 
interrelated processes have been observed and analysed from a number of research 
perspectives, and the challenge has focused on establishing a valid narrative, 
describing reasoning and behaviour applicable to each setting. Research has 
approached the task from two distinct starting points, with varying degrees of 
concordance (Kahnemann & Klein, 2009), but an understanding of both is key here, 
in order to advance the current proposals. 
 
TDM 
Based on traditional decision-making (TDM) theory, the focus will be on a 
simplified model, breaking decisions down into three interrelated processes: options, 
evaluation, and choice (Herrnstein & Prelec, 1991; Baron, 1994; Lipshitz, Klein, 
Orasanu, & Salas, 2001). In particular, we will follow on from the decision-making 
stages proposed by Gollwitzer, Heckhausen, and Steller (1990), which describe in 
more detail individuals’ evaluation, deliberation and implementation of decisions 
within a TDM framework. 
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It is important to bear in mind that while the distinction of these three stages 
of decision making is to some extent arbitrary, it still provides a starting point for a 
more systematic examination of the individual component processes. 
 
Figure 1. 3-Stage Decision Making Model (adapted from Fellows, 2004) 
 
It is within this model that we consider the generation of possible options, the 
evaluation process applied to all of these available options, and the final commitment 
to one specific one. 
 
Options 
The generation and recognition of options has been investigated by a number 
of researchers (Baron, 1994; Russo & Schoemaker, 1990; Gigerenzer & Todd, 
1999), but the effect of forced-choice environments has received little attention. 
These particular settings lack the options-generation component, but raise other 
questions about the lack of influence and effect the decision-maker has over the task 
or problem. These are environments of do-or-don’t moments, from the simple level 
of deciding whether or not to make a purchase, or the more high-risk levels in law-
enforcement, deciding whether or not to shoot a suspect. These lack the option-
generation stage, but still follow a similar dynamic on the most fundamental level. 
So it is worth looking at the subsequent stages, and see how these play out in forced-
choice environments. 
 
Evaluation 
 
Evaluation has been examined principally from an economic framework, as 
the subjective utility an individual places on the particular courses of action (Keeney 
OPTIONS 
•Generate/identify possible 
choices. 
EVALUATION 
•Assign value to an 
alternative. 
•Based on context, 
experience and (internal or 
external ) assessment. 
CHOICE 
•Response based on value. 
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& Raiffa, 1976; Glimcher & Rustichini, 2004) and from a reward perspective, seen 
as an intrinsic stimulus property (Baxter & Murray, 2002), fulfilling primary needs 
(Richardson & DeLong, 1991), as well as dependence needs (Breiter & Rosen, 
1999), with some mixed results for studies using specific rewards (Knutson, Adams, 
Fong, & Hommer, 2001; Breiter, Aharon, Kahneman, Dale, & Shizgal, 2001; 
Pochon, Levy, Fossati, Lehericy, Poline, Pillon, Le Bihan, & Dubois, 2002). 
 
In these environments, the focus is on uncertain problems, with no clear 
value stated for each of the (prescribed) options and with limited feedback. This 
makes it almost impossible for the individual to develop or learn a pattern of value, 
thus reinforcing the difficulty and complexity of the task. As a result of the 
characteristics of these environments, it is impossible to develop a meaningful 
assessment of the alternatives, or assign to them a neural currency (Montague & 
Berns, 2002). Decision makers have no information on which to generate value or 
judgement about individual alternatives, from which to develop a meaningful 
preference. 
 
Further, research has shown that beliefs about outcomes are vital to the 
evaluation process, particularly when assessing the various attributes of choice 
alternatives (Shanteau, 1980), as well as during the active search for information 
relevant to the decisions (Böckenholt, Albert, Aschenbrenner, & Schmalhofer, 
1991). Barlas (2003) proposed that the importance with which one perceives a 
decision is crucial, because such perceptions are instrumental in evaluating tradeoffs 
between conflicting attributes of choice. It is this added dimension which influences 
levels of cognitive processing invested in decision formulation. These environments 
include varying levels of outcome, which directly influence the evaluation process at 
different stages, providing another factor affecting the overall decision-making 
process. 
 
Choice 
Despite the difficulties and complexities present in the first two stages of the 
decision-making model, decision makers are still under pressure and are required to 
make a choice and commit to a particular course of action. Recent research has 
looked into some issues relating to response selection, based mostly on an 
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individual’s previous evaluation of the decision context (Bush, Vogt, Holmes, Dale, 
Greve, Jenike, & Rosen, 2002; Gehring & Willoughby, 2002; Knutson, Fong, 
Bennett, Adams, & Hommer, 2003; O’Doherty, Critchley, Deichmann, & Dolan, 
2003), while research into simple decision-making has recognized the frequent 
dissociation between hypothetical preferences and actual choices (Barlas, 2003). 
This idea describes the process of informing a choice based on available information, 
and assessing this choice against anticipated knowledge about the subsequent 
consequences. 
 
The difficulty that arises here relates to the differentiation between choices, 
based on a value developed and assigned to the different options, as assessed during 
the evaluation stage. This process is significantly hindered when there is no prior 
knowledge or feedback to inform such a value assignment. It is within this limited 
decision environment that feelings and emotions have been brought back into the 
discourse.  
 
Some researchers have explicitly identified affect as central in decision 
processes (Raghunathan & Pham, 1999) and have equated feelings to heuristics 
(Clore, 1992; Pham, 1998; Schwarz & Clore, 1988), insofar as recognising that they 
increase in value as a basis for information when decisions are bereft of other 
judgment processes (Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1994; Strack, 1992). The question 
that is raised here relates to the extent to which these factors influence decision 
making in these environments (Mosier & Fischer, 2009), and what is their 
interaction with other, more informative factors (Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003). 
 
 The majority of this research has gathered insight into decision making 
through experimental set-ups, aimed at controlling for extraneous factors and making 
it possible to identify and differentiate between key processes. This has contributed 
immensely to the current understanding of decision making, but an alternative field 
has emerged from a practitioner-centred perspective, aimed at filling the gaps in 
understanding around more complex decision-making environments. It is important 
to understand how research in this area has developed, and where these two 
approaches meet in relation to the aims of the present research. 
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NDM 
 The reality of decisions in the real world is that they arise out of an 
interaction of environmental influences and influences related to the motivation and 
goals of the person. It is within this setting that decision-making has been recognised 
as a complex process, dependent on the unique characteristics of the operational 
setting and influenced by a number of internal as well as external factors (Klein, 
Orasanu, Calderwood, & Zsambok, 1993). The complexity of these processes holds 
the key to understanding how individuals operate in real-world environments. And in 
order to have a clear idea of what this entails, our focus here will be on some of the 
main factors and what have been termed wicked problems. 
 
 The concept of wicked problems was proposed in the context of social 
policy, where a lack of clear definition and competing agents add to the complexity 
of the task (Rittel & Webber, 1973). The main challenge remained the clear 
definition of the problem, seeing as most other stages to solving it depended on this 
premise. Further, the fact that no idealised system could be applied to these, made 
the basic application of models and heuristics impossible. Work in this area was 
advanced within the fields of design (Rittel, 1988; Stolterman, 2008), systems 
engineering (Sølvberg & Kung, 1993) and economics (Hogarth, 2001). On a more 
general level, defining characteristics of wicked problems have been identified as 
follows (Conklin, 2005): 
 
1. The problem is not understood until after the formulation of a solution. 
2. Wicked problems have no stopping rule. 
3. Solutions to wicked problems are not right or wrong. 
4. Every wicked problem is essentially novel and unique. 
5. Every solution to a wicked problem is a 'one shot operation'. 
6. Wicked problems have no given alternative solutions. 
 
The key characteristics in this case relate to the fact that there are no clear solutions, 
as the outcome is dependent on the particular course of action selected. 
Coincidentally, once a solution is implemented, the problem will be different the 
next time around, making each iteration of the problem to some extent unique and 
novel. Thus, decisions are only evaluated as being right or wrong after the resolution 
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and identification of the outcome. It is the combination of the naturalistic setting and 
the formulation of these characteristics where the definition of problem-solving steps 
beyond traditional decision making theory, and requires the inclusion of a number of 
external factors, in order to be understood in terms of processes at play. 
 
Individuals tasked with solving these problems often operate in dynamic and 
fast-paced environments, where the setting brings added stresses to already complex 
situations. Beyond simply defining these as stressing factors in the traditional sense 
(Janis & Mann, 1977; Ivanicevich & Matteson, 1980; Hogan & Hogan, 1982), the 
definition which best matches these type of problems defines stress in these 
environments as the “process by which certain environmental demands ... evoke an 
appraisal process in which perceived demand exceeds resources and results in 
undesirable physiological, psychological, behavioral and social outcomes” (Salas, 
Driskell, & Hughes, 1996; p. 6). 
 
They main stressors identified in these environments include the high risk of 
negative outcomes, changing conditions, time constrains, and uncertainty and 
ambiguity (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1998). Within these settings, individuals still 
need to gather, process, integrate and act on the data available, in order to inform 
their decisions. One of the key factors that describe these problems is the notion of 
uncertainty, which is a defining characteristic of human performance in NDM 
environments (Fiore, Rosen, & Salas, 2011). It builds on the fact that the available 
information does not provide sufficient details on which to construct expectations, as 
described in wicked problems, while the operational settings still require a 
commitment from the decision maker. This uncertainty is further amplified by these 
extraneous factors, surrounding performance pressure (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999), 
which add to the cognitive load of the task. Individuals operating in these 
environments are also extremely susceptible to anticipated regret (Zeelenberg, van 
Dijk, Manstead, & van der Pligt, 2000) and emotional affect (Loewenstein & Lerner, 
2003). 
 
 The other key aspect relates to the processing of task-relevant information. 
Traditional decision-making models have focused on decomposing the problem into 
its elements, making it possible to assess them based on rational choice frameworks 
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(i.e. subjective expected utility theory, multiattribute theory, Bayesian inference). 
Despite the validity and application of these models in a number of fields, they fall 
short in being validated in these naturalistic environments (Collyer & Malecki, 
1998). On the one hand, they require a relatively long time in order to identify 
problems and assess judgements necessary to develop solutions. On the other, the 
explicit judgements used in these models are artificial and fail to incorporate implicit 
and dynamic considerations. So it is precisely the variation in information, in terms 
of its contribution to the uncertainty of the situation and the ambiguity of the 
delivered insight, which forms a key part of the factors it adds to the decision-
making environment. 
 
 As a result of these unique characteristics, both in terms of naturalistic 
decision-making environments and the operational constraints identified within 
them, the emphasis has shifted towards decision delay or complete inertia. Research 
in this area has not focused on what could be termed ‘erroneous decisions’ – seeing 
as the complexity and ever-changing dynamics of these problems make it difficult to 
classify decisions as such – and have rather looked at incidences where individuals 
delay or fail to make a decisions altogether. This applies particularly in these 
environments, as individuals have to choose between two equally (un)attractive 
options (Lipshitz, 2005), while operating under a high level of pressure and 
uncertainty, creating a sense of doubt that blocks or delays action (Lipshitz & 
Strauss, 1997). Individuals engage in uncertainty management in naturalistic 
decision-making environments (cf. Fiore, Rosen, & Salas, 2011), but research has 
shown that the overwhelming conditions and uncertainty often prevent them from 
applying an effective strategy, resulting in them not making any choice (Anderson, 
2003). Similarly, the active need and desire to reach a resolution has also been 
shown to result in so-called ‘seizing and freezing’ (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). 
This becomes a major issue especially when dealing with wicked problems in 
dynamic environments, where the need to decide is essential in order to further 
advance and gather more information. So it is this ultimate failure to operate which 
we aim at identifying, combining knowledge around affective decision-making and 
information processing, in these unique environments.  
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2. Neuroscience 
 
A number of sub-disciplines have emerged, each addressing the various 
influencing factors and taking stock of the varying results. The main approach here is 
to use a simplified model of decision making, taking into consideration the key 
factors identified within NDM environments, to identify cognitive processes on a 
fundamental level. Part of the challenge, as highlighted above, has been to identify 
the right models to describe decision making in particular environments. The aim 
here lies in looking at those models from a different perspective, as most of the 
current insight into decision making has largely been based on qualitative and 
observational research. The goal is to go further in our understanding, using the 
current advances in cognitive neuroscience, to develop a more fundamental model of 
the processes at play. Significant inroads have been made in terms of the emerging 
field of decision neuroscience (Shiv, Bechara, Levin, Alba, Bettman, Dube, Isen, 
Mellers, Smidts, Grant, & McGraw, 2005; Gold & Shadlen, 2007), and it is 
important to see how this has included ideas from social neuroscience and 
neuroeconomics. 
 
Social Neuroscience & Neuroeconomics 
 
 Closely aligned to the ideas within social psychology, the interdisciplinary 
field of social neuroscience is devoted to the inclusion of neural, hormonal, cellular, 
and genetic mechanisms, while looking at the associations and influences between 
social and biological levels of organisation (Cacioppo, Berntson, & Decety, 2010). 
The aspect most relevant in this case is the integration of biological and 
psychological explanations of social behaviour (Harmon-Jones & Winkielman, 
2007; Harmon-Jones & Beer, 2009). One key notion is the idea of bidirectionality 
and correlation, where it is important to emphasise the understanding of how the 
brain influences social processes as well as how social processes can influence the 
brain (Harmon-Jones & Devine, 2003). It is this complimentary approach, and its 
insight into neurocognitive mechanisms that give rise to social behaviour, which 
have driven the surge of interest in social neuroscience (e.g., Cacioppo, Visser, & 
Pickett, 2005; Harmon-Jones & Winkeilman, 2007). Further, as highlighted, this 
emerging field benefits from adding a neurobiological approach to social 
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psychology, identifying the fundamental substrates and correlates, using a multilevel 
analytical approach (Cacioppo & Berntson, 1992).  
 
 It is from within this framework that questions have been raised about the 
cognitive processes at play during decision-making problems. Significant advances 
have come from the field of neuroeconomics (McCabe, 2003), focused on applying 
brain-based methods and theories to account for economic decision-making 
(Loewenstein, Rick, & Cohen, 2008; Glimcher, Camerer, Fehr, & Poldrack, 2008). 
This has been in line with proposals from TDM, looking at decisions that require 
allocation of resources (e.g. time) or an assignment of value (e.g. neural value, 
preferential judgement). 
 
 The goal here, based on similar arguments presented above in terms of the 
validity of TDM models to NDM environments, is to expand the methodological 
propositions where traditional heuristics fail to fit the operation constraints. Further, 
the insight in the environments is aimed at non-prescriptive explanations about how 
individuals do make decisions, rather than on how they should make them. The 
emphasis here is on the strong inclusion of social elements, which come to the 
forefront when evaluating decision environments and alternatives. On the simplest 
level, the goal is to look at the interaction of individuals’ emotional response and 
their immediate goals (McClure, Li, Tomlin, Cypert, Montague, & Montague, 2004), 
advancing work on preferential judgement and competition between immediate and 
delayed rewards (McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein, & Cohen, 2004). The bottom line 
is that these studies look at decisions that arise out of an interaction of the 
environmental influences (bottom-up: emotions) and influences related to the 
motivation and goals of the individual (top-down: information), while constructing a 
neural model of their interaction (cf. Knutson & Peterson, 2005). 
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3. Methodology 
 
3.1 References from Executive Functions 
 
In order to identify decisions on a neurological level, it is important to be 
aware of what processes one is observing. Being part of high-order processing, 
situations involving planning or decision-making, involving error correction or 
trouble-shooting, requiring responses to novel actions, requiring dangerous or 
difficult judgements, or requiring overcoming strong habitual response or resisting 
temptation, have all been recognised to involve executive functions (Norman & 
Shallice, 1986). These are identified as complex responses, by which individuals 
optimise their performance in situations that require the operation of a number of 
cognitive processes (Baddeley, 1996). This results in instructions about which 
regions of the brain to activate, generally coordinating their synchronised activity 
(Goldberg, 2001). So it is these functions that are of interest in decision-making 
processes, in terms of their interaction within the brain, focusing on their influence, 
as well as dictating effects on responses based on the available stimuli and related 
information.  
 
3.2 Decision-making – Models & Movement 
 
 A number of models have been proposed based on neurological insight in 
relation to these executive functions, and it is worth considering these models and 
their development, onto which to incorporate factors more closely related to 
decision-making research. Thus, despite the acknowledged complexity of decision-
making, it is necessary to find a reference point from which to identify these 
processes and the accompanying brain activity. In this case, the best starting point 
involves considering movement as a choice, based on the idea of goal-driven action, 
as opposed to automatic movements and functions (Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; 
Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977).  
 
 The original version of the Supervisory Attentional System (SAS) model 
focuses on goal-driven actions (Norman & Shallice, 1986; Cooper & Shallice, 2000), 
pointing to significant activation in the prefrontal cortex. This region has also 
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functionally been related to responses (i.e. ‘willed’ action) in conditions in which 
response was essentially arbitrary or drawn from a set of responses (Frith, Kriston, 
Liddle & Frackowiak, 1991; Jahanshahi & Frith, 1998). These sets of actions, within 
more complex environments, are carried out along sets of stored information (termed 
schemas), which provide biasing mechanisms that activate or suppress particular 
actions or action routines according to current goals (Norman & Shallice, 1986). 
This model describes the activation of these schemas as the result of the balance 
between bottom-up processes (e.g. environmental cues, habit) and top-down 
processes (e.g. task demands, consequential planning). The revised SAS is more 
complex, taking into consideration three separate stages: specifying a new schema, 
implementing it, and monitoring the results (Shallice & Brugress, 1996). 
 
 Aimed at describing the overall control of cognition, the integrative model 
of voluntary choice again places a strong emphasis on the prefrontal cortex (Miller & 
Cohen, 2001). In this model, the brain region provides biasing signals, enabling 
novel and non-automatic mapping between sensory inputs (environmental 
information), internal states (emotional affect), and response outputs (choice). 
Within this model, research has also highlighted that the prefrontal cortex responds 
primarily to the rules of the task, rather than the specific stimulus (Asaad, Rainer, & 
Miller, 1998, 2000); fulfilling the role of goals and plan processing, rather than basic 
input and information processing. 
 
 Overall, the question raised at this stage is about the 
feasibility/validity/possibility of applying these models to decision-making under 
particular operational conditions. On an epistemological level, it is important to 
identify if these models of cognitive processing suffice to describe complex 
processing of executive functions during choice situations. On a higher level, the 
question emerges as to whether these neurological premises are flawed in terms of 
their ability to confidently describe cognitive and experiential processes 
(Rachamandran & Blakeslee, 2005; Panksepp, 2008). Both of these concerns are 
acknowledged in our approach, which aims at addressing these from a new 
perspective, based on current methodological advances. 
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3.3 ERPs from EEGs 
 
To gain a valid insight into these processes, it is important to maintain a good 
time resolution, as the focus is on the effect of high-pressure and uncertain 
environments have on decision making, as a combination of the factors identified 
from within NDM. Experimentally, the emphasis is on the particular time-intervals 
where these changes are present in individuals’ responses to these fast-paced 
situations, and how they are further reflected when referenced against behavioural 
measures. For this purpose, the best approach for this involved taking 
electroencephalographic recordings, with the view on identifying key evoked-
response potentials. 
 
Electroencephalographic (EEG) waveforms reflect neural activity from all 
parts of the brain, where some of this activity is related to specific tasks (e.g. visual 
perception, reading, movement), while most will be related to activity of other 
neurons, not directly engaged in the task (regarded as background-noise of electrical 
activity) (cf. Luck, 2005; cf. Handy, 2005). This noise can be accounted for through 
the repetition of the stimuli, in order to reduce the so-called signal-to-noise ratio. The 
resulting graphs describe the changes over time (x-axis, in milliseconds) for the 
electrode potential (y-axis, in microvolts). 
 
Figure 2. EEG Waves and ERP Averages 
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Recordings provide an insight into brain processing, using EEG as a remote 
measurement of the electrical potential directly generated by neuronal activity, in the 
form of signals originating in the postsynaptic dendritic currents, rather than the 
axonal currents associated with the action potential (Nunez & Srinivasan, 2006). 
This allows one to study perceptual and cognitive processes, by averaging the 
electrical activity that is time-locked to particular stimulus categories. Designing a 
specific decision-making paradigm enables one to observe and quantify complex 
cognitive processing through a continuous measure (Luck, Woodman, & Vogel, 
2000), based on event-related potentials (ERPs), used to describe activity relating to 
individual stimuli, where these stimuli have been paired with proposed decision-
making stages.  
 
 ERPs are changes in electrical activity, which can be recorded noninvasively 
from the surface of the scalp and reflect summated postsynaptic potentials from large 
sets of synchronously-firing neurons (Allison, Woods, & McCarthy, 1986; Fabiani, 
Gratton, & Coles, 2000). The identified ERPs are important to the study of 
psychological processes, based on the association of individual components with 
distinct information-processing operations, time locked to sensory, motor, or 
cognitive events (Gehring, Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1992). In these cases, 
component amplitude is thought to reflect the extent to which the associated 
psychological operation has been engaged with, and latency of the component’s peak 
is thought to reflect the point in time by which the operation has been completed (Ito, 
Willadsen-Jensen, & Correll, 2007). 
 
 For the purposes of identifying decision-making processes under these 
conditions, ERPs not only offer an excellent temporal resolution, but are also useful 
in assessing both explicit and implicit processes. This is particularly true of the latter, 
as they are recorded without informing participants of what is being assessed or 
requiring them to accurately or honestly report their responses (cf. Greenwald & 
Banaji, 1995). This is especially true when trying to find subtle differences, 
especially for components occurring early during processing, where the influence of 
information manipulation and response strategies is less likely. Finally, although the 
spatial resolution of ERPs is lower than that of techniques such as fMRI and PET, 
the scalp distribution of observed activity can be used to obtain estimates of 
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neuroanatomical location of the source of activity, based on 3-dimensional source 
modelling. 
 
 Seeing as the emphasis is on identifying decision-specific ERPs, in line with 
the recognised decision-making stages, the reference was taken from movement-
specific components. Recordings in these instances focused on the 
Bereitschaftspotential (readiness potential), identified as activity prior to a 
movement (Shibasaki & Kato, 1975; Boschert, Hink, & Deecke, 1983). These 
potentials have been shown to appear as negative shifts prior to the movement over 
the primary sensorimotor areas (Kornhuber & Deecke, 1965; Deecke, Scheid, & 
Kornhuber, 1969; Kristeva, Keller, Deecke, & Kornhuber, 1979). Considering the 
fast response times for some of the conditions, the emphasis has also been on the 
negative slope (NS’), observed as the steepest part of the negative shift prior to the 
onset of muscular contraction (Shibasaki, Barrett, Halliday, & Halliday, 1980). 
 
 The overall idea is to simplify the decision-making implementation, relying 
on choices as voluntary movement, accounting for any variations in terms of oral or 
written commitment to an alternative. Further, the focus in this situation is not on the 
specificity of a choice, but on the making of a decision (deliberation) and the final 
commitment to it (implementation). This framework allows capturing any changes in 
terms of urges to move, as observed for participants who may not be fully committed 
to act and may still be able to suppress the action, as part of a late-checking 
mechanism (Brass & Haggard, 2007). Similarly, the translation of mental decisions 
into motor-responses allows for experimental confirmation based on lateralisation of 
readiness potentials (Haggard & Eimer, 1999), as well as activity linked to planning, 
preparation and movement (Passingham, 1996; Ball, Schreiber, Feige, Wagner, 
Lϋcking & Kristeva-Feige, 1999). 
 
 So the basic premise advanced here follows on from our basic decision-
making stages, identified through perception and movement related components 
within EEG measures, aimed at identifying these as individual processes. This 
mirrors the overall ethos of social neuroscience, as the application of knowledge 
about brain and body gained from cognitive measurements, in order to develop new 
theories of basic mechanisms, resulting in a more complete understanding of 
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psychological and behavioural process (Harmon-Jones & Beer, 2009). Furthermore, 
whereas traditional research on social cognition and motivation has had to infer the 
activity of underlying cognitive mechanisms only by the proxy of behavioural 
expressions (e.g., on reaction-time tasks), ERPs and other neuroimaging methods 
allow researchers direct access to the cognitive machinery that drives social 
behaviour, thereby providing a powerful tool for testing theories of social cognitive 
and motivational processes (Bartholow & Amodio, 2009). These ideas expand on 
early suggestions that we should try and bring real-world problems to an 
experimental setting to assess their cognitive make-up, in an attempt to improve our 
understanding of cognition in the wild (Hutchins, 1995). While this particular 
paradigm does not claim to provide an exhaustive description of real-world decision 
making, it will further contribute to the emerging models of cognitive architectures 
(Taatgen & Anderson, 2009), aimed at providing predictive descriptions and overall 
identification of individual processes and their relationship in particular tasks. 
 
 
4. Contribution 
 
 The main goal is to further contribute to the current understanding of 
decision-making processes in forced-choice environments. This contribution is based 
on recent developments in the field of cognitive neuroscience, adding insight through 
the use of EEG measures, as a way of isolating key factors relating to information 
processing, deliberation and implementation of decisions. We will look at if, and 
how, behavioural responses and cognitive measures interact when making decision, 
in environments characterised by ambiguous information and high-risk conditions, 
as prescribed by the operational limitations. 
 
The goal here is not to provide an exhaustive description of cognitive and 
neurological processes within naturalistic decision-making environment, but to 
establish a valid framework in which to continue expanding on fundamental models 
of decision making.   
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5. Chapter Outline 
 
 The rest of the PhD dissertation is structured around the five different 
experiments carried out. Each experiment is described in an individual chapter 
(Chap. II – VI), focusing on a specific introduction, and information on methodology 
and results. These are then discussed in detail for the particular experiment.  Finally, 
all of these results are discussed in the last chapter (Chapter VII), in order to draw 
final conclusions from the findings, before moving on to the overall research 
contributions and implications for the proposed hypotheses. 
 
Chapter II 
Experiment 1: lack of information, on which to base deliberation and decision; 
only emotional-consequences available to base references on. 
 
Chapter III 
Experiment 2: addressing questions raised in Experiment 1, to see if higher 
cognitive loading (merging) influences the behavioural response. 
 
Chapter IV 
Experiment 3: addressing questions raised in Experiment 1, to see if confidence 
manipulation (mood setting) influences the behavioural response. 
 
Chapter V 
Experiment 4: information provided, to inform the deliberation and decision; 
based on advice manipulations in relation to the Reverse Stroop Effect. 
 
Chapter VI 
Experiment 5: information provided, to inform the deliberation and decision; 
based on advice manipulations of unclear information. 
 
Chapter VII 
General discussion and conclusions, drawing together findings from all 
experiments. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter II 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Emotional Influence 
 
Experiment 1 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This study examined individuals’ decision-making processes in an 
experimental environment characterised by an absence of information, time pressure 
and risk. Not uncommonly, decision makers have to make rapid decisions where 
aversive outcomes are inevitable but task specification is ambiguous and more 
information (ideally) would be forthcoming but ultimately is not available. For 
example, ‘Do I, or do I not, deploy paramedics to injured victim X in terrorist 
scenario?  If I do deploy and there is another device I could be risking further loss of 
life. If I do not, I run the risk of losing the currently injured victim’. Alison, 
Humann, and van Den Heuvel (2011) have described these high risk binary choice 
decisions as ‘damned if I do or don’t decisions’ and argued that they are especially 
difficult because both options look aversive and there is no capacity for further 
useful information upon which to develop a sufficiently clear situational model that 
would help lead to a more informed decision. As such, no matter which decision is 
taken, it could lead to a bad outcome. 
  
The objective of the current paper is to establish: (i) whether we can 
discriminate distinct decision phases throughout these sorts of tasks and (ii) whether 
a manipulation of the seriousness of the outcome (bad consequences) affects these 
phases. The paper proposes that, by reference to behavioural (timing) measures, EEG 
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and verbal feedback from participants after the task that the following distinct phases 
will emerge:  evaluation (of task), deliberation (of options) and implementation (of 
action). We argue that distinct phases will emerge and that although deliberation is 
redundant (i.e. it does not help solve the task) individuals will still consider options 
and seek to ‘solve’ the task. We argue that this will be especially pronounced in the 
high consequence conditions and that there will be greater urgency to implement 
action.  
 
1.1 Phases of Decision Making 
 
Decision making is defined as “the process commonly portrayed as occurring 
early in the ‘problem-solving process’ - the sensing, exploration, and definition of 
problems or opportunities - as well as the generation, evaluation, and selection of 
solutions” (Huber & McDaniel, 1986; p.576). However, there has been little effort to 
establish the cognitive activity associated with these proposed shifts from evaluation 
- deliberation - implementation (Gollwitzer, Heckhausen, & Steller, 1990) or 
options, evaluation, and choice (Herrnstein & Prelec, 1991; Baron, 1994; Lipshitz, 
Klein, Orasanu, & Salas, 2001). 
  
Some researchers have explicitly identified affect as central in decision 
processes (Raghunathan & Pham, 1999) and have equated feelings to heuristics 
(Clore, 1992; Pham, 1998; Schwarz & Clore, 1988), insofar as recognising that they 
increase in value as a basis for information when decisions are bereft of other 
judgment processes (Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1994; Strack, 1992).  
 
1.2 Cognitive Processes 
  
As the emerging field of decision neuroscience has made large strides in 
advancing ideas around individual cognitive processing (see Shiv et al., 2005, and 
Gold & Shadlen, 2007, for reviews), it has been less committed to incorporating 
those factors relevant to deliberation and implementation of decisions, and how these 
are reflected in brain activity. Considering the particular decision-making phases 
described above, the proposed focus was on the observation of movement-related 
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potentials in the supplementary motor area (Kornhuber & Deecke, 1965; Shibasaki, 
Barrett, Halliday, & Halliday, 1980; Kawashima et al., 1995) and early activity, 
known as the Bereitschaftspotential (Shibasaki & Kato, 1975; Boschert, Hink, & 
Deecke, 1983). Both of these were regarded as indicators of decision deliberation 
and, ultimately, commission to a choice, as fundamental reflections of movement-
commission. The emphasis was on changes in source activation, analysing the 
phases of voluntary preparation and execution. 
 
Research has repeatedly shown that large, positive slow-waves of event-
related potentials (ERP) reflect the allocation of more attentional resources in cases 
of motivational significant stimuli (Hamm, Schupp, & Weike, 2003). Further, results 
have consistently described these affective evaluations as routine processes involved 
in virtually all processes of perceptions (Cacioppo, Gardner, & Bernston, 1999). The 
basic premise here followed on from the notion that emotional tasks result in 
prolonged periods and elevated intervals of brain activity, as more cognitive 
resources are necessary to assess situations. 
 
This is linked to the idea that emotional experience is a by-product of neural 
computations associated with processing of value-laden stimuli (LeDoux, 1996). 
Thus, extensive visual cortex activity has been recorded when participants view 
emotional pictures (Bradley et al., 2003). Further, the anterior cingulate cortex plays 
a role in representing subjective emotional responses, which has also been found to 
be consistent with a suggested role for associated medial prefrontal structures in 
representing states of mind (Lane, Fink, Chau, & Dolan, 1997). The expectation thus 
follows on from the idea that emotional-laden information will result in increased 
cognitive activity at a visual as well as an affective processing level. 
 
1.3 Objectives and Hypotheses 
 
The goal was to use a simplified decision paradigm, characterised by lack of 
information and varying levels of consequence threat, to identify the different phases 
within the proposed decision-making model. These factors provided the grounds to 
establish how individuals were affected by the potential consequences of their 
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choices and whether they engaged in (redundant) deliberative processing before 
implementing their decisions. The following objectives were also considered: 
 
> To identify the neural processes involved at each stage of decision-making 
(evaluation, deliberation, pre-implementation, and implementation). 
 
> Emotional stimuli that suggest more significant and consequential outcomes 
will result in increased and prolonged amplitudes at the stages of deliberation, 
preparation (frontal lobe and cingulate cortex) and implementation (parietal 
lobe). 
 
> In the overt absence of any information on which to deliberate individuals will 
show neural signs associated with deliberation (which from a purely rational 
perspective is redundant). 
 
> Reaction time associated with deliberation and implementation in forced choice 
tasks is affected by the emotional conditions, resulting in delay for significant 
and consequential outcome scenarios, as the decision threshold is reached later. 
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2. METHOD 
 
2.1 Participants 
 
Fourteen individuals (9 females, 5 males) participated in the study. They 
ranged in ages from 21 to 34 years, with a mean age of 27 years. Participants were 
drawn from a sample of psychology students, all without any disclosed health issues, 
and were all right-handed. 
 
 
2.2 Procedure 
 
Participants were presented with task-related information on a computer 
screen, and they used a mouse placed below their right hand to give their responses. 
The experiment consisted of a series of decision situations, at the end of which 
individuals were asked to make a choice between two random alternatives under 
time pressure. The task consisted of a ‘bomb scenario’, where participants were 
asked to imagine themselves operating in the various scenarios and where the 
objective was to ‘cut’ the correct of two wires to disarm a bomb. Following this, they 
faced a decision stage and had to choose between two alternatives, in the form of two 
different-coloured wires (see Table 1) (failing to do so, automatically led to 
‘detonation’). The basic premise of the decision problem focused on a binary 
negative outcome paradigm, where participants had to choose between two arbitrary 
alternatives, not knowing which would be the correct wire - reinforced through time 
constrains and performance pressures - and  where a ‘wrong’ decision lead to a 
negative outcome. 
 
First, they were presented with a context-setting scenario involving either: 
(i) a light-bulb, which they had to switch off by picking a wire (low 
consequence condition), 
(ii) an industrial courtyard, in which the wires were used to disarm a bomb 
(medium consequence condition), or 
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(iii) children on a playground, in which the wires were used to disarm a bomb 
(high consequence condition). 
In summary then, the stimulus indicated one of three conditions: 1) low 
consequence, 2) medium consequence, and 3) high consequence. This was followed 
by an image of a light switch (low consequence condition) or explosive device 
(medium- and high-consequence conditions), to reinforce the situational context. 
Finally participants were prompted to choose between a red or blue wire ‘connected’ 
to the particular device. Failure to make a decision or a wrong one, led to detonation 
of the device. Following each choice, they received feedback in the form of a 
“CORRECT” or “INCORRECT” on-screen message. 
 
 The instructions, prior and during the experiment, all emphasised the need to 
take quick and decisive action. Participants were told that they would be assessed on 
their accuracy as well as their speed, forming part of an overall learning task. What 
participants did not know, was that the order and number of correct or incorrect 
decisions was set prior to the experiment, and they had no influence on the decision 
task. This was done in order to maintain a uniform pattern across participants. A total 
of 180 stimuli series were presented in two blocks, with a 5 minutes break between 
them. Each block also contained 3 interludes, where participants were presented with 
a progress report about their performance so far. All of these reports contained the 
same information about mistakes made so far, stating that they had been performing 
“below average” and reinforcing the need for them to take decisive and quick action, 
as well as the need to improve their performance and accuracy. 
 
After the task, participants provided some demographic information (e.g. 
gender, age) and completed a picture-rating task, based on the scenario images they 
saw during the experiment. They were asked to rate each picture, based on how 
emotional they found the image (3-point Likert scale: Neutral, Low, or High), and 
then on the perceived affect if their choice resulted in a negative outcome (7-point 
Likert scale: 1. Not-at-all, to 7. Extremely Affected) (see Appendix A). These ratings 
gauged the perceived emotionality of pictures and provided a measure of internal 
consistency between the conditions and the paradigm’s effectiveness, resulting in a 
post-test validation of the different scenarios. After this, participants completed a 
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brief open-ended questionnaire about their performance, their individual strategy and 
their focus during the task, and three different scales after the rating task. These 
included Barratt’s Impulsivity scale (Patton, Stanford, & Barratt, 1995), the 
Regulatory Mode Concerns (Assessment-Locomotion) scale (Higgins, Kruglanski, & 
Pierro, 2003), and the Need for Closure scale (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996) (see 
Appendix B). Finally, they were debriefed about the research and the pre-determined 
task conditions. The whole experimental procedure took a maximum of 1 hour and 
30 minutes for each participant.  
 
Table 1. Decision Paradigm 
Stage  Evaluation Deliberation Choice  
Stimuli Mask Context Device Decision Feedback 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRECT 
or 
INCORRECT 
TIME 2,000ms 2,000ms 2,000ms 3,000ms 1,500ms 
 
 
2.3 Recordings 
 
EEG was recorded using 64 electrodes in continuous mode on Biosemi 
(ActiView v6.05, Amsterdam – Netherlands). A band pass filter of 0.16-100 Hz and 
a sampling rate of 500 Hz were used, while the electrode-to-skin impedance was 
kept below 5 kΩ. Elecrooculography (EOG) measures were recorded, using 
electrodes placed above and below the left eye, while electrocardiographic (ECG) 
measures were recorded by placing one electrode on the right ankle and another one 
on the left wrist. Both of these recordings were used to account for any artefacts in 
the data analysis. The decision scenarios were designed using Inquisit (Millisecond 
Software v3.0.4, Seattle – USA), and recordings for each participant’s reaction times 
were matched with the particular triggers included in the task stages. 
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2.4 Data Analysis 
 
Averaged EEG epochs were segmented after band pass filtering and analyzed 
using the Brain Electrical Source Analysis (BESA) program (MEGIS Software, 
Munich – Germany). Trials containing ECG artefacts or large EOG variations (> 75 
mV) were discarded from further analysis. For the vision-related measures, 2,269 
averaged EEG epochs were segmented to a length of 1,100 ms (100 ms pre- to 1, 000 
ms post-stimulus). For the movement-related measures, 2,264 averaged EEG epochs 
were segmented to a length of 2,000 ms (1,500 ms pre- to 500 ms post-stimulus). A 
source model of the EEG potentials was constructed from the grand average data (N 
= 14) for each of the measures. The data were transformed into the Talairach 
coordinate system, and the locations of the EEG sources were evaluated for each 
individual source dipole (Talairach Client v2.4.2, Research Imaging Centre, 
UTHSCSA - USA). 
 
 
2.5 Statistical Analysis 
 
The effect of stimulus intensity on the dipole source was analyzed using an 
analysis of variance (ANOVA), where the recordings within the participants were 
compared, for the movement processing. The independent variables were the three 
different scenarios (low-, medium- and high-consequence). Pair-wise comparisons 
were carried out between the three scenarios, and a 95% confidence level was used 
throughout. 
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3. RESULTS  
 
 Results will detail the two parts of the experiment. First, the focus will be on 
the perception components within the EEG recordings, describing the differences in 
amplitudes for each of the source dipoles directly following the presentation of the 
scenario context stimuli. Secondly, the focus will be on the movement component of 
the EEG recordings, describing the differences in amplitudes for each of the source 
dipoles prior to the commission to a particular choice. Data for the response times 
were also considered at this stage, to gain a fuller picture of the relationship between 
cognitive and behavioural processes. For both of these recordings, the data will be 
compared based on the three scenario conditions, looking for significant differences 
in the source waveforms. 
 
3.1 Perception-related components 
 Five regional source dipoles were fitted to describe the 3-dimensional source 
currents contributing to the data (see A, in Figure 1). Three sources were located in 
the occipital lobe. The central source (S1, Talairach coordinates in mm [8, -82, 19], 
Brodmann area 18), peaked at 170 ms. Two secondary sources, occupying lateral 
locations, (S2L [-41, -99, -23] and S3R [42, -81, -12]) peaked at 184 ms and 176 ms 
respectively. Two other sources were located in the parietal lobe. One source was 
located contralateral to the movement hand (S4 [-13, -46, 24], peak 258 ms), while 
the other source was located ipsilateral to the hand (S5 [39, -40, 39], peak 550 ms). 
The grand-average model was tested for all conditions, and the residual variances 
were similar in all conditions (all 23%, low-consequence 18%, medium-consequence 
11%, high-consequence 17%) (see B, in Figure 1). 
 
To evaluate the differences between the three scenario conditions, individual 
source waveforms for each were obtained using the grand-average model. The 
average source waveforms with time intervals showing statistically significant 
deviation (p < 0.05) between the different conditions are show in Figure 1. 
 
Scenario conditions were associated with statistically significant differences 
of source dipole amplitude in the S1 source (time interval: 100 ms to 240 ms), F (2, 
Emotional Influence                                                                   Chapter II 
 
30 
 
26) = 6.6, p = .005), with post-hoc tests showing that high-consequence scenarios (M 
= -8.38, SD = 45.52) resulted in a larger decrease in amplitude than low-
consequential ones (M = 12.41, SD = 25.23), F (1, 13) = 9.5, p = .009. Similar 
significant differences were observed at both lateral source dipoles (S2 & S3) located 
in the occipital lobe, when looking at later time intervals. In this case, amplitudes for 
the contralateral source dipole (S2) showed a significant difference (400 ms to 500 
ms), F (2, 26) = 17.4, p = .000, with post-hoc tests showing that high-consequence 
scenarios (M = 26.94, SD = 11.82) resulted in a slower decrease in amplitude than 
did low-consequence ones (M = 19.52, SD = 10.17), F (1, 13) = 20.8, p = .001). 
Similarly, amplitudes for the ipsilateral source dipole (S3) showed a significant 
difference (300ms to 500ms), F (2, 26) = 22.9, p = .000), with post-hoc tests 
showing that high-consequence scenarios (M = 30.74, SD = 19.81) resulted in a 
slower decrease in amplitude that did low-consequence ones (M = 9.72, SD = 15.88), 
F (1, 13) = 30, p = .000. 
 
Analysis for both source dipoles in the parietal lobe showed again significant 
differences between the scenarios conditions. There were statistically significant 
differences between the amplitudes recorded at the contralateral source (S4) (200 ms 
to 300 ms), F (2, 26) = 38.4, p = .000, with post-hoc tests showing that high- (M = 
92.99, SD = 51.84), F (1, 13) = 54.2, p = .000, as well as medium-consequence 
scenarios (M = 61.02, SD = 40.71), F (1, 13) = 19.2, p = .001, resulted in a larger 
increase in amplitude than low-consequence ones (M = 33.4, SD = 47.01). On the 
other hand, the ipsilateral source (S5) also showed significant differences between 
the amplitudes (290 ms to 390 ms), F (2, 26) = 15.3, p = .000, but these pointed 
towards a larger increase in amplitude for the low-consequence scenarios (M = 
23.19, SD = 14.24) than for the high-consequence ones (M = 2.71, SD = 18.31), F (1, 
13) = 23.9, p = .000). 
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Figure 1. Perception Components 
(A) Localisation of source dipoles shown schematically in the transparent glass brain. Short lines in 
each source indicate the orientation of the primary component of the respective regional source. 
Source labels: 1 = S1 Occipital Lobe; 2 = S2 Occipital Lobe; 3 = S3 Occipital Lobe; 4 = S4 Parietal 
Lobe; 5 = S5 Parietal Lobe. (B) Global field power (blue scale) and residual variance (red scale). (C) 
Source waveforms of source dipoles derived from the grand average data. Averages for each 
scenario condition overlaid (low-consequence = green; medium-consequence = blue; high-
consequence = red). Empty rectangles indicate statistically significant (p < .05) increase for source 
amplitudes in more consequential scenario conditions, while filled rectangles indicate statistically 
significant (p < .05) decrease for source amplitudes in more consequential ones. Numbers of source 
waveforms correspond to (A). 
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3.2 Decision Components 
3.2.1 Movement-related components 
For the analysis five regional source dipoles were fitted to describe the 3-
dimensional source currents contributing to the data (see A, in Figure 2). One source 
was located in the cingulate cortex (S1 [-8, -25, 37]), peaking at -313 ms before the 
decision was. Two other sources were located in the parietal lobe. One source was 
located contralateral to the movement hand (S2 [-28, -34, 64], peak -65 ms), while 
the other source was located ipsilateral to the movement (S3 [13, -84, 42], peak 156 
ms). Two more ipsilateral sources were identified, one located in the frontal lobe (S4 
[55, 29, 27], peak 225 ms), and a last one located in the ventral posterior lobe (S5 
[34, -82, -23], peak 102 ms). Again, the grand average model was tested for all 
conditions, and the residual variances were similar in all conditions (all 18%, no-
emotion 25%, low-emotion 25%, high-emotion 21%) (see B, in Figure 2). 
 
To evaluate the differences between the three scenario conditions, individual 
source waveforms for each were obtained using the grand average model. The 
average source waveforms with time intervals showing statistically significant 
deviation (p < 0.05) between the different conditions are show in Figure 2. Analysis 
of the selected Bereitschaftspotential parameters was performed, using a three-way 
ANOVA for repeated measures. The focus was on particular time intervals, prior to 
the participants’ voluntary movements, identifying their commitment to a particular 
choice through movement-related potentials (see C, in Figure 2). 
 
For source S1, scenario conditions were associated with statistically 
significant differences of source dipole amplitude for two separate time intervals. An 
early interval (-850 ms to -750 ms) showed a significant difference between the 
source amplitudes, F (2, 26) = 4.7, p = .018, with post-hoc tests showing that the 
low-consequence scenarios (M = 23.58, SD = 22.01) resulted in larger increase in 
amplitudes than did high- (M = 8.39, SD = 19.22), F (1, 13) = 9, p = .010, or 
medium-consequence ones (M = 9.02, SD = 17.34), F (1, 13) = 5.1, p = .042. A later 
interval (-350 ms to -250 ms) also showed a significant difference between the 
source amplitudes, F (2, 26) = 5.1, p = .013, with post-hoc tests showing again that 
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low-consequence scenarios (M = 34.05, SD = 33.43) resulted in larger increase in 
amplitudes than did high- (M = 17.71, SD = 25.86), F (1, 13) = 7.8, p = .015, or 
medium-consequence ones (M = 14.85, SD = 32.46), F (1, 13) = 5.6, p = .035. 
 
For the source in the contralateral parietal lobe (S2), we selected two 
overlapping time intervals, to analyse the differences between conditions. An early 
interval (-450 ms to -200 ms) showed a significant difference between the source 
amplitudes, F (2, 26) = 9.5, p = .001, with post-hoc tests showing that the high- (M = 
8.9, SD = 14.07), F (1, 13) = 11.1, p = .005, and medium-consequence ones (M = 
10.63, SD = 14.11), F (1, 13) = 12.3, p = .004, resulted in larger increase in 
amplitudes than did the low-consequence ones (M = -2.17, SD = 12.18). A later 
interval (-350 ms to -100 ms) also showed a significant difference between the 
source amplitudes, F (2, 26) = 6.9, p = .004, with post-hoc tests showing that the 
high- (M = 12.4, SD = 16.54), F (1, 13) = 8.5, p = .012, and medium-consequence 
ones (M = 12.67, SD = 16.61), F (1, 13) = 10.2, p = .007, resulted in larger increase 
in amplitudes than did the low-consequence ones (M = 0.97, SD = 11.3). On the 
other hand, analysis for the source in the ipsilateral parietal lobe (S3) at the time 
interval (-220ms to -120) around the pre-movement peak amplitude at -170 ms, 
showed that there was no significant difference between the three scenario 
conditions in this particular location. 
 
When looking at the source located in the frontal lobe (S4), we again 
identified two separate time intervals. An early interval (-450 ms to -350 ms) showed 
a significant difference between the source amplitudes, F (2, 26) = 4.5, p = .02, with 
post-hoc tests showing that the high-consequence scenarios (M = 7.01, SD = 8.31) 
resulted in larger increase in amplitudes than the non-emotional ones (M = -6.5, SD 
= 17.63), F (1, 13) = 7.4, p = .018. A later interval (-300 ms to -150 ms) showed no 
significant difference between the source amplitudes for the three scenario 
conditions. The last source we looked at was located in the in the ventral posterior 
lobe (cerebellum) (S5), and analysis on a wider time interval (-480 ms to -280 ms) 
showed that there were no significant differences between the amplitudes for the 
different scenario conditions. 
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Figure 2. Movement Components 
(A) Localisation of source dipoles shown schematically in the transparent glass brain. Short lines in each source 
indicate the orientation of the primary component of the respective regional source. Source labels: 1 = S1 
Cingulate Cortex; 2 = S2 Parietal Lobe; 3 = S3 Parietal Lobe; 4 = S4 Frontal Lobe; 5 = S5 Posterior Lobe. (B) 
Global field power (blue scale) and residual variance (red scale). (C) Source waveforms of source dipoles derived 
from the grand average data. Averages for each scenario conditions overlaid (low-consequence= green; medium-
consequence = blue; high-consequence = red). Empty rectangles indicate statistically significant (p < .05) 
increase for source amplitudes in more consequential scenario conditions, while filled rectangles indicate 
statistically significant (p < .05) decrease for source amplitudes in more consequential ones. Numbers of source 
waveforms correspond to (A). 
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3.2.2 Reaction Times 
When analysing the recorded reaction times, the scenario conditions were 
associated with statistically significant differences (F (2, 26) = 5, p = .015), with 
times for high-consequence scenarios (M = 804.48, SD = 201.16) being significantly 
slower than those recorded for medium- (M = 876.73, SD = 186.49), F (1, 13) = 12, 
p = .004, r = 0.69, and low-consequence ones (M = 904.99, SD = 202.97), F (1, 13) 
= 7.1, p = .019, r = 0.59. Results showed an overall tendency, where the more 
consequential a presented scenario was, the faster individuals made a decision about 
their choice of wire to cut. The results for the differences in reaction times were 
overlaid with the significant differences in amplitudes observed for two of the 
movement-related sources (see Figure 3). The time differences were of less than 100 
ms, with deviations of around 200 ms, which pointed to a very narrow margin of 
difference between the reaction times for all three conditions. 
 
When looking at the movement-component located in the parietal lobe (S2), 
the graph showed an inverse trend for the waveform amplitudes in comparison to the 
reaction times (see A, in Figure 3). While individuals recorded faster times as the 
consequentiality of the scenarios increased, the recorded activity showed a 
significant increase in amplitudes for both consequence scenarios, in both selected 
time intervals. 
 
On the other hand, when looking at the movement-component located in the 
cingulate cortex (S1), the graph showed a similar trend for the waveform amplitudes 
when compared to the reaction times (see B, in Figure 3). As individuals recorded 
faster times with the increase of consequentiality in the scenarios, the recorded 
activity showed a significant decrease in amplitudes for both scenarios, again in both 
selected time intervals. 
 
The last movement-component overlaid was the one located in the frontal 
lobe (S4), for which the graph again showed an inverse trend for the waveform’s 
amplitudes in comparison to the reaction times (see C, in Figure 3). While 
individuals recorded faster times as the consequentiality of the scenarios increased, 
the recorded activity showed a significant increase in amplitudes for both scenarios 
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in both the early time intervals. The late interval did not show a significant 
difference between the conditions. 
 
3.3 Ratings 
Further, to look at the relationship between the different scenario conditions 
and the various measures taken, correlations were carried out based on the 
individuals’ picture ratings. Ratings were significantly different across all 
participants, for both the measure of how emotional they perceived the scenario to be 
(F (2, 26) = 74.6, p = .000), as well as how affected they would have felt if they 
made a wrong decision (F (2, 26) = 110.7, p = .000). For the emotionality ratings, 
results showed that, overall, the images were classed into the specific scenarios as 
predicted. Also, in terms of the affect ratings, the results revealed that the high-
consequence scenarios were given a significantly higher emotionality rating (M = 
6.39, SD = 1.12) than the medium- (M = 2.83, SD = 0.69) and low-consequential 
ones (M = 2.02, SD = 0.99), F (1, 13) = 444.5, p = .000). It should be noted, that 
although the analysis pointed to a significant difference between the medium- and 
low-consequential scenarios, both mean scores were very similar, with an 
overlapping standard deviation. 
 
3.4 Attitude Scales 
 The scales used have been development with them aim of looking at traits 
relating to decision delay and inertia, as well as impulsivity in choice making. In 
pairing the different scales – Need for Closure with Assessment and Impulsivity with 
Locomotion – we aimed at testing their complimentary assumptions as applied to our 
decision task, in line with our above-mentioned assumptions around the Somatic 
Marker hypothesis and the added pressures around uncertainty. Overall, the goal was 
to link known traits with variations in response times, as expected through task-
related pressures and emotional factors. Analysis for these showed that despite the 
established nature of the scales, the scores did not provide an additional measure to 
look at individual differences. 
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Figure 3. Interaction graph; overlaying the trends for recorded response times (blue lines), with the trends recorded for the waveform amplitudes at the different 
source locations, for each of the three scenario conditions. (A) Trends for S2, located in the parietal lobe, for the early (red line) and late (green line) time intervals. 
(B) Trends for S1, located in the cingulate cortex, for the early (red line) and late (green line) time intervals. (C) Trends for S4, located in the frontal lobe, for the early 
(red line) and late (green line) time intervals. The scale for the response times (in ms) was given on the left y-axis, while the scale for both waveform amplitudes 
sources (in µV) was given on the right y-axis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
> Reaction Times 
> S2.1 (-450 to -200)  
> S2.2 (-350 to -100) 
 
> S1.1 (-850 to -750)  
> S1.2 (-350 to -250) 
 
> S4.1 (-450 to -350)  
> S4.2 (-300 to -150)* 
* Not significant 
Emotional Influence                                                                   Chapter II 
 
38 
 
 
4. DISCUSSION 
 
 Based on a simplified forced-choice decision-making paradigm it was 
possible to identify differences in cognitive processing based on consequential 
variations, following on from propositions based on the decision-making phases. 
Further, results showed that individuals’ responses, when lacking any meaningful 
information, were affected significantly by the operational environment they were 
faced with, resulting in redundant deliberation and decision delay. 
 
The analysis showed that the recorded amplitude waveforms at the decision 
stage of the experiment pointed to a difference in activity between the scenario 
conditions, proposing cognitive activity relating to deliberation and implementation 
processes. For the purpose of the discussion, first we focus on the basic visual and 
cognitive processing at the initial stage where individuals received contextual 
information about their operational environment. The second part then describes the 
basic decision-making phases proposed in the 3-stage model, retracing differences in 
cognitive and behavioural activity and finally, we discuss the extent to which it was 
possible to link the EEG results with our behavioural measure (reaction time). 
 
4.1 Perception-related components 
 
In the recordings for the first part of the experiment, three sources were 
identified, which described essentially visual-processing-related potentials. While 
the sources presented similarities with traditional activation patterns (Coles & Rugg, 
1995; Hillyard & Picton, 1987), it was impossible to draw any meaningful 
conclusions with increased activation as a function of the affective significance of an 
item (Phelps, 2006; Vuilleumier & Driver, 2007; Padmala & Pessoa, 2008). This 
was due to the lack of control recordings for the images used, to assess their base 
activation, as compared to the recordings when used as contextual information for 
the particular scenarios. 
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 In relation to this, it is important to highlight that the images used for the 
more consequential scenarios were characterised by more complex visual 
information. This would be a clear explanation for the stronger activation in those 
conditions, seeing as no base-line activation was recorded for all three scenario 
conditions without the contextual information. This did not affect the overall validity 
of the design, but adds a caveat to any conclusions drawn solely from perception-
related components at this stage of the decision-making paradigm. 
 
4.2 Movement-related components & response times 
  
The recordings for the second part of the experiment were aimed at 
identifying individual decision-related components, as well as the variations in brain 
activity for each of the scenario conditions, following on from the proposed 3-stage 
model. The individual’s decision was identified with regards to their choice of a 
wire. Since the focus was on the making of a decision, not which wire, these 
recordings provided a base-line from which to assess any variations in cognitive as 
well as behavioural activity. 
 
Implementation Delay 
 
 The first source identified at this decision stage was located in the mid-
cingulate cortex (S1), which has been related to emotional processing in the brain 
(Devinski, Morrell, & Vogt, 1995; Paus, 2001; Vogt, 2005). Results here showed 
larger waveform amplitudes across both time intervals for the low-consequential 
scenarios. This pointed to a more prolonged activation and stronger emotional 
engagement for these scenarios, than for the high consequence ones. The mid-
cingulate cortex, typically associated with attention (Paus, Petrides, Evans, & Meyer, 
1993; Petersen, Fox, Posner, Mintum, & Raichle, 1989), showed in this case that the 
low-consequence scenarios generated more attentional activity. This finding, perhaps 
counter intuitively, appears to show that low-consequence scenarios result in 
stronger and prolonged activation in the cingulate cortex, but when taking into 
consideration the recordings for response times, a more complex picture emerges. 
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 The response times showed that individuals made significantly quicker 
decisions in the high consequence conditions (as opposed to low and medium) as 
soon as they were prompted with the choice of the two wires. These differences were 
less than 100 ms, showing deviations of around 200 ms, which narrowed the 
confidence with which clear conclusions can be drawn. Nonetheless, this meant that 
the recordings for the high-consequence scenarios covered a shorter time-frame 
when faced with the two wires, before individuals made a movement to commit to 
their decision. Thus, the heightened activity occurred milliseconds later for the low-
consequence conditions; a fact which was masked by the current visualisation, as the 
overlaid waves gave a skewed picture. This correction showed then, that even if they 
spent less time on the particular stimuli (i.e. the two wires), activity during this short 
time still showed a strong increase. A further indication for this was clear from the 
steep rise for both medium- and high-consequence conditions, just prior to making a 
decision, and the very similar peaks that all three scenarios reached at that time 
interval. The same levels of activity were reached for the low-consequence scenarios 
at the moment when individuals made a choice, but were reached over a longer 
period of time. During this time individuals observed the two wires and deliberated 
over which one to choose, reaching the threshold at which time individuals made a 
choice. This switch was reflected in the parietal lobe (S2), where the movement-
related components were taken as indicators of a shift from the deliberation to the 
implementation stage. 
 
Individuals spent less time deliberating in the high consequence conditions, 
and reached the same peak level when making a decision. A potential explanation for 
this relates to the performance pressures placed on the task, as the time-pressure and 
accuracy-demands were reinforced throughout the experiment. Individuals were 
quick to move to a resolution in the high-consequence condition, and were already 
priming themselves for action when given the prompt to select one of the two wires. 
Thus, the activity in the mid-cingulated cortex (S1) did not reflect the intensity of 
activity induced by the more emotional conditions, but rather how much time was 
invested in the deliberation process (MacDonald, Cohen, Stenger, & Carter, 2000; 
Kuo, Sjöström, Chen, Wang, & Huang, 2009). There was less time expended for the 
highly consequential scenarios, trying to assess the choices and re-consider the 
decision plan (strategy), probably because individuals were under higher pressure 
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(i.e. more negative consequence). This would see the longer deliberation for the low-
consequence scenarios as a process of re-assessment of their choice within this 
source area, as they did not feel pressured by the scenario condition or the time 
constrains. The opposite was observed for the high-consequence scenarios, where the 
presentation (i.e. visualisation) of the stimuli immediately could have reinforced the 
emotion and time pressures, thus leading to a faster response, in order to reach a 
quicker resolution, without prolonged deliberation. 
 
 Another factor contributing towards this idea emerged from recordings for 
the source located in the contralateral parietal lobe (S2), which has been directly 
linked to activity around planning, preparation and movement (Passingham, 1996; 
Ball, Schreiber, Feige, Wagner, Lücking, & Kristeva-Feige, 1999). Results here 
showed that waveform amplitudes for high consequence scenarios were significantly 
larger than for low-consequence ones. This was observed across two time intervals, 
pointing to (i) earlier and (ii) more prolonged activation. Thus, individuals in the 
high-consequence conditions may have moved earlier from a deliberative to an 
implementative mindset, as shown in an earlier activation of the movement-related 
areas. 
 
The focus was on movement-related potentials, which have been shown to 
appear as negative shifts prior to the movement over the primary sensorimotor areas 
(Kornhuber & Deecke, 1965; Deecke, Scheid, & Kornhuber, 1969; Kristeva, Keller, 
Deecke, & Kornhuber, 1979). Considering the fast response times for some of the 
conditions, the emphasis was also on the negative slope (NS’), observed as the 
steepest part of the negative shift, starting at 500 ms prior to the onset of muscular 
contraction (Shibasaki et al., 1980). It was clear from the analysis that these 
potentials were in line with previous models, showing significantly larger amplitudes 
for the high-consequence scenario within the intervals after the recognised 500 ms 
for the NS’. This pointed to an earlier onset of the Bereitschaftspotential for the 
medium- and high-consequence scenarios, resulting also in a more prolonged 
activity period for these conditions. Thus, individuals were already prepared to make 
their choice, before they were presented with the two wires. 
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Furthermore, analysis of the ipsilateral source within the parietal lobe (S3), 
showed no significant differences between the identified potentials for the three 
scenario conditions. This was again in line with findings relating to the 
Bereitschaftspotential, as principally observed over the primary sensorimotor area, 
contralateral to the movement and over the supplementary motor area (Kornhuber & 
Deecke, 1965; Neshige, Lüders, & Shibasaki, 1988; Tarkka & Hallett, 1990; Bötzel, 
Plendl, Paulus, & Scherg, 1993). These observations contrasted with results for the 
source located in the cingulate cortex. Analysis considering the 
Bereitschaftspotential pointed towards an early onset of activity, directly relating to 
the commitment to a choice, identified as the preparation for a voluntary movement. 
When taking into consideration the response times, results showed that the 
individuals engaged in decision deliberation earlier (i.e. even before the wires 
appeared on screen) when faced with high-consequence scenarios. This does not 
necessarily directly point to the identification of a clear and discrete decision stage, 
as individuals possibly spent time deliberating about their options - as seen in 
activity for the cingulate cortex - before even moving on to preparation, planning and 
commitment to a choice. Nevertheless, these differences pointed to significantly 
stronger cognitive activity when deliberating about committing to a choice for the 
scenarios with more critical consequences (i.e. S2). Further, increase in activity for 
these scenarios (i.e. S1) reached a similar peak as the low-consequence one, over a 
much shorter period of time. This pointed to an accelerated activation and 
heightened consideration in terms of emotionally significant factors relating to those 
scenario conditions. 
  
In order to confirm these propositions, subsequent research should be 
directed at detailing expectations for the interaction of the deliberation- and 
implementation-related activity. One possibility would involve presenting both 
stimuli at the same time, merging the individually-observed stages. Results, 
following the proposed reasoning, would show even shorter deliberation and a faster 
switch to implementation for the medium- and high-consequence scenarios, as the 
urgency is heightened even more, thus pushing individuals to making ever-faster 
decisions. This would be reflected in even lower and shorter activity in this source 
area, where the reinforcement of the negative consequences would lead to even 
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greater cognitive ‘blindness’ (i.e. lack of deliberation and re-consideration of 
choice). 
 
Redundant Deliberation 
 
The aim of this study was to trace the cognitive processing during each 
decision stage, combining both deliberation and implementation, and to establish 
whether individuals engaged in redundant deliberation, influenced by contextual task 
factors. A central feature of the task was that there was no information provided to 
aid the evaluation of the options. Interestingly, the individuals still spent more time 
deliberating in one scenario condition than in the other. These observations pointed 
back to issues around frame- and mind-set shifting (Gollwitzer et al., 1990) even 
though deliberation between alternatives was futile, since there was no discernible 
difference between the prescribed choices. Further, the propositions regarding 
emotional information and the SMH (Damasio, 1994) did not hold up in this 
particular paradigm, seeing as the low-emotional scenarios resulted in longer 
deliberating; details of which will be expanded on below. Ideas surrounding possible 
reasons have been suggested above, but some propositions regarding response 
suppression and possible set-shifting activity were raised at hand of significant 
activity in the prefrontal lobe (S4). 
 
 
 One more source, located in the frontal lobe (S4), pointed to the relationship 
this brain area has with decision-making and problem-solving (Bechara, Damasio, 
Damasio, & Anderson, 1994; Kringlebach, 2005; Mesulam, 2003; Stuss & Levine, 
2002), and more recently with intuitive judgements (Volz, Rübsamen, & von 
Cramon, 2008). Results showed activation in the high-consequence scenarios, while 
an active suppression was recorded for the low-consequence ones. These differences 
did not hold up at the later time intervals closer to the commitment to a choice. 
Further, the peak amplitudes for all scenario conditions at this source occurred 250 
ms after the decision was made, which pointed to an activation relating to the 
outcome expectation and consequential thinking (Baird & Fugelsang, 2004; den 
Ouden, Frith, Frith, & Blakemore, 2005), as it was in the time-frame before they 
received feedback about their decision. 
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 One proposed explanation for the activity, prominently observed in the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), related to participants’ consideration of 
other solutions and strategies. Especially the right DLPFC has been related to set-
frame shifting (Rausch, 1977), while also being responsible for inhibiting one’s 
immediate response (Vanderhasselt, De Raedt, Baeken, Leyman, & D’haenen, 
2006). Activation of the same area has been found to enhance the capacity or 
tendency of individuals to suppress tempting responses (Duncan & Owen, 2000), 
while it has also been found to curb risk taking (Fecteau, Knoch, Fregni, Sultani, 
Boggio, & Pascual-Leone, 2007). All of these processes would be directly related to 
individuals’ considerations about which wire to select, inhibiting the immediate 
response to the alternatives presented. The results showed that activity was 
significantly stronger for the high-consequence conditions, while recordings for the 
low-consequence ones showed suppressing activity. This was in direct opposition to 
conclusions drawn based on the previous sources (S1 & S2), as this pointed to a 
deliberative engagement with the high-consequence scenario, even though, as 
pointed out earlier, the activity observed in this area was relatively small in 
comparison. 
 
 Clearly, no direct conclusions were possible based on activity within this 
source. Research has repeatedly highlighted the difficulty of isolating activity in the 
prefrontal cortex, due to the complex connectivity with the sensory and motor 
cortices, as well as the limbic system (Miller & Cohen, 2001). Miller and Cohen’s 
approach describes the ‘cognitive control’ within the PFC, as applied to any situation 
where a biasing signal is used to promote task-appropriate responding and regulate 
corresponding inhibition. Part of this control also pointed to the attention given to 
the task, differentiating between the voluntary, goal-oriented attentional shift, and 
involuntary, stimulus-dependent shift (Sohn, Ursu, Anderson, Stenger, & Carter, 
2000). In this case, expecting a goal-oriented shift, as the type of information is still 
delivered through stimuli with similar characteristics, but the focus changes from 
prioritising accuracy to prioritising speed.  
 
 Based on this particular sub-region, acknowledging the complexity of the 
PFC, none of the propositions accurately described the activity observed during the 
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current decision paradigm. Nonetheless, the results provided some grounds on which 
to expand on particular substrates of the activity, in order to isolate its relationship 
with the particular decision-making task and the key characteristics influencing the 
problem-solving processes. A more specific experiment, focusing on specific 
performance goals, would allow for a more confident identification. But it is 
important to highlight, that the DLPFC has been identified as playing a key role 
when solving ill-structured problem tasks (Gilbert, Zamenopoulos, Alexiou, & 
Johnson, 2010), as well as being key for integrating events over time (Fuster, 2001) 
and being essential in the timing of duration (Jones, Rosenkranz, Rothwell, & 
Jahanshahi, 2004); all of which are processes expected to feature prominently within 
this particular decision-making paradigm. 
 
4.3 Emotions 
  
When considering how the emotional variations – lower or higher 
consequence – were reflected in the cognitive processing during the decision making 
process, a number of congruent observations emerged between this study and the 
available literature. 
 
Analysis showed that the high-consequence conditions had an effect on a 
number of processes identified in various sources, which links directly to proposals 
from the area of affective neuroscience, about a number of mental operations and 
specific neural substrates directly linked to the perception of emotional information 
(Davidson & Sutton, 1995). In terms of value placed on each scenario condition and 
the consequential information, findings were in line with propositions based on an 
emotional-motivational system (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1990; 1992), pitting 
approach-activating and aversion-activating conditions against each other, as a 
continuation from traditional conditioning literature (Konoroski, 1976). Furthermore, 
variations in cognitive load (i.e. problems with greater difficulty, engagement or 
distraction) have been correlated with larger waveform amplitudes in EEG 
(recordings) for cognitive indices (Stevens, Galloway, & Berka, 2007). This was 
replicated in this study, where the high-consequence scenario resulted in greater 
cognitive loading. 
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More directly relating to source localisation, especially the frontal lobe (S4), 
findings here replicated previous research, which showed greater right frontal 
activity during negative emotion images (Davidson, Ekman, Saron, Senulis, & 
Friesen, 1990). Further, in line with findings showing frontal activity to reflect 
approach-withdrawal motivation (Harmon-Jones, 2003), expectations of more 
activity for those scenarios that would like to be avoided by individuals were again 
fulfilled within this research. 
 
Overall, the advances in neuroanatomical frameworks have continued to 
provide physiological evidence for the ideas of interoceptive states (Damasio, 1994; 
Craig, 2008). Based on these particular results, clear observations emerged around 
the effect emotional variations can have on cognitive decision-making processes. 
While results for response times showed a heightened urgency for the medium- and 
high-consequence scenarios, more in-depth observations into cognitive activity also 
pointed to earlier and more prolonged deliberation for these conditions. The main 
difference seemed to emerge when individuals were faced with the actual choice 
they had to make, resulting in an increase in cognitive activity over a short period of 
time, in which the threshold to make a decision was reached early quicker for the 
more emotional scenarios. In the simplest of terms, using emotions to anticipate 
feelings in order to “control our behaviour towards a maximisation of positive 
emotions and a minimisation of negative ones” (Hardy-Vallée, 2007; p. 945), 
individuals were driven by the desire to resolve the problem quicker in some of the 
more emotional scenario conditions. 
 
Results showed that the priming in both parts of the experiment, visual 
perception and decision prompt, contributed to a heightened level of preparedness 
for the more consequential scenarios. This was highlighted by the recordings for the 
visual response and movement readiness, leading to an accelerated response in the 
more consequential scenarios (Pessoa, 2008). Individuals were more pre-occupied 
with making speedy decisions, rather than correct ones, as they were possibly 
overwhelmed by the scenario and felt the task was not solvable based on their 
strategies. On the other hand, they spent a slightly longer time deliberating about 
their choice in the low-consequential scenarios. One possibility might have related, 
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as already pointed out above, to the perceived solvability of the task and the shifting 
performance pressure from speed to accuracy. 
 
In combination, considering the results for both stages within the experiment, 
the observations gathered provide further contribution to the understanding of the 
effect situational and emotional factors have on fundamental decision-making 
processing. In both cases, the results further contributed to the task of identifying 
these experimentally, combining previous research around the effect of emotions on 
cognitive processing (Oatley et al., 2006) and their effect on decision making 
(Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003). 
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
 Following on from established ideas around the effect of emotions on 
cognitive processing, results here allowed the identification of isolated activity, 
which was to some extent affected by these manipulations. From the basic task of 
recognising operational settings (evaluation), to the more complex processes relating 
to deliberation and implementation of a choice, results in this study showed that 
emotions had a significant relationship with and influence on brain activity, in terms 
of amplitude as well as duration. While higher consequence scenarios resulted in 
stronger and prolonged activation, behavioural responses did not show a reflection of 
this activity in the form of delay in making a decision, and indeed the opposite was 
found when compared to the other conditions.  
 
The study also confirmed that, even in the absence of information on which 
to base a decision choice, individuals engaged in deliberative processes. Still, the 
study provided a clear identification of the different variations for the particular task, 
providing a basis for further more complex manipulations, in order to recognise 
stronger affecting factors in similar operational environments. Subsequent studies are 
aimed at identifying the factors influencing the differing deliberation processes, 
before moving on to the interaction these have with decision delay. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter III 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Feedback Influence 
 
Experiment 2 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In Experiment 1 (see Chapter II), results pointed to differences in brain 
activity during the deliberation phase, before moving to the implementation of a 
decision. Individuals had time to think about what choice to make, before being 
prompted to commit to one. This activity was expected to be stronger for the more 
emotional conditions, as these conditions amplified concern and anxiety experienced 
through the expectation of a more negative consequence, which in turn raised 
participants’ readiness to quickly make a decision. Conversely, less deliberation and 
implementation activity was expected for the non-emotional conditions, as 
individuals were less concerned and pressured by the outcome. 
 
 Contrary to expectations, individuals showed less deliberation activity during 
the more consequential task conditions, than during the low-consequence ones; while 
implementation activity was still stronger and more prolonged during the emotional 
conditions. This was interpreted as individuals engaging in longer deliberative 
processes for the low-consequence scenario conditions, while they moved quicker to 
an implementation stage for the emotional ones. Explanations in the experiment’s 
discussion pointed to the overlap of recordings, with the overlaying of brain activity 
on top of the reaction times showing a more dynamic picture of activity. 
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 One explanation for this difference between the various scenario conditions 
related to the individual’s commitment to the task and focus on certain performance 
pressures. Observations pointed to individuals giving up on solving the task, due to 
the perceived insolvability of the decision paradigm, as they rather focused on 
making quick decisions, to reach a faster resolution. This occurred considerably more 
for the more consequential scenarios, due to the negative consequences of these 
scenarios. This shift in effort and engagement was strongly influenced by the design 
of the decision problem and the instructions provided, aimed at increasing the 
performance pressures. Individuals simply lost confidence about being able to make 
the correct choice (accuracy), leading them to just focus on making choices quickly 
(speed). 
 
 Once accounting for this shift, the most surprising observation related to the 
activity leading up to the decisions in the non-emotional scenario conditions. 
Individuals engaged in deliberative processes, even in situations where there was no 
information available upon which to base judgement and preferential choice. The 
goal at this stage was to identify the reason for the differences observed between the 
scenario conditions. It was possible that the difference was related to individuals’ 
perception of solvability and active engagement with the decision task, as influenced 
by the feedback they received (Henson, Rugg, Shallice, & Dolan, 2000).  
 
Following on from the same decision-paradigm, participants’ perceived 
accuracy was manipulated during the task. The idea was that, by presenting 
individuals with more or less positive/negative feedback on their choices, it was 
possible to influence how strongly they engaged with the task, as they gained a better 
idea about the solvability of the problem. These propositions followed on from 
findings around the effect of mood described in other decision tasks (de Vries, 
Holland, & Witteman, 2008), as a significant influence on performance. Similarly, 
especially when combining the pressures of making decisions in high-risk scenarios 
and the repeated failure to make the correct choice, the notion of heightened 
anticipated regret (Zeelenberg, van Dijk, Manstead, & van der Pligt, 2000) come to 
the forefront and is expected to possibly affect the task performance. 
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All of these variations were aimed at engaging the individual more with the 
task, raising or lowering the level of (perceived) solvability. The prediction was that 
this engagement would result in extended deliberation with the task, providing a 
longer window of observable activity, showing significant differences for emotional 
scenarios, due to the added complexity and negative outcome. This experiment 
focused on reaction times (behavioural) and a qualitative insight, expanding on ideas 
around confidence, and the effect of positive and negative reinforcement, as provided 
through feedback. 
 
 
1.1 Objectives and Hypotheses 
 
 The goal was to further identify the factors influencing performance in the 
decision paradigm, in order to answer the questions raised in Experiment 1. A 
slightly amended version of the decision paradigm was used, focusing on varying the 
number of correct and incorrect responses participants made. This was done in order 
to assess the effect feedback and the perceived confidence in their ability to solve the 
task had on their performance on the task, based on behavioural and self-reflective 
measures. The following objectives were also considered:  
 
> Guided by their overwhelming positive or negative feedback, participants in 
such groups will produce faster response times. 
 
> Participants receiving a similar number of positive and negative feedback to 
their choices, will produce longer response times. 
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2. METHOD 
 
2.1 Participants 
 
Fifteen individuals (12 females, 3 males) participated in this study. They 
ranged in ages from 18 to 39 years, with a mean age of 21 years, and were drawn 
from a sample of students at the University of Liverpool. Participants were split into 
three equal groups, consisting of 5 individuals each. Each group was assigned a level 
of low, medium and high feedback, based on the experimental conditions they 
completed. 
 
 
2.2 Procedure 
 
Participants were seated in a comfortable chair, inside a dim-lit room, and 
were left alone to complete the experiment. All task-related information was 
presented to them on a computer screen, and they used a mouse placed below their 
hand to give their responses. 
 
The experiment consisted of a series of decision situations, at the end of each 
individuals were asked to make a choice between two random alternatives under time 
pressure. The task consisted of a ‘bomb scenario’, where participants were asked to 
imagine themselves operating in the various environments pictured and where the 
objective was to ‘cut’ a wire and disarm a bomb. Following this, they faced a 
decision stage and had to choose between two alternatives, in the form of two 
different-coloured wires (see Table 1) (failing to cut one of the wires sufficiently 
quickly led to automatic ‘detonation’). The basic premise of the decision problem 
focused on a binary negative outcome paradigm, where participants had to choose 
between two arbitrary alternatives, not knowing which would be the correct wire - 
reinforced through time constrains and performance pressures - and  where a ‘wrong’ 
decision lead to a negative outcome. 
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First, they were presented with a context-setting scenario involving either: 
 
(i) a light-bulb, which they had to switch off by picking a wire (low 
consequence condition), 
(ii) an industrial courtyard, in which the wires were used to disarm a bomb 
(medium consequence condition), or 
(iii) children on a playground, in which the wires were used to disarm a bomb 
(high consequence condition). 
 
In summary then, the stimulus indicated one of three conditions: 1) low consequence, 
2) medium consequence, and 3) high consequence. This was followed by an image of 
a light switch (low consequence condition) or explosive device (medium- and high-
consequence conditions), to reinforce the situational context. Finally participants 
were prompted to choose between a red or blue wire ‘connected’ to the particular 
device. Failure to make a decision or making a wrong one, led to detonation of the 
device. Following each choice, they received feedback in the form of a “CORRECT” 
or “INCORRECT” on-screen message. 
 
The instructions, prior and during the experiment, all emphasised the need to 
take quick and decisive action. Participants were told that they would be assessed on 
their accuracy as well as their speed, forming part of an overall learning task. What 
participants did not know, was that the order and number of correct or incorrect 
decisions was set prior to the experiment, and they had no influence on the decision 
task. This was done in order to assess, if in the absence of any information and clear 
solution, participants still deliberated about their decision. Despite having no control 
and no clear pattern in the results, the most rational suggestion would lead to just 
cutting any wire, as there is no preferential value assigned to either. 
 
 A total of 60 stimuli series were presented in three blocks. At the end of each 
block, participants were presented with a brief 8-item questionnaire to assess their 
experience so far. The three experiment groups differed in the type of feedback they 
received, between the low, medium or high conditions. This related to the percentage 
of positive or negative feedback they received about their decisions, separated 
respectively into 20%, 50% or 80% positive. 
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Table 1. Decision Paradigm 
STAGE  Evaluation Deliberation Choice  
STIMULI Mask Context Device Decision Feedback 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRECT 
or 
INCORRECT  
or 
TOO SLOW 
TIME 2,000ms  2,000ms  2,000ms  3,000ms  1,500ms 
	  
The decision scenarios were designed using Inquisit (Millisecond Software 
v3.0.4, Seattle – USA), and recordings for each participant’s response times were 
taken at each decision stage. 
 
2.3 Measures 
 
 The main measure for this experiment described the time (in milliseconds) it 
took participants to make a decision, once they were presented with the available 
alternatives. Further, they completed an 8-items questionnaire (see Appendix B) after 
each of the three blocks, where they responded to questions about their attitudes 
towards and experience of the experiment using a 10-point Likert scale. At the end of 
the experiment they completed a brief questionnaire (see Appendix C), which 
provided a qualitative description of their decision-making process and an overall 
perspective of the experience during the task. 
 
2.4 Analysis 
 
The effect of feedback on response time was assessed using an analysis of 
variance (ANOVA), where the recordings between the groups were compared for 
each of the scenario conditions. The independent variables for the analysis were the 
three different scenarios (low-, medium- and high-consequence), differentiating 
between the three feedback groups (low, medium and high). Pair-wise comparisons 
were carried out between the three scenarios, and a 95% confidence level was used 
throughout. Similar comparisons were carried out between the three different blocks 
Feedback Influence                                                                   Chapter III	  
56	  
	  
(Block A, Block B & Block C), to look at possible changes over time, and between 
the feedback groups, to look at the effectiveness of the manipulations. In addition to 
this, qualitative data was gathered from participants’ post-task questionnaires, to gain 
an insight into strategies and thought processes during the experiment. 
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3. RESULTS 
 
The results will detail the analysis of the experiment in three parts, with a 
fourth one providing some qualitative description based on the post-task 
questionnaire. First, the focus will be on assessing any possible repetition effect 
across the blocks of the experiment. Afterwards, the analysis will look at indicators 
for the effect the manipulations had on participants’ behavioural and attitudinal 
responses. Lastly, the analysis will compare the reaction times for the different 
feedback conditions and see how they reflected changes for the specific consequence 
scenario conditions. 
 
3.1 Repetition 
 
Results for the repeated measures ANOVA for the response times showed 
that there were some differences between the blocks in two of the consequence 
scenarios. On the other hand, repeated measures ANOVAs were also carried out for 
the various scale items completed between the different phases. These showed that 
there were no significant differences between the ratings given by the participants at 
the different points in time during the decision task. 
 
Considering that the sphericity assumptions were violated for the response 
times in some of the scenarios conditions (low- and medium-consequence), the large 
standard deviations recorded and the small samples sizes available for the attitude 
scales, the results showed an overall homogeneous distribution of response times and 
ratings over the three blocks. Despite some significant differences in some of the 
feedback conditions, it was still safe to say that overall there was no significant 
change in response times or scale ratings over time. This allowed for the collapsing 
of the three blocks and a more in-depth analysis of the response times for the 
different scenarios conditions across all three feedback groups. 
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3.2 Feedback Manipulation 
 
Before looking at the comparative analysis, it was important to assess the 
effectiveness of the feedback manipulations and the participants’ groupings. For this, 
response times and scale ratings were compared between the three feedback groups. 
 
Results for all three individual blocks (i.e. A, B & C) showed that there were 
no significant differences between the response times for each consequence 
condition (i.e. low, medium & high) when comparing them within the different 
feedback groups (i.e. low, medium & high). Further, taking into consideration the 
non-significant findings for the three different blocks, the same analysis was carried 
out with all of them collapsed together (see Table 3). 
 
Table 2. Mean (SD) response times for each feedback group in all three consequence 
conditions 
Consequence 
Scenario 
Feedback Group 
Low Medium High 
Low 926.35 (725.29) 914.02 (669.03) 796.76 (516.83) 
Medium 772.07 (521.04) 900.76 (596.62) 680.64 (377.14) 
High 773.30 (587.97) 851.82 (559.11) 674.3 (319.55) 
	  
The analysis showed that there were no significant differences between the response 
times for each individual consequence condition when compared between the 
different feedback groups. 
 
 For the scale ratings, analysis was carried out again on the blocks collapsed 
together, based on the findings above. Results here showed that there was a 
significant difference between most of the scale ratings, with exception of three of 
the items (see Table 4). Due to the distribution of the recorded data, a non-parametric 
Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA was carried out. 
 
Table 3. Median scale ratings across all three feedback groups 
Scale Item Feedback Group Analysis Low Medium High H (2) p 
% Correct 10 30 70 32.103 .000 * 
Concentrate 7 6 8 6.479 .035 * 
Solved 2 3 7 17.103 .000 * 
Strategy Rev. 6 5 7 2.312 .329 
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Stressed 8 5 4 13.204 .000 * 
Anxious 7 7 4 10.156 .004 * 
Quickly 7 6 8 4.2 .124 
Accurately 8 7 7 0.839 .657 
* Significant difference between the feedback groups, at p < .05. 
	  
Mann-Whitney tests were carried out to follow up on the significant findings, to 
identify where the differences were. A Bonferroni correction was applied and so all 
effects are reported at a .0167 level of significance. When asked about how many 
trials individuals thought they had answered correctly, there was a clear trend, with 
an increase from the low- to medium-feedback groups (U = 41, r = -0.56), and from 
the medium to high-feedback one (U = 10.5, r = -0.78). It appeared that individuals 
in the low-feedback group rated their concentration level higher than those in the 
medium-feedback one (U = 54.5, r = -0.45). On the other hand, results showed that 
individuals in the high-feedback group claimed to have solved the task when 
compared to those in the medium- (U = 21.5, r = -0.7) and low-feedback (U = 33.5, r 
= -0.6) groups. When it came to their experience of the task, individuals rated their 
stress level for the low-feedback condition higher than for the high-feedback one (U 
= 24, r = -0.65). Similarly, individuals in the low-feedback group also rated their 
anxiety significantly higher than those in the high-feedback one (U = 56.5, r = -0.43). 
 
 The results showed no uniform reflection of the feedback manipulation 
having a significant effect on the individual measures, for both the response times as 
well as the rating scales. Despite some individual scale items showing a significant 
change when considering the groupings, these did not follow a consistent trend 
throughout the task. Further, weaknesses relating to the small samples sizes and the 
distribution of the data, pointed to small or medium effect sizes in terms of variation 
accounted for. 
 
3.3 Response Times 
 
 Despite no clear confirmation of the feedback manipulation’s effectiveness 
when looking at the behavioural and attitudinal measures, comparative analyses were 
carried out between the response times for the different scenarios in each individual 
feedback group. 
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Results showed that there was no difference between the response times for 
the scenario conditions when looking at the individual low and medium feedback 
groups (see Table 5).  
 
Table 4. Mean (SD) response times for each consequence scenario in all three feedback 
groups 
Feedback 
Group 
Consequence Scenario Analysis 
Low Medium High F (2, 178) p 
Low 926.35 (725.29) 772.07 (521.04) 773.3 (587.97) 2.576 .079 
Medium 914.02 (669.03) 900.76 (596.62) 851.82 (559.12) 0.404 .668 
High 796.76 (516.83) 680.64 (377.14) 674.3 (319.55) 3.422 .035* 
*	  Significant	  difference	  between	  the	  consequence	  conditions,	  at	  p	  <	  .05.	  
 
On the other hand, there was a significant difference between the scenarios for the 
high feedback group, F (2, 178), = 3.422, p = .035. Analysis showed that response 
times for the low-consequence scenarios were significantly slower than for the 
medium-, F (1, 89) = 4.527, p = .036, and high-consequence ones, F (1, 89) = 4.656, 
p = .034 (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Mean response times for the three separate feedback groups in each individual 
consequence scenario 
	  
  
Considering the comparisons for the response times between the feedback 
conditions did not show any significant differences and the scale ratings did not show 
uniform differences across the groups, a further analysis was carried out between the 
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scenario conditions without accounting for the feedback grouping. Results showed 
that there was a significant difference between the consequence conditions, F (2, 
530) = 4.624, p = .010.  Comparisons showed that response times for the low-
consequence scenarios (M = 878.33, SD = 642.03) were significantly slower than 
those for the medium-consequence (M = 784.68, SD = 512.54), F (1, 265) = 5.238, p 
= .023, and high-consequence (M = 766.37, SD = 505.51), F (1, 265) = 7.375, p = 
.007, ones. 
 
 Response times for the high-consequence scenarios were still shorter than for 
the non-consequence ones, where feedback variations was not a contributing factor 
to variation between the groups. 
 
3.4 Task Questionnaire 
 
After completing the decision paradigm, participants filled out a post-task 
questionnaire. These responses provide a qualitative insight into the decision-making 
processes and individuals’ experience during the experiment, complementary to the 
behavioural measures.  
 
 When individuals were asked about particular strategy applied to solve the 
task (Q.2), there was some variation amongst the responses, reflecting a post-
experiment rationalising of their performance. Some in the low-feedback group 
stated they did not try any strategy, while others described some early attempts. All 
individuals applied some strategy in the medium-feedback group, even if some failed 
as the task progressed (“That didn’t work [...] I just went with my gutfeeling (sic).”). 
Similarly, all those in the high-feedback tried out a strategy, with some giving 
extended commentary and description of the process (“If a bomb =cut blue wire for 
people, cut red wire for buildings without people. If a switch, cut red wire for light, 
cut blue wire for sound.”). 
 
When asked if they reconsidered their choices at the very last moment (Q.4), 
individuals in the low-feedback group stated that they did not and simply guessed, as 
they had not settled on a successful strategy (“I ended up just guessing as I could not 
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figure out any form of strategy.”). Those in the medium-feedback group stated that 
they were insecure about their own strategy while they did not reconsider their 
choices (“I was doubting myself due to other answer being wrong.”), while those in 
the high-feedback group did not stop to reconsider, especially following negative 
feedback from previous choices (“Occasionally, because although my strategy 
worked most of the time, sometimes the blue/red wire would be incorrect.”).  
 
In terms of the time available and individuals’ focus on speed or accuracy, 
there was a general consensus across all three feedback groups. As reflected in the 
response times and the consistent scoring below the 3 seconds time-limit, all 
individuals made their decision within the given time frame. This was further 
reflected in their answers (Q.5 & Q.6), where they stated that accuracy was their 
main concern while completing the task and that more time would not have aided 
them in developing a more successful strategy. 
 
When asked about the solvability of the task, and how difficult they found it 
(Q.7), there was again a variation in the answers given by the three feedback groups. 
Those in the low-feedback group stated that it was not solvable, as they failed to gain 
meaningful information from their own performance, and thus resigned to guessing 
(“I was consciously looking for clues and feedback, but I did not find any and so my 
decisions were pretty random.”). Those in the medium-feedback group were unsure 
about the solvability or perceived difficulty of the task, reflecting on their own 
performance (“I can’t say it was or wasn’t too hard, because I’m not quite sure if my 
method of solving the task was good.”). Finally, those in the high-feedback group 
stated that the task was solvable, even if they admitted getting some of the decisions 
wrong. They highlighted that some of the decision scenarios seemed clearer than 
others, while others simply required more effort (“... I thought it was solvable as 
although some seemed straight forward others were more difficult... ”). 
 
 When asked about the correct solution (Q.8), most in the low-feedback group 
stated that they were unable to figure out the correct solution, with others stating that 
there was no right solution (“I got so many wrong that I thought [...] that in fact it 
was predetermined answers.”). All individuals in the medium-feedback group stated 
that they had no idea what the solution was, while those in the high-feedback one 
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suggested some theories about the task’s solution and some described complex 
strategies (“I looked at the colour in the pictures and tried to memorise each 
answer.”). 
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4. DISCUSSION 
 
 Aimed at identifying potential factors which affected performance in the 
forced-choice decision paradigm, the experiment looked at the possible effect 
perceptions of feedback for each consequence scenario have on performance. 
Focused on behavioural responses, the analysis looked in detail at the various phases 
of the experiment, before assessing the effect it had on the overall validity of the 
design. 
 
 While some differences were highlighted in terms of the repetition of the task 
and any possible issues relating to habituation, these were not consistent across the 
feedback and consequence conditions. There was an overall homogenous distribution 
of the scores between the different phases, with no significant variation over time, 
pointing to a consistent and prolonged engagement by the participants, as further 
reflected by the absence of change in their ratings. 
 
 The manipulations did have a clear effect on participants’ scale ratings, 
showing that those in the high-feedback condition indeed felt they had found the 
solution to the task. In contrast, those in the low- and medium-feedback groups stated 
feeling more stressed and anxious about the task, while they more often described 
frustration and re-assessment of their choices. The differences were present only in 
some of the ratings and no variation was observed when asked about their need to be 
accurate or quick in their decisions. Nonetheless, the manipulations did still reflect 
some expectations about the effect feedback would have on individuals’ ratings and 
task-descriptions. 
 
 When looking at the effect the feedback manipulations had on response times 
in each of the consequence scenarios, the results showed that they did not 
significantly affect individuals’ performance. Despite showing that the feedback did 
affect their perception of accuracy and their performance during the decision task, it 
did not affect the speed with which they made their decisions. This provided the first 
indication that despite propositions about the possible effect feedback could have on 
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decision-making, findings in this particular experimental setting pointed to an 
unchanged performance, despite the different positive or negative reinforcements. 
 
 It was then important to assess if these variations, even if not observed within 
the individual consequence scenarios, did have an influence when compared between 
them. Findings showed that response times were significantly different only in the 
high-feedback group, with individuals responding significantly slower in the low-
consequence scenarios than in the medium- and high-feedback ones. Overall, those 
in the group receiving mostly positive feedback showed faster response times, 
possibly driven by their elevated confidence in their performance (Loewenstein, 
Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001; Bagozzi, Dholakia, & Basuroy, 2003). But these 
differences did not follow similar propositions when considering the low- and 
medium-feedback groups, thus putting in question the overall effect it had on this 
particular decision paradigm. Further, considering the lack of significant variations in 
the individual feedback groups, a comparison between the scenarios for all groups 
collapsed together showed again that the low-consequence scenario resulted in a 
faster response for the medium- and high-consequence ones. This replicated the 
overall findings from Experiment 1, where individuals were guided by the 
environment rather than the feedback, when there was no meaningful information 
available. 
 
 On the various behavioural and self-reflective measure collated, it was clear 
that feedback did not have an effect on the time it took individuals to make a choice 
in this particular decision environment. In other words, while their feedback 
condition was reflected in their self-reported ratings and task-description, it did not 
influence their overall performance. Against expectations, these variations did not 
drive them in any particular way to make significantly faster or slower decisions in 
the forced-choice scenario they were presented with. 
 
This has important implications for the experiment design, as it clarifies any 
issues that could relate to the effect feedback had on the task and especially on the 
observed variation observed for the different consequence scenarios. At the same 
time, the medium-feedback condition, which is equal to the one used in Experiment 1 
and the subsequent ones, did not show any significant difference between the groups, 
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which made it possible to rule these out as affecting factors. Moreover, the 
experiment clearly engaged individuals and maintained performance-pressures across 
the task, and it did also provided clear observations to further explore the individual 
cognitive processes and how these affect the behavioural responses. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
Addressing questions raised in Experiment 1, this particular experiment 
looked at the potential effect varying degrees of positive or negative feedback could 
have on individuals’ performance. Findings showed that this was not a significant 
factor in the current decision paradigm and the behavioural response to the task. 
While variations in the feedback showed to influence perceptions about individuals’ 
performance, they did not affect the time it took them to make a choice under the 
different scenario-consequence conditions. Moreover, as results pointed to a similar 
variation in response times as observed in Experiment 1, with responses for the low-
consequence scenarios still being faster than the other two, these findings again 
confirmed the role the different operational conditions seem to play in forced-choice 
decision environments when lacking any meaningful information. 
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Experiment 3 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 When considering behavioural responses to the decision paradigm in 
Experiment 1 (see Chapter II), results showed that individuals responded 
significantly faster in the low-consequence scenarios than in the other two. But when 
taking into consideration the cognitive measures recorded during the task, results 
showed heightened and prolonged brain activation during the more consequential 
scenarios. This pointed to a fundamental difference in engagement and processing in 
the brain regions corresponding to problem-solving and movement preparation. 
 
 The question raised following this focused on the linear set-up of information 
and stimuli presentation in the current experimental design, which resulted in an 
overlap of cognitive processing and behavioural response. Due to the repetitive 
nature of the experiment, participants developed an expectation and were able to 
anticipate the next decision-making point, leading to an anticipated evaluation as 
well as deliberation. It was this earlier activation, as reflected in the underlying brain 
activity recorded, that resulted in a significant difference between the consequence 
scenarios. 
 
 One proposition regarding this focused on the idea of cognitive loading, 
looking into the amount of information that is processed at any given time (Sweller, 
1988; Sweller, Ayres, & Kalyuga, 2011). Within the framework of this decision-
making paradigm, this referred to the presentation of the contextual information, in 
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the form of the operational scenario, and the presentation of the two available 
alternatives. All of this played out in a sequential manner, with sufficient time 
between each new piece of information. In order to identify what effect this linear 
processing had on the behavioural response, it was necessary to assess how the 
simultaneous presentation of all available information would affect attention, 
deliberation and implementation within the decision-making process. 
 
 Additionally, propositions around the effect of feedback manipulations, in the 
form of varying levels of positive or negative feedback to individuals’ choices, were 
incorporated again in this experiment. Carrying on ideas around the effect of mood 
on decision tasks (de Vries, Holland, & Witteman, 2008), and a heightened feeling of 
anticipated regret (Zeelenberg, van Dijk, Manstead, & van der Pligt, 2000), these 
were expected to significantly affect performance during the task. 
 
 
1.1 Objectives and Hypotheses 
 
 The goal of the experiment was to identify how cognitive loading influences 
performance in this forced-choice decision paradigm, in order to clarify the 
proposition made in Experiment 1. Using a slightly amended version of the decision 
paradigm, the focus was on the simultaneous presentation of scenario and decision 
information, while still combining this with the varying degrees of feedback 
manipulations identified in Experiment 2 (see Chapter III). The aim was to assess 
what behavioural effect, if any, this more complex presentation of information had 
on performance in this particular decision paradigm, influencing both deliberation 
and implementation phases within the decision-making process. The following 
objectives were considered:  
 
> When participants are presented with all task-related information 
simultaneously, the higher-consequence scenarios will result in longer response 
times, as the deliberation and implementation processes are compressed and 
need to compete with the initial processing of the contextual details. 
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> When operating in a setting of mostly positive or negative feedback, 
participants in those individual feedback groups will result in faster response 
times, as influenced by their performance mood. Similarly, individuals operating 
in a setting which results in the same amount of correct as well as incorrect 
decisions will take longer to make their decisions, as affected by the heightened 
uncertainty about the effectiveness of their solution strategy and regular re-
assessment. 
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2. METHOD 
 
2.1 Participants 
 
Fifteen individuals (12 females, 3 males) participated in this study. They 
ranged in ages from 18 to 40 years, with a mean age of 21 years, and were drawn 
from a sample of students at the University of Liverpool. Participants were split into 
three equal groups, consisting of 5 individuals each. Each group was assigned a level 
of low, medium and high positive feedback, based on the experimental conditions 
they completed. 
 
 
2.2 Procedure 
 
Participants were seated in a comfortable chair, inside a dim-lit room, and 
were left alone to complete the experiment. All task-related information was 
presented to them on a computer screen, and they used a mouse placed below their 
hand to give their responses. The task consisted of a ‘bomb scenario’, where 
participants were asked to imagine themselves operating in the various environments 
pictured and where the objective was to ‘cut’ a wire and disarm a bomb. They faced 
a decision and had to choose between two alternatives, in the form of two different-
coloured wires (see Table 1) (failing to cut one of the wires sufficiently quickly led 
to automatic ‘detonation’). The basic premise of the decision problem focused on a 
binary negative outcome paradigm, where participants had to choose between two 
arbitrary alternatives, not knowing which would be the correct wire - reinforced 
through time constrains and performance pressures - and  where a ‘wrong’ decision 
lead to a negative outcome. 
 
The pictured environments involved either:  
 
(i) a light-bulb, which they had to switch off by picking a wire (low 
consequence condition), 
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(ii) an industrial courtyard, in which the wires were used to disarm a bomb 
(medium consequence condition), or 
(iii) children on a playground, in which the wires were used to disarm a bomb 
(high consequence condition). 
 
This was accompanied by an image of a light switch (low consequence condition) or 
explosive device (medium- and high-consequence conditions), to reinforce the 
situational context. Participants were then prompted to choose between a red or blue 
wire ‘connected’ to the particular device. Failure to make a decision or making a 
wrong one, led to detonation of the device. Following each choice, they received 
feedback in the form of a “CORRECT” or “INCORRECT” on-screen message. 
 
The instructions, prior and during the experiment, all emphasised the need to 
take quick and decisive action. Participants were told that they would be assessed on 
their accuracy as well as their speed, forming part of an overall learning task. What 
participants did not know, was that the order and number of correct or incorrect 
decisions was set prior to the experiment, and they had no influence on the decision 
task. This was done in order to assess, if in the absence of any information and clear 
solution, participants still deliberated about their decision. Despite having no control 
and no clear pattern in the results, the most rational suggestion would lead to just 
cutting any wire, as there is no preferential value assigned to either. 
 
 A total of 60 stimuli series were presented in three blocks. At the end of each 
block, participants were presented with a brief 8-item questionnaire to assess their 
experience so far. The three experiment groups differed in the type of feedback they 
received, between the low, medium or high positive feedback conditions. This 
related to the percentage of positive or negative feedback they received about their 
decisions, separated respectively into 20%, 50% or 80% positive. 
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Table 1. Decision Paradigm 
STAGE   SCENARIOS   
STIMULI Mask Low-Consequence Med-Consequence High-Consequence Feedback 
    
 
 
 
 
CORRECT 
or 
INCORRECT  
or 
TOO SLOW 
TIME 2,000 ms 5,000 ms 5,000 ms 5,000 ms 3,000 ms 
	  
The decision scenarios were designed using Inquisit (Millisecond Software 
v3.0.4, Seattle – USA), and recordings for each participant’s response times were 
taken at each decision stage. 
 
2.3 Measures 
  
The main measure for this experiment described the time (in milliseconds) it 
took participants to make a decision, once they were presented with the available 
alternatives. Further, they completed an 8-items questionnaire (see Appendix B) after 
each of the three blocks, where they responded to questions about their attitudes 
towards and experience of the experiment using a 10-point Likert scale. At the end of 
the experiment they completed a brief questionnaire (see Appendix C), which 
provided a qualitative description of their decision-making process and an overall 
perspective of the experience during the task. 
 
2.4 Analysis 
 
The effect of feedback on response time was assessed using an analysis of 
variance (ANOVA), where the recordings between the groups were compared for 
each of the scenario conditions. The independent variables for the analysis were the 
three different scenarios (low-, medium- and high-consequence), differentiating 
between the three feedback groups (low, medium and high). Pair-wise comparisons 
were carried out between the three scenarios, and a 95% confidence level was used 
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throughout. Similar comparisons were carried out between the three different blocks, 
to look at possible changes over time, and between the feedback groups, to look at 
the effectiveness of the manipulations. In addition to this, qualitative data was 
gathered from participants’ post-task questionnaires, to gain an insight into strategies 
and thought processes during the experiment. 
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3. RESULTS 
 
The results will detail the analysis of the experiment in three parts, with a 
fourth one providing some qualitative description based on the post-task 
questionnaire. First, the focus will be on assessing any possible repetition effect 
across the blocks of the experiment. Afterwards, the analysis will look at indicators 
for the effect the manipulations had on participants’ behavioural and attitudinal 
responses. Lastly, the analysis will compare the reaction times for the different 
feedback conditions and see how they reflected changes for the specific consequence 
scenario conditions. 
 
3.1 Repetition 
 
Results for the repeated measures ANOVA for the response times showed 
that there were some significant differences within the various blocks (see Table 2). 
They were associated with statistically significant differences in response times for 
the low-consequence scenarios within the high-feedback group, F (2, 58) = 17.032, p 
= .000, with post-hoc showing that recordings for the first block resulted in slower 
response times than the second block, F (1, 29) = 21.357, p = .000, and the third 
block, F (1, 29) = 17.135, p = .000. 
 
Table 2. Mean (SD) response times with significant differences between three blocks of the 
decision task, for all consequence scenarios in each feedback group 
Feedback 
Group 
Consequence 
Scenario 
Block Analysis 
A – First B – Second C – Third F (2, 58) p 
High Low 2023.33 (1182.3) 1140.43 (537.97) 1032.40 (572.91) 17.032 .000* High 1594.03 (1039.8) 1372.70 (776) 1029.57 (481.56) 6.730 .002* 
* Significant difference between the blocks, at p < .05. 
	  
Response time for the high-consequence scenarios also showed a significant 
difference between the blocks within the high-feedback group, F (2, 58) = 6.730, p = 
.002, with the third block resulting in significantly faster responses than the first 
block, F (1, 29) = 11.988, p = .002, and the second block, F (1, 29) = 6.871, p = .014. 
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Finally, repeated measures ANOVAs were carried out for the various scale 
items completed after each of the blocks. These showed that there were significant 
differences only for the concentration ratings in the high feedback conditions, F (2, 
8) = 5.032, p = .038, with the level of concentration being rated significantly lower 
for the second block (M = 6.8, SD = 0.45) than for the first one (M = 7.8, SD = 0.84), 
F (1, 4) = 10, p = .034. There were no other significant differences between the 
ratings given by the participants at the different points in time. 
 
Despite some significant differences in the analysis, as well as the large 
standard deviations recorded and the small samples sizes represented in the attitude 
scales, the results showed an overall homogeneous distribution of response times and 
ratings over the three phases. It was still safe to support the view that there was no 
significant change in response times or scale ratings over time. This allowed for the 
collapsing of the three phases and a more in-depth analysis of the response times for 
the different scenarios conditions across all three feedback groups. 
 
3.2 Feedback Manipulation 
 
Before moving on to the comparative analysis, it was important to assess the 
effectiveness of the feedback manipulations and the participants’ groupings. For this, 
response times and scale ratings were compared between the three feedback groups. 
 
Results for the individual blocks (i.e. A, B & C) showed that there were 
significant differences between the response times for some of the consequence 
scenarios (i.e. low, medium & high) when comparing them within the different 
feedback groups (i.e. low, medium & high) (see Table 3). 
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Table 3. Mean (SD) response times for each feedback group in all consequence conditions, 
during each of the three blocks  
Block Consequence Scenario 
Feedback Group Analysis 
Low Medium High F (2, 104) p 
A 
Low 1990.94 (879.89) 1842.91 (786.23) 1920.51 (1135.7) 0.215 .807 
Med 2015.91 (942.09) 1676.86 (887.96) 1472.54 (912.83) 3.152 .047 * 
High 1658.33 (736.14) 1680.67 (849.1) 1594.03 (1039.8) 0.078 .925 
       
B 
Low 1702.3 (967.72) 1707.3 (946.16) 1140.43 (537.97) 4.481 .014 * 
Med 1602.6 (1032.14) 1957.89 (1089.8) 1191.6 (508.273) 6.148 .003 * 
High 1384.57 (558.08) 1818.77 (819.72) 1372.97 (788.67) 4.223 .017 * 
       
C 
Low 1594.54 (939.72) 1472.83 (791.3) 1007.2 (554.38) 5.555 .005 * 
Med 1530.07 (798.69) 1441.1 (777.95) 1180.07 (644.84) 1.795 .172 
High 1438.43 (722.71) 1545.91 (878.23) 1027.46 (475.7) 5.173 .007 * 
* Significant difference between the feedback groups, at p < .05. 
	  
In the first block there were differences for the medium-consequence scenarios, with 
individuals in the low-feedback group responding significantly slower than those in 
the high-feedback one (t (68) = 2.451, p = .017, r = 0.28). 
 
 For the second block, results showed differences in all three consequence 
conditions. For the low consequence scenarios, individuals in the high-feedback 
group responded significantly faster than those in the low- (t (58) = 2.78, p = .007, r 
= 0.34) and medium-feedback (t (58) = 2.838, p = .006, r = 0.35) ones. For the 
medium-consequence scenarios, individuals in the high-feedback group responded 
significantly faster than those in the low- (t (68) = 2.113, p = .038, r = 0.25) and 
medium-feedback (t (68) = 3.77, p = .000, r = 0.42) ones. Similar significant 
differences were observed for the high-consequence scenarios, where individuals in 
the high-feedback group responded significantly faster than those in the medium-
feedback one (t (68) = -2.59, p = .012, r = 0.3). 
 
Results also pointed to significant differences between response times in the 
third block. When faced with low-consequence scenarios, individuals in the high 
feedback group responded significantly faster than those in the low- (t (68) = 3.185, 
p = .002, r = 0.36) and medium-feedback (t (68) = 2.851, p = .006, r = 0.11) ones. 
Similarly, in the high-consequence scenarios, results showed that those in the high-
feedback group responded significantly faster than those in the low- (t (68) = 2.81, p 
= .006, r = 0.32) and medium-feedback (t (68) = 3.071, p = .003, r = 0.35) ones. 
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 Based on the block analysis into possible repetition effects, results showed 
that the data could confidently be collapsed together and analysis should be carried 
out on the blocks as a whole (see Table 4). Results showed that there were significant 
differences in the response times in the individual consequences when comparing 
them between the feedback groups, showing a similar trend for all three scenarios. 
 
Table 4. Mean (SD) response times for each feedback group in all consequence conditions 
Consequence 
Scenario 
Feedback Group Analysis 
Low Medium High F (2, 299) p 
Low 1765.61 (934.34) 1671.8 (845.13) 1366.83 (896.08) 5.456 .005 * 
Medium 1725.5 (950.93) 1704.49 (948.67) 1286.47 (714.02) 7.93 .000 * 
High 1485.55 (677.14) 1681.84 (848.54) 1318.36 (813.66) 5.395 .005 * 
* Significant difference between the feedback groups, at p < .05. 
	  
In the low-consequence condition, individuals in the high-feedback group responded 
significantly faster than those in the low- (t (198) = 3.08, p = .002, r = 0.21) and 
medium-feedback (t (198) = 2.476, p = .014, r = 0.17) ones. When faced with 
medium-consequence scenarios, again individuals in the high-feedback group 
responded significantly faster than those in the low- (t (198) = 3.684, p = .000, r = 
0.25) and medium-feedback (t (198) = 3.513, p = .001, r = 0.24) ones. Finally, results 
in the high-consequence scenarios showed that individuals in the medium-feedback 
group responded significantly faster than those in the high-feedback (t (198) = 3.092, 
p = .002, r = 0.21) one. 
 
 For the scale ratings, analysis was carried out again on the blocks collapsed 
together, based on the findings above. Results here showed that there was a 
significant difference between most of the scale ratings, with exception of three of 
the items (see Table 5). Due to the distribution of the recorded data, a non-parametric 
Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA was carried out.  
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Table 5. Median scale ratings across all three feedback groups 
Scale Item Feedback Group Analysis Low Medium High H (2) p 
% Correct 10 40 70 33.885 .000 * 
Concentrate 6 7 7 3.257 .197 
Solved 1 3 7 28.3 .000 * 
Strategy Rev. 4 7 7 16.405 .000 * 
Stressed 8 5 6 4.486 .112 
Anxious 7 5 6 4.627 .095 
Quickly 7 7 7 2.695 .264 
Accurately 7 7 8 5.575 .056 
* Significant difference between the feedback groups, at p < .05. 
	  
Mann-Whitney tests were carried out to follow up the significant findings, to identify 
where the differences were. A Bonferroni correction was applied and so all effects 
are reported at a .0167 level of significance, in order to look at the significant 
differences observed for three of the scale items. When asked about how many trials 
individuals thought they had answered correctly, there was a clear trend, with an 
increase from the low-  to medium feedback groups (U = 8, r = -0.81), and from the 
medium to high-feedback  one (U = 29.5, r = -0.64). Similarly, results showed that 
individuals in the high-feedback group claimed to have solved the task when 
compared to those in the medium- (U = 14, r = -0.76) and low-feedback (U = 6, r = -
0.83) groups. Finally, individuals in the low-feedback group stated that they rarely 
revised their strategy based on the feedback provided, especially when compared to 
the higher ratings given by those in the medium- (U = 43.5, r = -0.53) and high-
feedback (U = 22, r = -0.7) groups. 
 
 The results for the response times showed that there were some significant 
differences, which showed a trend across the feedback groups for the particular 
consequence scenarios, even though pointing to small effect sizes. On the other hand, 
only a few of the scale items showed significant differences between the feedback 
groups, pointing to possible weaknesses in identifying the main factors which 
possibly influenced the behavioural differences. 
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3.3 Response Times 
 
A comparative analysis was carried out between the response times for the 
different scenarios in each individual feedback group, using a repeated measures 
ANOVA (see Table 6). 
 
Table 6. Mean (SD) response times for each consequence condition in all three feedback 
groups 
Feedback 
Group 
Consequence Scenario Analysis 
Low Medium High F (2, 178) p 
Low 1765.61 (934.34) 1725.5 (950.93) 1485.55 (677.14) 2.032 .134 
Medium 1671.8 (845.13) 1704.49 (948.67) 1681.84 (848.54) 0.058 .944 
High 1366.83 (896.08) 1286.47 (718.02) 1318.36 (813.66) 1.233 .294 
 
Results showed that there were no significant differences between the 
response times for the scenario conditions in each of the individual feedback groups 
(see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Mean response times for the three separate feedback groups in each individual 
consequence scenarios 
	  
	  
The recordings showed that there was no significant variation in response times 
between the consequence conditions, which was observed across all three feedback 
conditions.  
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3.4 Task Questionnaire 
 
After completing the decision paradigm, participants filled out a post-task 
questionnaire. These responses provide a qualitative insight into the decision-making 
processes and individuals’ experience during the experiment, complementary to the 
behavioural measures. 
 
 Asked to rate their feedback level after completing the task (Q.1), individuals 
in the low-feedback group had a very low rating and felt frustrated with the task (“It 
seemed to have no pattern, and was frustrating.”), while those in the medium-
feedback one also gave low ratings as they felt unsure about their performance 
(“Couldn’t figure out any strategy to complete the task.”). Those in the high-
feedback group rated their task performance as high, even if there was no clarity on 
their individual strategy (“I got many of them right... didn’t really understand why 
one response was correct and another incorrect.”). 
 
 When asked if they reconsidered their choices at the very last moment (Q.4), 
individuals in all feedback groups stated that they did not. Similarly, there was a 
consensus across the groups when asked about the focus of their strategy (Q.5) and 
the need for more time (Q.6). With no decisions reaching the assigned time-limit 
available, most individuals moved quickly to operating within the give time frame. 
This was further reflected their answers, where they stated that accuracy was their 
main concern while completing the task. Only in the medium-feedback group one 
individual stated that more time would have allowed them to figure out the pattern 
(“With more time I would have been able to properly understand if there was a 
relationship.”). 
 
 When asked about the perceived solvability and difficulty of the task (Q.7), 
there was a variation in the answers given by each feedback group. Those in the low-
feedback one showed frustration with the task, stating it was not solvable and too 
difficult (“Not solvable, so very difficult.”). Individuals in the medium-feedback 
group were open to the solvability of the task, but stated level of difficulty and 
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varying accuracy as the reasons for their insecurity (“At the time, no, I found it too 
difficult but I believe I was looking at it wrongly.”). Finally, those in the high-
feedback group felt that they had solved the task (“Quite easy once you realised what 
the solution was.”), while stating insecurity due to possible change in the solution 
pattern (“Pattern seemed to change and it takes a while to work out the new pattern 
and copy it.”). 
 
 In the last question, when asked about the correct solution to the task (Q.8), 
most in the low-feedback group stated that there was no solution to the task (“Don’t 
think there was one.”), while those in the medium-feedback one where unsure about 
what the correct solution was. Most in the high-feedback group did put forward a 
theory about what they though the correct solution was, ranging from recognising a 
pattern (“... when you saw a bomb and a building you had to choose the opposite 
length.”) to focusing on a specific wire (“Cut the red wire.”). 
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4. DISCUSSION 
 
 Results showed that when processing both, contextual information and choice 
alternatives simultaneously, there are no significant differences observed between the 
consequence scenarios. This followed up from Experiment 1, addressing questions 
about task loading and cognitive processing which explained the observations 
regarding response times, which were against expectations for these types of forced-
choice environments. This experiment answered some of the questions relating to the 
design and validity of the decision paradigm, addressed factors concerning cognitive 
loading and the effect on behavioural measures of decision-making. 
 
Design 
 
 Looking at the reliability of the experimental design, results showed that 
repetition of the task did not have an effect on performance, with an overall 
homogenous distribution of the response times and consistent ratings, across both 
feedback and consequence conditions.  
 
 The feedback group individuals were placed in did have a significant effect 
on their performance, where participants responded significantly faster in the high-
feedback condition for all three consequence scenarios. Relating to the results in 
Experiment 2, this pointed to a raised feedback and accelerated performance, seeing 
as they mostly received positive feedback to their choices. This was further reflected 
in some of their personal ratings. Individuals in this group rated their perceived 
accuracy highest and were most confident about having solved the task. Similarly, 
individuals in this group stated that they rarely felt the need to revise their strategy. 
While the differences in ratings were not uniform across the conditions, they did still 
point to a significant effect the manipulations had on individuals’ performance. This 
was in line with expectations regarding their task mood (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, 
& Welch, 2001; Bagozzi, Dholakia, & Basuroy, 2003), and raised some questions 
about the design of the experiment. 
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 Finally, when comparing the scenario conditions against each other, results 
showed that there were no significant differences between them for each of the three 
feedback groups. This showed, that regardless of the operational setting in which 
they were making a decisions, there was no difference in terms of the time it took 
participants to make a choice between the two wires. This pointed to the fact, that 
when being presented with all the information at once, it took participants the same 
amount of time to deliberate about their choice and implement it.  
 
 Considering this in relation to Experiments 1 and 2, these findings pointed to 
a further change in behavioural measures. While in the previous experiment there 
was a difference between the scenarios, results here pointed to the fact that 
individuals did not vary in their speed when choosing which wire to cut. One 
explanation for this possibly related to the heightened performance pressure, where 
all information was presented at once, compressing the time available to evaluate, 
deliberate or reconsider previous information, before making a choice. The expected 
delays were not observed between the consequential scenarios. 
 
While the lack of significant differences pointed to a difference in 
behavioural response, this particular design would not lend itself to be expanded to 
include EEG measures. The number of stimuli presented simultaneously would 
overlap and would make it difficult to isolate the individual stages proposed in the 
current decision-making model. But this format provides an explanatory basis on 
which to further identify the effect cognitive loading has on evaluation and 
deliberation, and how these affect the decision-making process and responses. Even 
when dealing with arbitrary decision problems, the presentation of multiple pieces of 
information at once clearly leads to delay in processing. But considering this in terms 
of the operational variations of these problems, consequence scenarios did not have 
the same effect they did in the other version of this task. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
 Following on from findings around the behavioural measures for the forced-
choice decision-paradigm, this experiment looked at the effect higher cognitive 
loading had on response times for the varying consequence scenarios. Results 
showed that when all information was presented simultaneously, there were no 
significant differences between the scenarios. Adding to findings from Experiment 1, 
this further confirmed the idea that individuals engaged cognitively with the problem 
before reaching the decision phase arbitrarily set in the experiment. Thus, the 
response times considered solely from the presentation of the choice-stimuli did not 
reflect a true picture of individuals’ processing of task information. This confirmed 
observations about the early and prolonged deliberation during the more 
consequential scenarios, and the need to consider longer time intervals prior to the 
presentation of any information stimuli or the implementation of a choice, in order to 
get a clearer understanding of the underlying decision-making processes.  
 
 Furthermore, results around the feedback manipulations in this set-up showed 
that they did significantly affect performance. This was in contrast to the findings 
from Experiment 2, where the same groupings did not seem to affect response times. 
While there were no neurocognitive measurements available in this experiment, this 
further pointed to the early engagement with the decision problem, which is not 
possible when all information is made available simultaneously. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter V 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stroop Advice 
 
Experiment 4 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The findings in Experiment 1 (see Chapter II) showed that individuals 
engaged in redundant deliberation, even in the absence of meaningful, choice-related 
information. Results further showed that participants did so with significant 
differences between the three scenario consequence conditions; showing stronger 
activity in relation to preparation and planning to respond, as well as faster response 
times when ultimately committing to a choice. These variations were correlated with 
the consequential impact of the decision environment indicating a significant effect 
of emotion on the decision making processing, when lacking other points of 
reference.  
 
To further assess the different effects consequential impact had on the 
decision-making process, the experiment was expanded to incorporate variations in 
the types of task-relevant information made available to individuals. Following a 
similar set-up, in some instances information was provided in the form of advice in 
order to identify variations in deliberation and implementation, combining this with 
the findings on scenario conditions. In other instances, no advice was provided, 
which provided an additional dimension, lacking task-relevant information, and 
prompting a shift in response, with participants applying their own strategy to make 
a decision. 
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Having established a base-line measure of the experimental decision 
paradigm and the effect of scenario consequence on performance, the next addition 
focused on providing information to the decision-making process. The main goal 
was to identify the cognitive processes relating to the evaluation and deliberation of 
information, and how this would be reflected in the making of the decision and any 
possible interaction with the scenario consequences. In order to best isolate this 
activity, the types of available information were designed in line with research 
exploring the Stroop Effect. More specifically, the idea behind the reverse Stroop-
effect (in which the mismatched colour of the word affects the time needed to 
identify the word) was used, instead of the Stroop Effect (the mismatched colour of 
the word affects the time needed to identify the colour it is displayed in). This 
Reverse Stroop Effect (RSE) variation provided an indicator of solvability to the task 
on varying degrees of difficulty (i.e. cognitive processing of the colour conditions). 
 
 Experimentally, the Stroop task has long been the ‘gold standard’ of attention 
(MacLeod, 1992). Regarded as a classic test of response interference, it is based on 
the principle that reading words is more habitual and automatic than saying the 
colour (Stroop, 1935; see MacLeod, 1991). In the experiment to be presented here 
the design followed variations similar to those in the RSE (Stroop, 1935; 
Experiments 1 & 3), where advice was given in congruent or incongruent conditions. 
As applied in various research settings in the past (Flowers, 1975; Martin, 1981; 
Durgin, 2000; Blais & Besner, 2007), this test has been key in developing ideas 
around attention and cognitive activity, as a means to creating varying conditions. 
Following on from the original decision task aimed at inducing conflict between the 
available alternatives (wires) based on the different operational scenario – albeit with 
no meaningful information to resolve that conflict – this version focused on using 
attentional activation as an additional reference. 
 
 Variations in the Stroop conditions have been identified in terms of the 
conflict and interference they cause in cognitive processing and behavioural 
response. EEG and fMRI studies have revealed selective activation of the anterior 
cingulate cortex during a Stroop task, part of the prefrontal brain structure which has 
been found to be responsible for conflict monitoring (Carter & van Veen, 2007). 
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Similarly to traditional theories around interference (Tomlinson, Huber, Riethb, & 
Davelaarc, 2009), brain activation during Stroop tasks has been observed in the 
anterior cingulate cortex, supplementary motor cortex, visual association cortex, 
inferior temporal cortex, inferior parietal cortex, inferior frontal cortex, dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex, and caudate nuclei (Peterson, Kane, Alexander, Lacadie, 
Skudlarski, Leung, Mat, & Gore, 2002). Further, both EEG and fMRI studies, have 
consistently shown activation in the frontal lobe, and more specifically in the 
anterior cingulate cortex and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Strauss, Sherman, & 
Spreen, 2006).  
 
 It is this conflict-inducing effect that was of interest when using the Stroop 
effect to provide information during the decision task, in the form of varying types of 
advice. Following on from findings in Experiment 1, the focus was to further 
identify activity in the frontal lobe and replicate previous associations of response 
conflict with activation in the anterior cingulate, especially when comparing 
incongruent against congruent trials (Bench, Frith, Grasby, Friston, Paulesu, & 
Frackowiak, 1993; Carter, MacDonald, Botvinick, Ross, Stenger, Noll, & Cohen, 
2000; Pardo, Pardo, Janer, & Raichle, 1990). Activation in these areas has been 
related to their role in executive functions (Bush, Luu, & Posner, 2000), which has 
also been proposed to describe the deliberation stage of forced-choice decision 
making environments.  
 
 The experiment followed on from previous investigations of the Stroop task 
using Event-related Potentials (ERPs), highlighting the need to analyse two different 
time-windows, differentiating between the stimuli presentation and the choice 
response (Badzakova-Trajkov, Barnett, Waldie, & Kirk, 2009). This set-up followed 
on from the overall paradigm design, not focusing solely on the cognitive response to 
the stimuli, but also the effect it had on the implementation of response. Research 
has suggested that the behavioural Stroop effect may be due to competition at the 
level of the response (Rosenfeld & Skogsberg, 2006), supporting the late selection 
theoretical accounts, which argue that conflict occurs late in processing, close to the 
response stage (MacLeod, 1991).  More recent studies have lent further support, 
recording ERPs to assess brain correlates of Stroop interference (N/P450 and 
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sustained potential), respectively reflecting conflict processing and attentional 
control (Lansbergen, van Hell, & Kenemans, 2007). 
 
 The propositions in this experiment were based on the idea that more 
cognitive-laden (effortful) decision environments (i.e. more consequential scenarios, 
and incongruent/ambiguous advice) result in larger amplitude and a prolonged period 
of activation. This would be further reflected in variations in response times, as 
activation relating to the suppression of immediate response allowed for a longer 
deliberation. These premises allowed for a robust comparative framework on which 
to identify particular decision stages and their time distribution, and brain areas 
active during higher-level decision-making processing, based on the understanding 
of these executive functions. 
 
 The main aim of this experiment was not to replicate and confirm the 
findings from the Stroop effect, but to rather use the established findings to identify 
the unique processes and stages of decision-making, based on known attentional 
activation and response delays. By using the varying types of advice, it was possible 
to trace the resulting brain activity during the decision-making process over a 
spectrum where information available required different levels of attention and 
cognitive effort. These findings were then overlaid on top of those around the effect 
scenarios consequences had on this forced-choice experimental paradigm, to assess 
when, and if, the type of information available interacts with the scenario condition 
in which this advice is presented and how individuals’ decision-making processing 
was affected by this. 
 
 
1.1 Objectives and Hypotheses 
 
 The aim was to look at the combined effect information and consequence 
scenarios had on cognitive processing and behavioural response during a simplified 
decision paradigm. Having identified activity relating to the stages of deliberation 
and implementation in the previous experiments, where no meaningful information 
was available, the goal here was to assess how different types of information were 
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processed and how they affected individuals’ performance in different operational 
scenarios. The various types of information provided a comparative framework, on 
which to measure the effects clear, ambiguous and no information had on 
individuals’ choices and how these mapped out on neurocognitive activity, when 
presented in different consequence scenarios. The following objectives were also 
considered:  
 
 
> Identify the neural processes involved at each stage of decision making, and 
map these out for each individual type of information. 
 
> Emotional stimuli that suggest more significant and consequential outcomes 
will result in increased and prolonged amplitudes at the stages of deliberation, 
preparation and implementation. 
 
> The incongruent and no information conditions will result in increased and 
prolonged amplitudes at the stages of deliberation and implementation, with 
longer response times, than the congruent information condition. But these two 
conditions will result in activation of different brain areas, providing a basis on 
which to differentiate between complex information processing and task-specific 
problem solving. 
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2. METHOD 
 
2.1 Participants 
 
Fourteen individuals (7 females, 7 males) participated in the experiment. 
They ranged in ages from 20 to 30 years, with a mean age of 25 years. Participants 
were drawn from a sample of students at the University of Liverpool, all without any 
disclosed health issues, and were all right-handed. 
 
2.2 Procedure 
 
This experiment followed a similar set-up as previous experiments (see 
Chapters II, III, and IV). Participants were seated in a comfortable chair, inside a 
dim-lit, electrically-shielded room, with their right arm resting on a platform. All 
task-related information was presented to them on a computer screen, and they used 
a mouse placed below their right hand to give their responses. 
 
The experiment consisted of a series of decision situations, at the end of 
which individuals were asked to make a choice between two random alternatives 
under time pressure. The task consisted of a ‘bomb scenario’, where participants 
were asked to imagine themselves operating in the various situations with the 
objective to ‘cut’ a wire and disarm a bomb. Following this, they faced a decision 
stage and had to choose between two alternatives, in the form of two different 
coloured wires (see Table 1) (failing to cut one of the wires at sufficient speed 
automatically led to ‘detonation’). The basic premise of the decision problem 
focused on a binary negative outcome paradigm, where participants had to choose 
between two arbitrary alternatives, not knowing which would be the correct wire - 
reinforced through time constrains and performance pressures - and  where a ‘wrong’ 
decision lead to a negative outcome. 
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Varying from the initial design, this experiment only focused on two 
situational settings. Participants were presented with a context-setting scenario 
involving either: 
 
(i) a light-bulb, which they had to switch off by picking a wire (low 
consequence condition), or 
(ii) children on a playground, in which the wires were used to disarm a bomb 
(high consequence condition). 
 
In summary, the stimulus indicated two conditions: 1) low consequence, and 
2) high consequence. This was followed by an image of a light switch (low 
consequence condition) or explosive device (high-consequence condition), to 
reinforce the situational context. Finally participants were prompted to choose 
between a red or blue wire ‘connected’ to the particular device. Failure to make a 
decision or an incorrect choice, led to detonation of the device. Following each 
choice, they received feedback in the form of a “CORRECT” or “INCORRECT” on-
screen message. 
 
The instructions, prior and during the experiment, all emphasised the need to 
take quick and decisive action. Participants were told that they would be assessed on 
their accuracy as well as their speed, forming part of an overall learning task. As part 
of this learning task, in some instances they received ‘advice’ on which wire was the 
correct one; while in others they received no advice, just as in Experiment 1. This 
information was provided as a direct statement above the two wires (i.e. RED WIRE 
or BLUE WIRE), varying in the colour they were written in. Following on from 
propositions about the Reverse Stroop Effect (Stroop, 1935; see MacLeod, 1991), the 
advice was provided in congruent or incongruent form. Additional advice conditions 
were considered (e.g. neutral colour, unrelated word), but a no-advice condition was 
chosen, to remain consistent with previous experiments 
 
A total of 240 stimuli series were presented in two blocks of 22 minutes each, 
with a 5 minutes break between them. The order in each block of 120 stimuli was 
randomised, combining both scenario conditions (i.e. low- and high-consequence) 
with all three advice conditions (i.e. congruent, incongruent, and no advice). 
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Table 1. Decision Paradigm (example) 
STAGE  Evaluation Deliberation Choice  
STIMULI Mask Context Device Decision Feedback 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRECT 
or 
INCORRECT 
or 
TOO SLOW 
TIME 2,000ms 2,000ms 2,000ms 3,000ms 1,500ms 
 
2.3 Recordings 
 
EEG was recorded using 64 electrodes in continuous mode on Biosemi 
(ActiView v6.05, Amsterdam – Netherlands). A band pass filter of 0.16-100 Hz and 
a sampling rate of 500 Hz were used, while the electrode-to-skin impedance was 
kept below 5 kΩ. Elecrooculography (EOG) measures were recorded, using 
electrodes placed above and below the left eye, while electrocardiographic (ECG) 
measures were recorded by placing one electrode on the right ankle and another one 
on the left wrist. Both of these recordings were used to account for any artefacts in 
the data analysis. 
 
The decision scenarios were designed using Inquisit (Millisecond Software 
v3.0.4, Seattle – USA), and recordings for each participant’s response times were 
taken at each decision stage. 
 
 
2.4 Data Analysis 
 
Averaged EEG epochs were segmented after band pass filtering and analyzed 
using the Brain Electrical Source Analysis (BESA) program (MEGIS Software, 
Munich – Germany). Trials containing ECG artefacts or large EOG variations (> 75 
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mV) were discarded from further analysis. There were two vision-related measures, 
with one focusing on the presentation of scenario context stimuli and the other on the 
advice stimuli. For the scenario-related measures, 3,045 averaged EEG epochs were 
segmented to a length of 1,100 ms (100 ms pre- to 1, 000 ms post-stimulus), while 
for the advice-related measures, 3,234 averaged EEG epochs were segmented to a 
length of 800 ms (200 ms pre- to 600 ms post-stimulus). For the movement-related 
measures, 3,067 averaged EEG epochs were segmented to a length of 2,000 ms 
(1,500 ms pre- to 500 ms post-stimulus). A source model of the EEG potentials was 
constructed from the grand average data (N = 14) for each of the measures. The data 
were transformed into the Talairach coordinate system, and the locations of the EEG 
sources were evaluated for each individual dipole (Talairach Client v2.4.2, Research 
Imaging Centre, UTHSCSA - USA). 
 
2.5 Statistical Analysis 
 
The effect of stimulus intensity on the dipoles source was analysed using a 
paired-samples t-test for the scenario conditions, comparing the recordings following 
stimuli presentations. The independent variables at this stage were the two different 
scenario conditions (low- and high-consequence). For the latter stages, advice 
presentation and choice commitment, the stimulus intensity on the dipoles source 
was analysed using a factorial repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA). 
The independent variables for both included again the scenario conditions (high and 
low), and additionally the three different types of advice (congruent, incongruent, 
and no advice). 
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3. RESULTS 
 
Results will detail three stages for each decision task within the experiment, 
describing the differences in amplitudes for each of the source dipoles, directly 
following the presentation of stimuli or the commitment to a choice. First, the focus 
will be on the perception components relating to the presentation of the context-
setting stimuli, indicating the scenario in which individuals were ‘operating’. 
Further, the focus will be on the perception components relating to the advice 
provision and, finally, on the activity prior to the button press and commitment to a 
choice. For all of these stages, the data will be compared based on the two 
consequence conditions, looking for significant difference in the source waveforms. 
Similarly, the second and third stages will additionally consider the differences in 
advice provision, while also looking at any significant interaction. Additionally, 
behavioural and qualitative measures will be analysed, to further expand on the 
decision-making narrative. 
 
3.1 Perception Components 
 
3.1.1 Scenario Consequence 
 
Five regional source dipoles were fitted to describe the 3-dimensional source 
currents contributing to the data (see A, Figure 1). Three sources were located in the 
occipital lobe. The central source (S1, Talairach coordinates in mm [x: -11.6, y: -65, 
z: -13.5], Brodmann area 19) peaked at 100ms. Two secondary sources, occupying 
lateral locations in the occipital lobe (S2R [x: 34.4, y: -66.9, z: 3.1], 10, and S3L [x: -
29.5, y: -91.3, z: -2.2], 18) peaked at 129ms and 267ms respectively. Another source 
was located in the posterior cingulate cortex (S4 [x: 9.7, y: -27.1 z: 37.8], 31), 
peaking at 482ms. While the last source was located in the frontal lobe (S5 [x: -11.1, 
y: 55.4, z: 32.3], 10) and peaked at 117ms. The grand-average model was tested for 
all conditions, and the residual variances were similar in both conditions (both 15%, 
low-consequence 21%, high-consequence 13%) (see B, in Figure 1). 
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To evaluate the differences between the two scenario conditions, individual 
source waveforms for each were obtained using the grand-average model. The 
average source waveforms with time intervals showing statistically significant 
deviation (p < 0.05) between the different conditions are shown in Figure 1. 
 
Scenario conditions were associated with statistically significant differences 
of source dipole amplitude in the source located in the posterior lobe (S1) for three 
different time intervals. An early interval (120ms to 190ms) showed that high-
consequence scenarios resulted in a larger increase in amplitude than the low-
consequence ones, t = -7.706, p = .00. The later interval (470ms to 560ms) showed 
that high-consequence scenarios resulted in a larger increase in amplitude than the 
low-consequence ones, t = -3.831, p = .00. The last interval (690ms to 810ms) again 
showed that high-consequence scenarios resulted in a larger increase in amplitude 
than the low-consequence ones, t = -7.157, p = .00. 
 
Similar significant differences were observed at both lateral source dipoles 
(S2R & S3L) located in the occipital lobe, when looking at two similar time intervals 
for both. Amplitudes for the ipsilateral source dipole (S2R) showed that high-
consequence scenarios resulted in a larger decrease in amplitude than the low-
consequence ones, t = 8.5896, p = .00, in an early interval (160ms to 360ms). A later 
one (400ms to 560ms) at the same source showed that low-consequence scenarios 
resulted in a larger increase in amplitudes than the high-consequence ones, t = 
7.8476, p = .00. Similarly, amplitudes for the contralateral source dipole (S3L) 
showed significant differences for two separate time intervals. An early interval 
(160ms to 340ms) showed that high-consequence scenarios resulted in a larger 
increase in amplitude than the low-consequence ones, t = -8.705, p = .00. The later 
interval (390ms to 570ms) showed similar differences, where high-consequence 
scenarios resulted in a larger increase in amplitude than low-consequence ones, t = -
8.0254, p = .00. 
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Table 2. Mean activity recorded for perception components with significant differences 
between consequence conditions 
Source 
Consequence Scenario Analysis 
Low High t p 
S1.1 
(120ms – 190ms) 
M = -7.68,  
SD = 24.62 
M = 27.92,  
SD = 34.53 -7.706 .000 
S1.2 
(470ms – 560ms) 
M = 13.76,  
SD = 12.4 
M = 25.21,  
SD = 17.27 -3.831 .00 
S1.3 
(680ms – 780ms) 
M = 12.89,  
SD = 11.75 
M = 23.67,  
SD = 11.75 -7.157 .000 
S2.1 
(160ms – 360ms) 
M = -5.05,  
SD = 18.46 
M = -35.82,  
SD = 24.72 8.5896 .000 
S2.2 
(400ms – 560ms) 
M = 6.58,  
SD = 12.16 
M = -3.43,  
SD = 13.01 7.8476 .000 
S3.1 
(160ms – 340ms) 
M = 8.1,  
SD = 11.95 
M = 25.06,  
SD = 15.43 -8.705 .000 
S3.2 
(390ms – 570ms) 
M = 0.25,  
SD = 5.38 
M = 7.95,  
SD = 8.09 -8.0254 .000 
S4.1 
(200ms – 320ms) 
M = 28.89,  
SD = 12.73 
M = 9.92,  
SD = 17.34 8.3843 .000 
S4.2 
(370ms – 540ms) 
M = 14.73,  
SD = 14.8 
M = 30.09,  
SD = 15.09 -6.5497 .000 
S5.1 
(200ms – 300ms) 
M = 7.71,  
SD = 8.12 
M = -1.12,  
SD = 6.45 6.8656 .000 
S5.2 
(420ms – 480ms) 
M = -4.56,  
SD = 5.5 
M = -9.58,  
SD = 7.61 4.0869 .000 
S5.3 
(670ms – 750ms) 
M = -5.45,  
SD = 7.72 
M = 2.21,  
SD = 4.24 3.3592 .00 
	  
	  
Analysis for the source dipoles in the cingulate cortex (S4) and the parietal 
lobe (S5) showed again significant differences between the scenarios conditions. 
Recordings for an early time interval in the cingulate cortex (200ms to 320ms) 
showed that the low-consequence scenarios resulted in a larger increase in amplitude 
than high-consequence ones, t = 8.3843, p = .00. A later interval (370ms to 540ms) 
in the same source showed that here the high-consequence scenarios resulted in a 
larger increase in amplitude when compared to the low-consequence ones, t = -
6.5497, p = .00. 
 
Finally, recordings in the parietal lobe (S5) showed again significant 
differences for three separate time intervals. An early interval (200ms to 300ms) 
showed that the low-consequence scenarios resulted in a larger increase in amplitude 
than high-consequence ones, t = 6.8656, p = .00. A later interval (420ms to 480ms) 
showed that the high-consequence scenarios resulted in a larger decrease in 
amplitude that low-consequence ones, t = 4.0869, p = .00. On the other hand, 
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recordings for another late interval (670ms to 750ms) showed that low-consequence 
scenarios resulted in a larger decrease in amplitude than did high-consequence ones, 
t = -3.3592, p = .00. 
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Figure 1. Scenario Consequence Components 
(A) Localisation of source dipoles shown schematically in the transparent glass brain. Short lines in 
each source indicate the orientation of the primary component of the respective regional source. 
Source labels: 1 = S1 Occipital Lobe; 2 = S2 Occipital Lobe; 3 = S3 Occipital Lobe; 4 = S4 Cingulate 
Cortex; 5 = S5 Frontal Lobe. (B) Global field power (blue scale) and residual variance (red scale). (C) 
Source waveforms of source dipoles derived from the grand average data. Averages for each 
scenario condition overlaid (low-consequence = blue; high-consequence = red). Empty rectangles 
indicate statistically significant (p < .05) increase for source amplitudes in more consequential 
scenario conditions, while filled rectangles indicate statistically significant (p < .05) decrease for 
source amplitudes in more consequential ones. Numbers of source waveforms correspond to (A). 
 
A B 
C 
Low 
High  
2=S2	  
1=S1	  
3=S3	  
4=S4	  
5=S5	  
1	  
2	  
3
4	  
1
5	  
5
4	  
4
3	   	  
2
1	  
1
4	  
4
3	  
2
1	  
3
2	  
1	  3
4	  
4
2
3	  
5
4
2	  
4
	  
1
2	  
5
1
2	  
+90	  
-­‐90	  
-­‐	  100ms	   +	  1000ms	  
-­‐	  100ms	   +	  1000ms	  
+90	  
-­‐90	  
-­‐	  100ms	   +	  1000ms	  
+90	  
-­‐90	  
-­‐	  100ms	   +	  1000ms	  
+90	  
-­‐90	  
-­‐	  100ms	   +	  1000ms	  
+90	  
-­‐90	  
5
3
4	  
2
4
2
3	  
-­‐	  100ms	   +	  1000ms	  
Stroop Advice                                                                              Chapter V	  
	  
	  
102	  
 
3.1.2 Advice 
 
For the advice perception-related components associated with the advice 
stimuli six regional source dipoles were fitted to describe the 3-dimensional source 
currents (see A, in Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2). Again, three sources were located in 
the occipital lobe. The central source (S1 [x: 10.3, y: -73.8, z: 18.6], 18) peaked at 
168ms. Two secondary sources, occupying lateral sources (S2L [x: -38.7, y: -72, z: -
20.9], 18, and S3R [x: 25.8, y: -85.4, z: -2.6], 18) peaked at 230ms and 246ms 
respectively. A fourth source was located in the contralateral temporal lobe (S4 [x: -
39.6, y: -34.6, z: 17.8], 41), peaking at 186ms. The fifth source was located in the 
anterior cingulate cortex (S5 [x: 7, y: 32.9, z: 14.4], 32), and peaked at 365ms. A 
final source was located in the ipsilateral inferior temporal lobe (S6 [x: 35.6, y: 2.4, 
z: -26.3], 38), peaking at 250ms. The grand-average model was tested for all 
conditions, and the residual variances were similar in all low- (all 10%, congruent 
11%, incongruent 13%, no advice 12%) as well as high-consequence advice 
conditions (all 11%, congruent 12%, incongruent 12%, no advice 14%) (see B, in 
Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 respectively). 
 
Same as above, the individual source waveforms for both consequence levels 
and all three advice conditions were obtained using the grand-average model, in 
order to evaluate the differences between them. The average source waveforms with 
time intervals showing statistically significant deviation (p < 0.05) between the 
different conditions are shown in Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2. 
 
Consequence 
 
 Analysis showed that only recordings for one of the source dipoles resulted in 
significant differences for the amplitudes in the two scenario conditions. For the 
congruent advice conditions, two intervals with significant differences were 
identified. An early interval (150ms to 250ms) located in the occipital lobe (S1) 
showed that low-consequence scenarios (M = -14.13, SD = 17.59) resulted in a larger 
decrease in amplitude than the high-consequence ones (M = -9.44, SD = 17.32), t = -
2.395, p = .032. A later interval (360ms to 420ms) in the same source dipole showed 
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again that low-consequence scenarios (M = -9.53, SD = 13.28) resulted in a larger 
decrease in amplitude than the high-consequence ones (M = -5.08, SD = 10.59), t = -
3.448, p = .004. 
 
Table 3. Mean activity recorded for advice-perception components with significant 
differences between consequence conditions, for all three advice conditions 
Stroop 
Advice Source 
Consequence Scenario Analysis 
Low High t p 
Congruent 
S1.1 
(150ms – 250ms) 
M = -14.13,  
SD = 17.59 
M = -9.44,  
SD = 17.32 -2.395 .032 
S1.2 
(360ms – 420ms) 
M = -9.53,  
SD = 13.28 
M = -5.08,  
SD = 10.59 -3.448 .004 
      
Incongruent S1.2 (360ms – 420ms) 
M = -11.57,  
SD = 14.62 
M = -5.66,  
SD = 12.94 -5.011 .000 
      
None S1.1 (150ms – 250ms) 
M = -15.45,  
SD = 17.04 
M = -9.4,  
SD = 16.01 -3.823 .002 
	  
For the incongruent advice conditions, the later interval (360ms to 420ms) showed 
that the low-consequence condition (M = -11.57, SD = 14.62) resulted in a larger 
decrease in amplitude than the high-consequence ones (M = -5.66, SD = 12.94), t = -
5.011, p = .000. Finally, when looking at the no-advice condition, the early interval 
(150ms to 250ms) showed similar differences to those found for the congruent one. 
Here the low-consequence scenarios (M = -15.45, SD = 17.04) resulted in a larger 
decrease in amplitude than the high-consequences ones (M = -9.4, SD = 16.01), t = -
3.823, p = .002. Analysis for the other 5 source dipoles showed no significant 
differences between the consequence scenarios in any of the different advice 
conditions. 
 
Advice 
 
When looking at significant differences between the three advice conditions, 
all results were reported based on the more conservative Greenhouse-Geisser 
correction, as the assumption of sphericity was violated for a number of the 
recordings. 
 
When looking at the low-consequence scenarios, advice conditions were 
associated with statistically significant differences in a number of source dipoles. An 
early time interval (100ms to 230ms) in the occipital lobe (S2L) showed that there 
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was a significant effect of the advice condition on the recorded activity, F (1.591, 
20.682) = 41.139, p = .000. Contrasts revealed that the no-advice conditions resulted 
in a larger increase in amplitude when compared to the congruent, F (1, 13) = 
29.226, p = .000, and incongruent, F (1, 13) = 53.395, p = .000, ones. A similar time 
interval (100ms to 230ms) in the occipital lobe (S3R) showed that there was a 
significant effect of the advice condition on the recorded activity, F (1.821, 23.676) 
= 23.195, p = .000. Contrasts revealed again that the no-advice conditions resulted in 
a larger increase in amplitude when compared to the congruent, F (1, 13) = 29.226, p 
= .000, and incongruent, F (1, 13) = 53.395, p = .000, ones. 
 
Two time intervals for the source dipole located in the temporal lobe (S4), 
showed a significant effect of the advice condition on the activity recorded. One 
difference was observed for the early interval (100ms to 190ms), F (1.461, 18.987) = 
27.881, p = .000, which showed that the no-advice condition resulted in a larger 
increase in amplitude than did the congruent, F (1, 13) = 18.331, p = .001, and 
incongruent, F (1, 13) = 109.676, p = .000, ones. The later time interval (280ms to 
350ms) showed again a significant difference, F (1.367, 17.772) = 7.661, p = .008, 
where the no-advice condition resulted in a larger decrease in amplitude than did the 
congruent, F (1, 13) = 6.839, p = .021, and incongruent, F (1, 13) = 10.93, p = .006, 
ones. 
 
For the activity recorded in the ipsilateral temporal lobe (S6), again two 
separate time intervals showed a significant effect of the advice conditions on the 
activity recorded. An early interval (90ms to 200ms) showed a significant difference, 
F (1.804, 23.447) = 8.298, p = .002, where contrasts showed that the no-advice 
condition resulted in a larger increase in amplitude than did the congruent, F (1, 13) 
= 7.626, p = .016, and incongruent, F (1, 13) = 20.552, p = .001, ones. Another 
difference was observed for a later interval (250ms to 350ms), F (1.203, 15.641) = 
4.426, p = .046, where the incongruent advice condition resulted in a larger decrease 
in amplitude when compared to the no-advice one, F (1, 13) = 5.274, p = .039. 
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Table 4. Mean activity recorded for advice-perception components with significant 
differences between advice conditions, for both consequence scenarios 
Consequence 
Scenario Source 
Stroop Advice 
Analysis 
Congruent Incongruent None 
Low 
S2 
(100ms – 230ms) 
M = 8.3, 
SD = 16.78 
M = 6.96, 
SD = 16.05 
M = -9.57, 
SD = 15.47 
F (1.591, 20.682) = 41.139, 
p = .000 
S3 
(100ms – 200ms) 
M = 9.5, 
SD = 17.43 
M = 8.9, 
SD = 19.67 
M = 19.1, 
SD = 19.08 
F (1.821, 23.676) = 23.195, 
p = .000 
S4.1 
(100ms – 190ms) 
M = 5.44, 
SD = 19.98 
M = 1.66, 
SD = 19.38 
M = 15.87, 
SD = 17.63 
F (1.461, 18.987) = 27.881, 
p = .000 
S4.2 
(280ms – 350ms) 
M = -4.02, 
SD = 15.65 
M = -2.79, 
SD = 11.18 
M= -15.15, 
SD = 17.51 
F (1.367, 17.772) = 7.661, 
p = .008 
S6.1 
(90ms – 200ms) 
M = 6.54, 
SD = 23.88 
M = 3.96, 
SD = 23.81 
M = 18.14, 
SD = 18.46 
F (1.804, 23.447) = 8.298, 
p = .002 
S6.2 
(250ms – 350ms) 
M = -23.87, 
SD = 30.29 * 
M = -24.68, 
SD = 26.49 
M = -4.68, 
SD = 27.13 
F (1.203, 15.641) = 4.426, 
p = .046 
      
High 
S1.1 
(350ms – 450ms) 
M = -7.72, 
SD = 9.52 
M = -7.62, 
SD = 11.26 
M = -14.97, 
SD = 14.09 
F (1.383, 17.984) = 4.849, 
p = .031 
S1.2 
(520ms – 590ms) 
M = -15.69, 
SD = 9.75 
M = -13.71, 
SD = 8.82 * 
M = -8.08, 
SD = 10.36 
F (1.313, 17.067) = 4.890, 
p = .033 
S2 
(100ms – 230ms) 
M= 6.92, 
SD = 14.47 
M = 5.01, 
SD = 18.21 
M = -8.08, 
SD = 13.49 
F (1.368, 17.779) = 16.258, 
p = .000 
S3 
(100ms – 200ms) 
M = 11.48, 
SD = 17.31 
M = 9.59, 
SD = 19.07 
M = 17.61, 
SD = 17.49 
F (1.248, 16.225) = 5.883, 
p = .022 
S4.1 
(100ms – 190ms) 
M = 9.09, 
SD = 19.86 
M = 6.25, 
SD = 18.74 
M = 14.09, 
SD = 15.03 
F (11.867, 24.277) = 7.919, 
p = .003 
S5 
(180ms – 280ms) 
M = 15.52, 
SD = 15.38 
M = 15.51, 
SD = 14.55 
M = 5.11, 
SD = 22.45 
F (1.221, 15.872) = 4.807, 
p = .037 
S6.1 
(90ms – 200ms) 
M = 11.75, 
SD = 24.09 * 
M = 6.99, 
SD = 22.52 
M = 19.74, 
SD = 16.92 
F (1.482, 19.262) = 6.224, 
p = .013 
S6.2 
(250ms – 350ms) 
M = -27.15, 
SD = 26.17 
M = -26.72, 
SD = 22.53 
M = -5.87, 
SD = 26.35 
F (1.417, 18.417) = 7.397, 
p = .008 
* Differences for these conditions were not statistically significant when compared to the 
other two, at p < .05. 
	  
When considering the high-consequence scenarios, advice conditions were 
again associated with statistically significant differences in a number of source 
dipoles. One of the source dipoles located in the occipital lobe (S1) showed that 
there was a significant effect of the advice condition on the recorded activity, F 
(1.383, 17.984) = 4.849, p = .031, for one time interval (350ms to 450ms). Contrasts 
showed that again the no-advice condition resulted in a larger decrease in amplitude 
than did the congruent, F (1, 13) = 5.384, p = .037, and incongruent, F (1, 13) = 
5.522, p = .035, ones. A later interval (520ms to 590ms) at the same source dipole 
showed that there was again a significant difference between the advice conditions, 
F (1.313, 17.067) = 4.890, p = .033, where the congruent advice condition resulted in 
a larger decrease in amplitude than did the no-advice one, F (1, 13) = 7.592, p = 
.016. 
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 Analysis for two other source dipoles within similar time intervals again 
showed that advice conditions were associated with significant differences. An early 
time interval (100ms to 230ms) in the occipital lobe (S2L) showed that there was a 
significant effect of the advice condition on the activity recorded, F (1.368, 17.779) 
= 16.258, p = .000, with contrasts showing that the no-advice condition resulted in a 
larger decrease in amplitude than did the congruent, F (1, 13) = 25.644, p = .000, and 
incongruent, F (1, 13) = 13.472, p = .003, ones. Similarly, an early interval (100ms 
to 200ms) for the source dipole located in the occipital lobe (S3R) showed a 
significant difference between the advice conditions, F (1.248, 16.225) = 5.883, p = 
.022. Contrasts here showed that the no-advice condition resulted in a larger increase 
in amplitude than the congruent, F (1, 13) = 6.003, p = .029, and incongruent, F (1, 
13) = 6.534, p = .024, ones. 
 
 Another source was located at the temporal lobe (S4) and an early interval 
around its peak (100ms to 190ms) showed a significant effect for the advice 
condition, F (11.867, 24.277) = 7.919, p = .003. Contrasts for this interval showed 
that the no-advice condition resulted in a larger increase in amplitude than did the 
congruent, F (1, 13) = 5.464, p = .036, and incongruent, F (1, 13) = 21.041, p = .001, 
ones. 
 
 The source located in the anterior cingulated (S5) showed a significant effect 
for the advice conditions on the activity recorded, F (1.221, 15.872) = 4.807, p = 
.037, at one particular time interval (180ms to 280ms). Contrasts showed that the no-
advice condition resulted in a larger increase for the congruent, F (1, 13) = 5.5, p = 
.036, and incongruent, F (1, 13) = 4.866, p = .046, advice conditions when compared 
to the no-advice one. 
 
 The last source dipole was located in the temporal lobe (S6) and showed a 
significant effect for the advice conditions at two separate time intervals.  An early 
time interval (90ms to 200ms) pointed to significant differences, F (1.482, 19.262) = 
6.224, p = .013, where the no-advice condition resulted in a larger increase in 
amplitude than the incongruent one, F (1, 13) = 10.769, p = .006. Significant 
differences were also observed at a later interval (205ms to 350ms), F (1.417, 
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18.417) = 7.397, p = .008. Contrasts revealed that the congruent, F (1, 13) = 8.666, p 
= .011, and incongruent, F (1, 13) = 8.138, p = .014, advice conditions resulted in a 
larger decrease in amplitude when compared to the no-advice one. 
 
 
Interaction between Consequence and Advice 
 
Further analysis showed that there was no significant interaction between the 
type of advice given and the scenario conditions in which they were received, when 
looking at the recorded activity before and after the presentation of the wires. The 
lack of interaction at this stage of the decision-making process is due to the details 
received for each of the scenario conditions, and the lack of significant differences 
between the types of advice conditions, in terms of form and characteristics. 
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Figure 2.1. Difference between the advice conditions for the advice-perception components when 
presented in the low-consequence scenarios 
(A) Localisation of source dipoles shown schematically in the transparent glass brain. Short lines in 
each source indicate the orientation of the primary component of the respective regional source. 
Source labels: 1 = S1 Occipital Lobe; 2 = S2 Occipital Lobe; 3 = S3 Occipital Lobe; 4 = S4 Temporal 
Lobe; 5 = S5 Cingulate Cortex; 6 = S6 Temporal Lobe. (B) Global field power (blue scale) and 
residual variance (red scale). (C) Source waveforms of source dipoles derived from the grand average 
data. Averages for each advice condition overlaid (congruent = red; incongruent = blue; none = 
green). Empty rectangles indicate statistically significant (p < .05) increase for source amplitudes in 
the no-advice conditions, while filled rectangles indicate statistically significant (p < .05) decrease for 
source amplitudes in the no-advice ones. Numbers of source waveforms correspond to (A). 
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Figure 2.2. Difference between the advice conditions for the advice-perception components when 
presented in the high-consequence scenarios 
(A) Localisation of source dipoles shown schematically in the transparent glass brain. Short lines in 
each source indicate the orientation of the primary component of the respective regional source. 
Source labels: 1 = S1 Occipital Lobe; 2 = S2 Occipital Lobe; 3 = S3 Occipital Lobe; 4 = S4 Temporal 
Lobe; 5 = S5 Cingulate Cortex; 6 = S6 Temporal Lobe. (B) Global field power (blue scale) and 
residual variance (red scale). (C) Source waveforms of source dipoles derived from the grand average 
data. Averages for each advice condition overlaid (congruent = red; incongruent = blue; none = 
green). Empty rectangles indicate statistically significant (p < .05) increase for source amplitudes in 
the no-advice conditions, while filled rectangles indicate statistically significant (p < .05) decrease for 
source amplitudes in the no-advice ones. Numbers of source waveforms correspond to (A). 
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3.2 Decision Components 
 
Movement-related: Choice 
 
 For the last part of the analysis relating to the EEG recordings, three regional 
source dipoles were fitted to describe the source currents (see A, in Figure 3.1 and 
Figure 3.2). One source was located in the occipital lobe (S1 [x: 17, y: -60.4, z: -
3.1], 19), peaking at -369ms. The second sources was located in the contralateral 
primary motor cortex (S2 [x: -27.1, y: -23.2, z: 59.6], 4) and peaked at 123ms. The 
final source was located in the frontal lobe (S3 [x: -17, y: 50.8, z: 23.3], 10), peaking 
at 21ms. The grand-average model was tested for all conditions, and the residual 
variances were similar in all low- (all 49%, congruent 42%, incongruent 45%, no 
advice 61%) as well as high-consequence advice conditions (all 56%, congruent 
53%, incongruent 54%, no advice 62%) (see B, in Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 
respectively). 
 
To evaluate the differences between both consequence levels and all three 
advice conditions, individual source waveforms for each were obtained using the 
grand average model. The average source waveforms with time intervals showing 
statistically significant deviation (p < 0.05) between the different conditions are 
show in the figures below. Analysis of the selected Bereitschaftspotential parameters 
was performed, using a three-way ANOVA for repeated measures at both low- and 
high-consequence scenarios, factoring in all three advice types. The focus was on 
particular time intervals, prior to the participants’ voluntary movements, identifying 
their commitment to a particular choice through movement-related potentials (see C, 
in Figures 3.1 and Figure 3.2 respectively). 
 
Consequence 
 
Analysis for the last component focused on the activity leading up to the 
commitment to a decision, describing the shifting activity from deliberation to 
choice. Results showed that there was only one source (S1) where the scenario 
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conditions resulted in significant differences, and this was only observed for the 
congruent and incongruent advice conditions. 
 
Table 5. Mean activity recorded for movement components with significant differences 
between consequence conditions, for all advice conditions 
Stroop Advice Source Consequence Scenario Analysis Low High t p 
Congruent S1  (-780ms – -690ms)  
M = 3.64,  
SD = 20.06 
M = -5.94,  
SD = 23.58 2.783 .016 
      
Incongruent S1  (-780ms – -690ms) 
M = 10.48,  
SD = 25.37 
M = -2.82,  
SD = 18.51 2.82 .014 
	  
In the congruent advice condition, results showed a difference between the 
scenario conditions at an interval prior to the commitment to a choice (-780ms to -
690ms), t = 2.783, p = .016, where the high-consequence scenario resulted in a larger 
decrease in amplitude than the low-consequence one. On the other hand, the 
difference for the incongruent advice in the same interval, t = 2.82, p = .014, showed 
that the low-consequence scenario resulted in a larger increase in amplitude than the 
high-consequence one. 
 
Advice 
 
Analysis for the activity based on the three advice conditions for the same 
component showed again that only the source dipole located in the occipital lobe 
(S1) resulted in significant differences during one time interval (-650ms to -550ms). 
The significant effect of advice condition in the low-consequence scenario, F (2, 26) 
= 12.713, p = .000, showed that the no-advice condition resulted in a larger decrease 
in amplitude when compared to the congruent, F (1, 13) = 12.247, p = .004, and 
incongruent, F (1, 13) = 17.686, p = .001, ones. 
 
Table 6. Mean activity recorded for movement components with significant differences 
between advice conditions, for both consequence scenarios 
Consequence 
Scenario Source 
Stroop Advice Analysis 
Congruent Incongruent None F (2, 26) p 
Low S1 (-650ms – -550ms) 
M = 12.48,  
SD = 22.65 
M = 17.52,  
SD = 26.88 
M = -13.31,  
SD = 21.93 12.713 .000 
       
High S1 (-650ms – -550ms) 
M = 1.95,  
SD = 21.04 
M = 4.58,  
SD = 20 
M = -14.04,  
SD = 14.98 5.293 .012 
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Similarly, analysis for the high-consequence scenarios, F (2, 26) = 5.293, p = .012, 
showed that the no-advice condition resulted in a larger decrease in amplitude than 
the congruent, F (1, 13) = 8.067, p = .014, or incongruent, F (1, 13) = 7.999, p = 
.014, one. 
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Figure 3.1 Difference between the advice conditions for the movement components when presented 
in the low-consequence scenarios 
(A) Localisation of source dipoles shown schematically in the transparent glass brain. Short lines in 
each source indicate the orientation of the primary component of the respective regional source. 
Source labels: 1 = S1 Occipital Lobe; 2 = S2 Primary Motor Cortex; 3 = S3 Frontal Lobe. (B) Global 
field power (blue scale) and residual variance (red scale). (C) Source waveforms of source dipoles 
derived from the grand average data. Averages for each advice condition overlaid (congruent = red; 
incongruent = blue; none = green). Empty rectangles indicate statistically significant (p < .05) increase 
for source amplitudes in the no-advice conditions, while filled rectangles indicate statistically 
significant (p < .05) decrease for source amplitudes in the no-advice ones. Numbers of source 
waveforms correspond to (A). 	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Figure 3.2 Difference between the advice conditions for the movement components when presented 
in the high-consequence scenarios 
(A) Localisation of source dipoles shown schematically in the transparent glass brain. Short lines in 
each source indicate the orientation of the primary component of the respective regional source. 
Source labels: 1 = S1 Occipital Lobe; 2 = S2 Primary Motor Cortex; 3 = S3 Frontal Lobe. (B) Global 
field power (blue scale) and residual variance (red scale). (C) Source waveforms of source dipoles 
derived from the grand average data. Averages for each advice condition overlaid (congruent = red; 
incongruent = blue; none = green). Empty rectangles indicate statistically significant (p < .05) increase 
for source amplitudes in the no-advice conditions, while filled rectangles indicate statistically 
significant (p < .05) decrease for source amplitudes in the no-advice ones. Numbers of source 
waveforms correspond to (A). 
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Interaction between Consequence and Advice 
 
A factorial repeated-measures ANOVA was carried out, with results pointing 
to significant effects of the consequence and advice conditions for two separate 
intervals recorded at the source dipole located in frontal lobe (S3). For the first time 
interval (-340ms to -250ms) Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of 
sphericity had been violated for the main effect of advice, χ² = 7.974, p = .019, so 
therefore degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of 
sphericity, ε = .67. The results showed no significant differences between the 
consequence conditions, but they did so for the advice conditions, F (1.346, 17.503) 
= 15.651, p = .000, when ignoring the scenario conditions. Contrasts revealed that 
this main effect reflected significant differences in activity the no-advice condition 
(M = -7.81, SE = 6.44) had when compared with the congruent, (M = 12.136, SE = 
6.05), F (1, 13) = 17.439, p = .001, and incongruent, (M = 15.255, SE = 5.27), F (1, 
13) = 17.478, p = .001, ones (see Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4. Interaction graph for the mean activity recorded for the advice conditions in both 
consequence scenarios near the frontal lobe prior to making a choice (-340ms to -250ms) 
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advice was available. The break-down for this interaction showed that there was a 
significant difference between the activity recorded for the low (M = 17.87, SD = 
22.32) and high (M = 6.4, SD = 24.5) congruent conditions, t (13) = 3.553, p = .004. 
Similarly, recordings for the incongruent advice showed significant differences 
between the low (M = 20.2, SD = 20.55) and high (M = 10.31, SD = 21.16) 
consequence conditions, t (13) = 2.701, p = .018. This significant difference was not 
observed for the no-advice condition. 
 
Further analysis showed significant differences between the advice 
conditions in the low-consequence scenarios, F (2, 26) = 17.545, p = .000. Contrasts 
showed that recordings for the no-advice condition (M = -11.23, SD = 29.92) were 
significantly lower than those for the congruent (M = 17.88, SD = 22.32), F (1, 13) = 
20.798, p = .001, and incongruent (M = 20.2, SD = 20.55), F (1, 13) = 18.432, p = 
.001, ones. Analysis between the advice conditions in the high-consequence 
scenarios also showed significant differences, F (2, 26) = 4.812, p = .028. Similarly, 
these showed that recordings for the no-advice condition (M = -4.39, SD = 22.55) 
were significantly lower than those for the incongruent (M = 10.31, SD = 21.16), F 
(1, 13) = 6.51, p = .024, ones. 
 
Analysis for the later interval (290ms to 350ms) at the same source dipole 
(S3) showed that there were no significant differences when considering the scenario 
or advice condition individually (see Figure 5). But a clear interaction was observed 
between the type of advice and the scenario condition in which it was received, F (2, 
26) = 4.67, p = .019. 
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Figure 5. Interaction graph for the mean activity recorded for the advice conditions in both 
consequence scenarios near the frontal lobe after making a choice (290ms to 350ms) 
 
	  
The break-down again showed that the type of advice had a different effect on 
activity depending on which scenario condition is was presented in. Contrasts 
showed that a significant effect was only observed for the high-consequence 
scenarios, F (1, 13) = 6.691, p = .023, where the no-advice condition (M = -6.82, SD 
= 38.03) resulted in a larger decrease in amplitude than the incongruent (M = 6.33, 
SD = 34.68) one. 
 
 
3.3 Reaction Times 
 
 When analysing the reaction times recorded for both, consequence and 
advice conditions (see Figure 6), the advice conditions were associated with 
significant differences (F (2, 26) = 17.574, p = .000), but the scenario conditions 
were not associated with significant differences (F (1, 13) = 0.687, p = .422) and 
there was no significant interaction between the two independent variables (F (4, 76) 
= 2.562, p = .096). Looking at the significant differences for the low-consequence 
scenarios (F (2, 26) = 20.589, p = .000) recordings showed significantly faster 
response times following congruent advice (M = 852.889, SD = 165.103), when 
compared to the incongruent (M = 1039.095, SD = 238.083), F (1, 13) = 41.564, p = 
-8.00 
-6.00 
-4.00 
-2.00 
0.00 
2.00 
4.00 
6.00 
8.00 
Congruent Incongruent None 
Low 
High 
Stroop Advice                                                                              Chapter V	  
	  
	  
118	  
.000, r = 0.87, and no advice (M = 1058.484, SD = 186.924), F (1, 13) = 31.768, p = 
.000, r = 0.84, conditions. 
 
Table 7. Mean (SD) response times for each advice condition for both consequence levels 
Consequence 
Scenario 
Stroop Advice 
Congruent Incongruent None 
Low 852.889 (165.103) 1039.095 (238.083) 1058.484 (186.924) 
High 859.123 (167.128) 1006.616 (225.183) 1062.393 (207.743) 
	  
Similarly, results for the high-consequence scenarios pointed to significant 
differences (F (2, 26) = 13.558, p = .000), with significantly faster response times 
after congruent advice (M = 859.123, SD = 167.128), when compared to incongruent 
(M = 1006.616, SD = 225.183), F (1, 13) = 22.829, p = .000, r = 0.8, and no advice 
(M = 1062.393, SD = 207.743), F (1, 13) = 21.116, p = .001, r = 0.77, conditions. 
 
Figure 6. Mean response times for the advice conditions in both consequence scenarios	  
	  
 
 
3.4 Qualitative Data 
 
 After completing the decision paradigm, participants filled out a post-task 
questionnaire (see Appendix D). These responses provide a qualitative insight into 
the decision-making processes and individuals’ experience during the experiment. 
852.889 
1039.095 
1058.484 
859.123 
1006.616 
1062.393 
800 
850 
900 
950 
1000 
1050 
1100 
Congruent Incongruent None 
Low 
High 
Stroop Advice                                                                              Chapter V	  
	  
	  
119	  
They provided an overall narrative, to compliment the findings from the 
neurocognitive analysis. 
 
 When asked about how confident they felt about solving the task (Q.1), 
participants stated that they felt somewhat confident (Avg. 6 on a scale of 1-10), but 
that this confidence decreased over time (“the task seemed easy at the beginning, but 
turned out to be quite hard.”). Related to this, when asked about the strategy used to 
solve the task (Q.2), individuals stated that this as well changed over time (“I tried 
remembering what the correct solution was in a particular scenario, which didn't 
work. I tried a sequential method, this time is blue next time red etc which didn't 
work.”).  
 
 In terms of their main concern (Q.3), participants stated that they did not feel 
any particular preference between the scenario conditions, as they were mainly 
focused on making the right choice (“I felt concerned all the time, Not only during 
the more emotional scenarios.” and “I tried to get every answer right, and got 
frustrated in the end when I got them wrong.”). While reflecting on their 
decisiveness and if they reconsidered their choice at the very last moment (Q.4), 
participants stated that they spent longer on the no-advice conditions, re-assessing 
and deliberating their choice (“...sometimes I did the last second decisions, as I 
wasn't completely sure which option to choose...” and “Sometimes, because I was 
using the time to think it through from the last response.”).  
 
In relation to the limited time available and the need to be accurate (Q.5), 
participants stated that the short time window added psychological pressure to the 
task, but that their main focus was still to try and be accurate in their decisions (“I 
was more concerned with accuracy for the clips that were designed to be emotive.” 
and “At the start of each experiment I was a little nervous so I was definitely 
concerned about both time and accuracy but as the experiment progressed I felt 
more pressured into getting the questions right.”). Finally, when asked if they would 
have benefitted from more time in order to solve the task (Q.6), participants stated 
that once they settled into the task, time was not an issue, while they still struggled 
with being accurate in their decisions (“Once I was settled time was not an issue...” 
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and “I didn’t think I could work out any rules to work out which wires to cut, so 
more time wouldn't have made any difference.”). 
 
 When asked about the perceived solvability of the task (Q.7), participants 
stated that there was no solution, supported by their assessment after trying out 
various strategies and successful ones being incorrect at later iterations of the task (“I 
didn't think it was solvable, as I tried a few different techniques to work it out, but 
didn't get any further.”). Further confirming this position, none of the participants 
claimed having found the correct solution (Q.8), while further describing the failure 
of applied strategies as time progressed (“At first I thought something like red wire 
for a bomb and blue wire for the bell, but in the end I didn't think there was a 
solution and it was 50/50.”). Despite these responses, participants stated that they 
still felt pressured throughout the task (Q.9), based on the regular feedback and the 
overall instructions of the experiment. 
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4. DISCUSSION 
 
 When considering the results from the experiment along the individual 
decision-making stages, it was clear that the different types of information provided 
as advice and the scenarios in which these were presented, had a varying effect on 
individuals’ cognitive activity and their behavioural response when completing the 
task. Looking at the different types of advice, it was clear that the information-
processing was different in terms of activation, which was further carried over into 
the implementation stage, significantly affecting the behavioural responses. These 
were identified at sources related to movement components, while differences were 
also observed at sources active during executive functioning. Further differences 
were also observed during all stages for vision-related sources, in terms of strength 
and length activation, which did not always fulfil expectations, raising some 
important issues about the experiments’ design. Nonetheless, some key observations 
were drawn from these, informing propositions about the different consequence 
scenarios and the varying types of advice. 
 
 In order to further expand on these findings, the focus is first on the basic 
visual and cognitive processing at the initial stage, where individuals received 
contextual information about the operational scenario. The second part describes the 
advice presented in order to inform the task, looking at the response to each of the 
three conditions. Finally, we describe the processes leading to the implementation of 
a choice, and how these were mapped based on the information available, and 
discuss the extent to which it was possible to link the EEG results to our behavioural 
and qualitative measures. 
 
4.1 Context Information 
 
Analysis pointed to significant differences between the two scenario-
consequence conditions, in terms of the effect the contextual stimuli had on visual 
processing. At the most fundamental level, the images used to represent both 
operational conditions differ in terms of complexity and visual information, thus 
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variations in processing within the occipital lobe were expected. As the results 
showed, the high-consequence scenarios resulted in stronger and prolonged 
activation for all three source dipoles located in the occipital lobe. Further, some 
participants stated that as part of their strategy, they actively searched for clues in the 
scenarios, in order to inform their decisions, which would point the prolonged 
activation for the more complex scenario images.  
 
While these shortcomings are not directly relevant to decision-making 
processing and only provide insight into the visual processing of contextual 
information, they do not undermine conclusions drawn from activity recorded in 
other brain areas. In the decision paradigm, the main goal was not to identify 
differences in processing based on visual stimuli, but to see if, how and at which 
interval this contextual information affected activity in other areas of the brain. The 
images merely served as a contextual trigger for individuals to visualize themselves 
operating in that particular situation, whether this meant solving the task in a low-
consequence environment or a high-consequence one. 
 
4.2 Advice Information 
 
 In terms of activity relating to the presentation of task-relevant information, 
included as advice or the lack-of it during the decision paradigm, the analysis looked 
again at the effect the scenario conditions had on this processing, but further 
included comparisons between the three types of advice. It is here where the 
established Reverse Stroop Test literature provided a strong basis to look at the 
differences between the proposed decision-making stages. 
 
Scenario 
 
Analyses showed that significant differences were only observed in the 
sources located in the occipital lobe, and that these differences were not consistent 
across all three advice conditions. As highlighted previously, the activity relating to 
visual processing of these conditions was not without flaw, in terms of any 
meaningful conclusions that could be drawn from them. In this stage, visually there 
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was no difference between the scenarios, so any differences in the recordings were 
most likely due to unrelated visual activity. Further, the large standard deviations and 
the early time interval pointed to further weaknesses with the differences between 
the recordings at those sources.  
 
Advice 
 
 When comparing the effect the three different types of advice had on brain 
activity, results for both lateral sources located in the occipital lobe pointed to larger 
amplitudes for the no-advice condition. Both of these amplitudes correspond to the 
N100 visually evoked potential, pointing to selective attention relating to the no-
advice condition (Luck, Woodman, & Vogel, 2000), where those stimuli resulted in 
stronger activation due to the participants additional focus. This follows on from the 
idea around those ERP components (P1, N1) initially reflecting sensory processing 
of incoming information (Heinze, Mangun, Burchert, Hinrichs, Scholz, Münte, & et 
al., 1994), but further being strongly influenced by higher cognitive processes 
(Johannes, Münte, Heinze, & Mangun, 1995; Mangun, 1995). 
 
 Activity located in the contralateral temporal lobe (S4) showed that the no-
advice condition resulted in larger amplitudes at both intervals (100ms to 190ms, and 
280ms to 350ms) in the low-consequence conditions, while only being significantly 
different in the early one for the high-consequence one. The source localisation 
pointed to activity near Wernicke’s area, angular gyrus and the superior temporal 
gyrus, both active during understanding of spoken and written language (Luce & 
Pisoni, 1998; Geschwind, 2004). Expectations would point to stronger activation for 
both advice conditions where information was presented in written form, requiring 
more cognitive processing, while the opposite was observed. This pointed to possible 
activation due to the no-advice setting, drawing on other information recall. It was 
not possible to draw any definitive conclusions from the analysis at this particular 
source. 
 
 Similarly, activity recorded in the ipsilateral inferior temporal lobe (S6) did 
not correspond to expectations for the experimental paradigm. Analysis pointed to 
larger amplitudes for the no-advice condition at a very early interval (90ms to 
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200ms), while this shifted significantly to the other two advice conditions for the 
later interval (250ms to 350ms). Considering the pattern of activation and the 
localisation of the source, these recorded differences most likely related to the 
ventral stream (Milner & Goodale, 2008) and its description of similar visual 
processing as observed for one of the lateral occipital sources (S3). While 
propositions about this activation are still being debated (Cardoso-Leite & Gorea, 
2010), they do provide the best explanation for the activation observed in this area, 
as it related to the visual processing of the advice information. 
 
 Finally, for the source located in the anterior cingulate cortex (S5), results 
showed that the congruent and incongruent advice condition resulted in larger 
amplitudes for an early interval (180ms to 280ms) than the no-advice one when 
presented during the high-consequence scenarios. This pointed to attention towards 
meaningful information, as identified for this brain area in previous research using 
the Stroop Test (Strauss, Sherman, & Spreen, 2006; Carter & van Veen, 2007). 
Incidentally, in this experiment only the high-consequence condition showed a 
significant difference and at an early interval, which goes against the most traditional 
descriptions of the conflict monitoring and resolution identified in the Stroop Test 
literature (Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004). Expectations would have pointed to 
similar differences for both scenario conditions, seeing as there was no interaction 
observed at this stage, as the task would be independent from the situational setting. 
None of the usual ERPs were observed in terms of Stroop interference (N/P450 and 
Sustained Potential), which reflect conflict processing and attentional control 
(Lansbergen, van Hell, & Kenemans, 2007), while no activation was observed at the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) (Ukai, Shinosaki, Ishii, & et al., 2002). 
 
 Despite some differences in activation when compared to the available 
literature, the recordings still pointed to the expected variations when processing 
meaningful information (in both its congruent and incongruent forms) and the 
conditions where no information was available. The importance of these differences 
is best assessed in the processing of this information and its application when 
making a choice in the particular decision paradigm. 
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4.3 Decision-related components 
 
 The phase of most interest, in terms of identifying particular decision making 
stages, was the one just prior to the button press, as individuals deliberated about the 
available, or lack of, information and their commitment to implementing the 
particular choice. Similar as above, it was important to look at the different 
conditions individually, before drawing conclusions on the effect they had on their 
cognitive processing. 
 
 Significant differences were observed only in the source located in the 
occipital lobe, for the congruent and incongruent advice conditions. Again, there 
were no particular differences between the scenarios at this stage based on visual 
information. Considering the early activation, especially when overlaid with the 
response times, this activity most probably related to the presentation of the advice 
stimuli, and was unrelated to the actual decision-making process. 
 
 Considering visual processing, differences were again observed for the 
source located in the occipital lobe, where the congruent and incongruent conditions 
resulted in significantly larger amplitudes than the no-advice one. This related 
directly to the first two including some written information, while the other condition 
was blank and prompted individuals to shift focus directly to the consideration of 
their own solution strategy. 
 
Interaction 
 
 Of particular interest was the possible interaction between the scenario and 
advice conditions, further exploring how these affected cognitive processing and 
which effect they on performance in the forced-choice decision paradigm.  Analysis 
for the activity located in the frontal lobe (S3) showed two particular time intervals 
where an interaction was observed between the operational conditions. 
 
 When looking at the time prior to individuals making a choice (-340ms to -
250ms) recordings showed that the congruent and incongruent advice condition 
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resulted in a large positive amplitude in both consequence scenarios. On the other 
hand, the no-advice condition resulted in a large negative amplitude, but not 
significantly different when compared between the low- and high-consequence 
conditions. When considering activity in the same source after individuals’ decision 
(290ms to 350ms), recordings showed that the type of advice had a significant effect 
on the high-consequence scenarios, but not on the low-consequence ones. While 
congruent advice did not affect activity, incongruent advice resulted in a large 
positive amplitude for the high-consequence condition. On the other hand, the no-
advice conditions resulted in a large negative amplitude for the high-consequence 
ones.  
 
The activity for the meaningful advice corresponded to activity in the 
dorsolateral prefontral cortex, recognised for its functional involvement in the Stroop 
Test (Vendrell, Junque, Pujol, Jurado, Molet, & Grafman, 1995; Stuss, Floden, 
Alexander, Levine, & Katz, 2001). Further, the DLPFC has been identified as 
playing a key role when solving ill-structured problems (Gilbert, Spengler, Simons, 
Steele, Lawrie, Frith, & Burgess, 2006), while also recent propositions have 
suggested that it is involved in strategic processes in memory retrieval and executive 
functions (Gilbert, Zamenopolous, Alexiou, & Johnson, 2010). 
 
 Considering the complex composition of this brain region, the results still 
provided some insight into the shift observed in terms of cognitive activity. Adding 
meaningful advice to the decision paradigm resulted in a shift in prioritisation during 
the task, especially when considering individuals’ qualitative task description and the 
differences with Experiment 1. In this case, while consequence scenarios had an 
effect in the conditions where advice information was provided, it did not influence 
activity prior to the decision. On the other hand, the consequence conditions did 
affect activity in the same brain area after individuals made their choice, but only for 
the high-consequence scenarios resulting in significant differences. This pointed to a 
post-choice consideration, which was not observed for the low-consequence ones. 
Overall, the set-up of the decision-paradigm pointed to task-relevant information 
being more important than the consequential context at all stages, while it only 
seemed to affect activity after the decision was made. 
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 While the current experiment focused on pre-decisional activity, some of the 
results pointed to future possibilities relating to post-decision measures. Some 
differences were observed in the figures for the recordings, with variations in the 
waveforms immediately after commission to a choice. Analysis in this area should 
look into possible activation describing feedback preparation and anticipated regret, 
while also considering potential issues relating to strategy consideration and re-
assessment. While the current paradigm did not allow for any confident analysis in 
this phase, future research would benefit from measures around these areas, to 
further contribute to the decision-making narrative. 
 
Response Times 
 
 In terms of the behavioural measures recorded, identifying activity relating to 
the stimuli presentation and choice response, results showed that individuals 
responded in the congruent advice conditions significantly faster than in the 
incongruent or no-advice ones. While the differences between the congruent and 
incongruent conditions do fall in line with the findings within the Stroop Test 
literature (MacLeod, 1991; Rosenfeld & Skogsberg, 2006), response times for the 
no-advice conditions were significantly longer for one. When looking at the 
cognitive measures in the no-advice conditions, they showed consistently early 
activation and differences in terms of shorter engagement in terms of perceptual 
processing. While no individual source of component stood out, these differences 
still raised the question why responses were still slower in those conditions, if no 
additional information was available. 
 
 The original expectation of slower response times for the incongruent and no-
advice condition was fulfilled, but a subsequent comparison did not yield any clear 
conclusions. The original goal was to look at the cognitive processing for these two 
conditions, in order to identify activity relating to the processing of more effortful 
information (incongruent advice) or the application of problem-solving strategies in 
the absence of any information (no advice). One suggestion would describe similar 
response delay for both conditions, but no clear differentiation was possible with the 
current data. Ultimately, following on from earlier experiments, the aim was to 
identify redundant deliberation in forced-choice environments, as previously 
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observed in situations when lacking any meaningful information. No brain regions 
were isolated individually for processing facing incongruent or no advice situations, 
which would have provided a basis on which to further differentiate between 
cognitive activities. 
 
4.4 Experiment 
 
 This version of the experiment added a measure of solvability, through the 
inclusion of advice for the forced-choice decision paradigm, providing a framework 
on which to observe problem-solving processes. The solvability of the task was 
provided along a continuum, through varying degrees of difficulty, in order to further 
isolate differences in evaluation, deliberation and implementation stages. These 
variations, especially when compared to Experiment 1, were aimed at engaging the 
individual with the task, observing changes between the different approaches applied 
to process information, or the lack of, and the shift to implementation of a given 
choice. 
 
 While the behavioural responses did fulfil expectations about variations in 
information processing and response delay, insight gained through cognitive 
measures did not provide clear-enough frameworks on which to trace individual 
activation in particular time-intervals. Some of the problems were due to weak 
activation and variations in the analysis, which did not provide confident 
differentiation between the conditions. Nonetheless, the overall experimental design 
did allow for clear observation of individual decision-making stages, in order to 
identify the effect information processing had on responses. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
 The experiment showed how information is processed during forced-choice 
environments, as it affected response times based on its complexity, while the 
particular consequence conditions in which they were presented did not affect 
performance. Based on established findings of the Reverse Stroop Effect, a clear 
distinction was made between processing of clear information (congruent) and the 
delayed response when processing unclear information (incongruent) or when 
deliberating about a decision in the absence of information. The aim to confidently 
identify the distinct neurocognitive activity of complex information processing and 
redundant deliberation was not achieved, as the recordings and source localisation 
did not provide a clear difference. However, the results again pointed to distinct 
phases of processing, which fitted both the basic decision-making model and 
expectations in the response time variations. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter VI 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Advice Clarity 
 
Experiment 5 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 Based on the similar issues raised in Experiment 4 (see Chapter V), some 
questions remained in terms of the effect different types of information had on 
deliberation and implementation. This experiment looked at how unclear information 
is processed, and the raised demands it places on cognitive activity, in order for it to 
contribute to meaningful decisions. Further, this experiment also looked at how 
unclear information is recognised and ignored, opting for an individual solution to 
the task. Both of these conditions further helped in identifying the particular brain 
areas active during these processes, and how these choices were affected by the 
varying degrees of certainty at different levels of choice consequence. The 
experiment provided different types of advice, in the form of simple information on 
which to base the decision. Similar to the Stroop conditions described in the previous 
experiment, these variations were aimed at identifying variations in deliberation and 
implementation of decision, in combination with the findings on scenario conditions. 
 
 After looking at an artificial variation in task-advice (Stroop conditions), this 
experiment was aimed at looking at a more realistic presentation of advice and its 
effect on cognitive processing. In decision-making environments available advice is 
not always presented in a coherent manner. This can lead to additional cognitive 
demands on the decision maker, in terms of evaluating the relevance of such 
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information for informing a current choice. With this in mind, and building on 
findings from the previous experiments, it was important to further identify how 
these variations in clarity and uncertainty of advice affected response times, and how 
these were reflected in terms of possible delay or effortful evaluation. It was shown 
in the previous experiments that the type of advice was significantly more influential 
on the decision maker than the situation in which it was presented.  Therefore, it was 
important to look at how these variations reflected along a continuum when faced 
with a forced-choice, time pressured decision task in an experimental setting. 
 
1.1 Information Uncertainty 
 
 The key focus in the experiment was on the uncertainty of information, 
which contributed to the ambiguity of task (Elliot, Dolan, & Frith, 2000). While 
advice within a task can be provided in different forms, it is also important to be able 
to differentiate this from superfluous or irrelevant advice, in order maximise its 
application and avoid processing meaningless information. In this experiment advice 
was provided on either a clear or more complex level.  The experiment also included 
a condition utilising irrelevant advice which required the active effort of the decision 
maker to avoid it and use a personally held strategy to solve the task. 
 
 This combination of processes, identified in the prefrontal cortex, relates to 
the focus on externally presented information (stimuli), as in tasks of sustained 
attention (Kanwisher & Wojciulik, 2000), as well as the monitoring of internally 
held information, such as monitoring the content of episodic or working memory 
(Habib, Nyberg, & Tulving, 2003). The initial processing relates to the identification 
of incoming information, with a subsequent evaluation of its meaning. More 
complex information, incongruent or requiring an additional process of ‘translation’, 
probably directly affects cognitive processing and subsequent response. 
 
 On the highest level of uncertainty, unclear information requires significantly 
more effortful processing (Ward, 2010), an expectation incorporated into the 
experimental design. As information is identified, an evaluation about its validity 
needs to be completed, raising the activity relating to monitoring and attending 
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(Cabeza, Dolcos, Prince, Rice, Weissman, & Nyberg, 2003). Following this 
assessment, recognising the information as redundant and task-irrelevant, task-
switching activity comes into play (Monsell, 2003). Task switching is the move from 
evaluation and deliberation in processing the available information, to the need to 
apply a different strategy to solve the task. On the most fundamental level, this 
would involve the deliberative retrieval from memory of the individual strategy 
(Mayr & Kleigl, 2000), based on alternative patterns and goals. But the goal in this 
experiment was to identify the switch cost (Wylie & Allport, 2000), as the difference 
between switch and non-switch tasks. This was then used as a means to differentiate 
between these two processes, relating to the cognitive activity observed when 
dealing with more complex information. 
 
 Considering the ambiguity of the task and the uncertainty of the outcome, 
based on the varying levels of meaningful advice information, it was essential to 
identify how these influenced response times and how this was reflected in cognitive 
activity. Similarly, the ability to differentiate between the processing of two complex 
types of information, each resulting in a switch towards a different problem-solving 
strategy, provided grounds to further confirm the role particular brain regions play 
during this type of decision making. 
 
 
1.2 Objectives and Hypotheses 
 
 The aim of the experiment was to look at how cognitive processing and 
behavioural response during a simplified decision paradigm is affected by varying 
types of task-information as presented in different scenario conditions. Following on 
from previous findings around decision-making stages, the goal was to further assess 
the effect different levels of clarity had on information processing and how this was 
used to inform choices in a time-limited and performance-pressured environment. 
This experiment combined brain activity as well as behavioural data, to identify the 
time-intervals at which particular areas were most active and how this varied based 
on clarity of information and the consequence environment it was presented in. The 
following objectives were also considered:  
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> Identify the neural processes involved at each stage of decision making and map 
these out for each individual type of information. 
 
> Emotional stimuli that suggest more significant and consequential outcomes 
will result in increased and prolonged amplitudes at the stages of deliberation, 
preparation and implementation. 
 
> The incongruent and unclear information conditions will result in increased and 
prolonged amplitudes at the stages of deliberation and implementation with 
longer response times than the congruent information condition. 
 
> The incongruent and unclear advice conditions will result in activation of 
different brain areas, providing a basis on which to differentiate between 
complex information processing (‘translation’) and task-specific problem 
solving (own strategy). 
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2. METHOD 
 
2.1 Participants 
 
Thirteen individuals (11 females, 2 males) participated in the experiment. 
They ranged in age from 19 to 33 years, with a mean age of 22 years. Participants 
were drawn from a sample of students at the University of Liverpool, all without any 
disclosed health issues, and were all right-handed. 
 
2.2 Procedure 
 
This experiment followed a similar set-up as previously discussed (see 
Chapters II, III, and IV), and closely mirrored conditions in Experiment 4. 
Participants were seated in a comfortable chair, inside a dimly-lit, electrically-
shielded room, with their right arm resting on a platform. All task-related 
information was presented to them on a computer screen and they responded using a 
mouse placed below their right hand. 
 
The experiment consisted of a series of decision situations, at the end of 
which individuals were asked to make a choice between two random alternatives 
under time pressure. The task consisted of a ‘bomb scenario’, where participants 
were asked to imagine themselves operating in the various situations with the 
objective to ‘cut’ a wire and disarm a bomb. Following this, they faced a decision 
stage and had to choose between two alternatives, in the form of two different-
coloured wires (see Table 1) (failing to cut one of the wires quickly enough 
automatically led to ‘detonation’). The basic premise of the decision problem 
focused on a binary negative outcome paradigm, where participants had to choose 
between two arbitrary alternatives, not knowing which would be the correct wire - 
reinforced through time constrains and performance pressures - and  where a ‘wrong’ 
decision lead to a negative outcome. 
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Varying from the initial design, this experiment only focused on two situational 
settings. Participants were presented with a context-setting scenario involving either: 
 
(i) a light-bulb, which they had to switch off by picking a wire (low 
consequence condition), or 
(ii) children on playground, in which the wires were used to disarm a bomb 
(high consequence condition). 
 
In summary, the stimulus indicated two conditions: 1) low consequence, and 
2) high consequence. This was followed by an image of a light switch (low 
consequence condition) or explosive device (high-consequence condition), to 
reinforce the situational context. Finally participants were prompted to choose 
between a red or blue wire ‘connected’ to the particular device. Failure to make a 
decision or a wrong one, led to detonation of the device. Following each choice, they 
received feedback in the form of a “CORRECT” or “INCORRECT” on-screen 
message. 
 
The instructions, prior and during the experiment, all emphasised the need to 
take quick and decisive action. Participants were told that they would be assessed on 
their accuracy as well as their speed, forming part of an overall learning task. As part 
of this learning task, in some instances they received percentile ‘advice’ on the 
likelihood of which wire was the correct one (i.e. 80% BLUE or 20% BLUE), 
varying in the clarity of information provided. While in others they received unclear 
advice (i.e. 50% BLUE or 50% RED). This information was provided as a direct 
statement above the two wires. Following on from the design in Experiment 4 these 
variations represented congruent or incongruent conditions, while the unclear advice 
condition mirrored the no advice one, in terms of details available to inform one’s 
choice. 
 
A total of 240 stimuli series were presented in two blocks of 22 minutes each, 
with a 5 minutes break between them. The order in each block of 120 stimuli was 
randomised, combining both scenario conditions (i.e. low- and high-consequence) 
with all three advice conditions (i.e. congruent, incongruent, and unclear advice). 
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Table 1. Decision Paradigm (examples) 
Stage  Evaluation Deliberation Choice  
Stimuli Mask Context Device Decision Feedback 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORRECT 
or 
INCORRECT 
or 
TOO SLOW 
TIME 2,000ms 2,000ms 2,000ms 3,000ms 1,500ms 
 
2.3 Recordings 
 
EEG was recorded using 64 electrodes in continuous mode on Biosemi 
(ActiView v6.05, Amsterdam – Netherlands). A band pass filter of 0.16-100 Hz and 
a sampling rate of 500 Hz were used, while the electrode-to-skin impedance was 
kept below 5 kΩ. Elecrooculography (EOG) measures were recorded, using 
electrodes placed above and below the left eye, while electrocardiographic (ECG) 
measures were recorded by placing one electrode on the right ankle and another one 
on the left wrist. Both of these recordings were used to account for any artefacts in 
the data analysis. 
 
The decision scenarios were designed using Inquisit (Millisecond Software 
v3.0.4, Seattle – USA), and recordings for each participant’s response times were 
taken at each decision stage. 
 
2.4 Data Analysis 
 
Averaged EEG epochs were segmented after band pass filtering and analyzed 
using the Brain Electrical Source Analysis (BESA) program (MEGIS Software, 
Munich – Germany). Trials containing ECG artefacts or large EOG variations (> 75 
mV) were discarded from further analysis. There were two vision-related measures, 
with one focusing on the presentation of scenario context stimuli and the other on the 
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advice stimuli. For the scenario-related measures, 2,707 averaged EEG epochs were 
segmented to a length of 1,100 ms (100 ms pre- to 1, 000 ms post-stimulus), while 
for the advice-related measures, 3,015 averaged EEG epochs were segmented to a 
length of 800 ms (200 ms pre- to 600 ms post-stimulus). For the movement-related 
measures, 2,912 averaged EEG epochs were segmented to a length of 2,000 ms 
(1,500 ms pre- to 500 ms post-stimulus). A source model of the EEG potentials was 
constructed from the grand average data (N = 13) for each of the measures. The data 
was transformed into the Talairach coordinate system, and the locations of the EEG 
sources were evaluated for each individual dipole (Talairach Client v2.4.2, Research 
Imaging Centre, UTHSCSA - USA). 
 
2.5 Statistical Analysis 
 
The effect of stimulus intensity on the dipoles source was analysed using a t-
test for the scenario conditions, comparing the recordings following stimuli 
presentations. The independent variables at this stage were the two different scenario 
conditions (low- and high-consequence). For the latter stages, advice presentation 
and choice commitment, the stimulus intensity on the dipoles source was analysed 
using a factorial repeated-measures analysis of variance (ANOVA). The independent 
variables for both included again the scenario conditions (high and low), and the 
three different types of advice (congruent, incongruent, and unclear). 
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3. RESULTS 
 
The results will detail three stages for each decision task within the 
experiment, describing the differences in amplitudes for each of the source dipoles, 
directly following the presentation of stimuli or the commitment to a choice. First, 
the focus will be on the perception components relating to the presentation of the 
context-setting stimuli, indicating the scenario in which individuals were ‘operating’ 
in. Further, the focus will be on the perception components relating to the advice 
provision and, finally, on the activity prior to the button press and commitment to a 
choice. For all of these stages, the data will be compared based on the two 
consequence conditions, looking for significant difference in the source waveforms. 
Similarly, the second and third stages will further, additionally to the scenario 
conditions, consider the differences in advice provision, and any significant 
interaction. Additionally, behavioural and qualitative measures will be analysed, to 
further expand on the decision-making narrative. 
 
3.1 Perception Components 
 
3.1.1 Scenario Consequence 
 
Five regional source dipoles were fitted to describe the 3-dimensional source 
currents contributing to the data (see A, in Figure 1). Three sources were located in 
the occipital lobe. The central source (S1, Talairach coordinates in mm [x: -1.4, y: -
82, z: 2.2], Brodmann area 18) peaked at 103ms. Two secondary sources, occupying 
lateral locations (S2R [x: 39.5, y: -76.3, z: 0.5], 19/18, and S3L [x: -29.5, y: -91.3, z: -
2.2], 18) peaked at 135ms and 94ms respectively. Another source was located in the 
posterior cingulate cortex (S4 [x: 9.7, y: -27.1, z: 37.8], 31), peaking at 92ms. While 
the last source was located in the frontal lobe (S5 [x: -8.6, y: 47.8, z: 13], 10) and 
peaked at 115ms. The grand-average model was tested for all conditions, and the 
residual variances were similar in both conditions (both 10%, low-consequence 15%, 
high-consequence 9%) (see B, in Figure 1). 
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To evaluate the differences between the two scenario conditions, individual 
source waveforms for each were obtained using the grand-average model. The 
average source waveforms with time intervals showing statistically significant 
deviation (p < 0.05) between the different conditions are shown in Figure 1. 
 
Analysis showed that in three separate time intervals for the source located in 
the occipital lobe (S1) were associated with significant differences for the different 
scenario conditions. An early interval (120ms to 210ms) showed that the high-
consequence scenarios resulted in a larger increase in amplitude than the low-
consequence ones, t = -3.9446, p = .000. A second interval (570ms to 670ms) for the 
same source dipole showed a similar result, with the high-consequence scenarios 
resulting in a larger increase than the low-consequence ones, t = -4.5488, p = .000. 
The last interval (680ms to 780ms) in the same source showed that the high-
consequence scenarios resulted in a larger increase in amplitude than did the low-
consequence ones, t = -4.227, p = .000.  
 
Significant differences were observed at both lateral sources dipoles (S2R & 
S3L) located in the occipital lobe. An early interval (170ms to 360ms) in right source 
(S2R) showed that the high-consequence scenarios resulted in a larger decrease in 
amplitude than the low-consequence ones, t = 8.51, p = .000. For the left source 
(S3L), three separate time intervals were identified. An early interval (170ms to 
260ms) showed that the high-consequence scenarios resulted in a larger increase in 
amplitude than the low-consequence ones, t = -5.0028, p = .000. A later (350ms to 
450ms) similarly showed that the high-consequence scenarios resulted in a larger 
increase in amplitude when compared to the low-consequence ones, t = -3.458, p = 
.000. A last interval (480ms to 560ms) further showed that the high-consequence 
scenarios resulted in continued larger increase in amplitude than the low-
consequence ones, t = -4.1124, p = .000. 
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Table 2. Mean activity recorded for scenario-perception components with significant 
differences between consequence conditions 
	  
	  
 Analysis for the source dipoles in the limbic lobe (cingulate gyrus) (S4) 
identified again three separate time intervals which showed significant results. An 
early interval (130ms to 210ms) showed that high-consequence scenarios resulted in 
a larger increase in amplitude than the low-consequence ones, t = -3.6536, p = .000. 
A later interval (340ms to 430ms) showed similar differences, with high-
consequence scenarios resulting in a larger increase in amplitude when compared to 
low-consequence ones, t = -5.6284, p = .000. A following interval (440ms to 600ms) 
showed a prolonged difference, with high-consequence scenarios continue still 
resulting in larger amplitudes than the low-consequence ones, t = -7.658, p = .000. 
 
 A final difference was observed in the source located in the frontal lobe (S5). 
For this interval (180ms to 290ms) results showed that the low-consequence 
scenarios resulted in a larger increase in amplitude than the high-consequence ones, t 
= 6.1751, p = .000. 
	  
	  
Source 
Consequence Scenario Analysis 
Low High t p 
S1.1 
(120ms – 210ms) 
M = -10.63,  
SD = 17.25 
M = 15.41,  
SD = 34.69 -3.9446 .000 
S1.2 
(570ms – 670ms) 
M = 8.51,  
SD = 7.41 
M = 20.25,  
SD = 11.39 -4.5488 .000 
S1.3 
(680ms – 780ms) 
M = 8,  
SD = 7.1 
M = 17.79,  
SD = 11.06 -4.227 .000 
S2 
(170ms – 360ms) 
M = -8.02,  
SD = 15.68 
M = -37.35,  
SD = 20.61 8.51 .000 
S3.1 
(170ms – 260ms) 
M = 11.74,  
SD = 12.68 
M = 26.52,  
SD = 9.99 -5.0028 .000 
S3.2 
(350ms – 450ms) 
M = 5.27,  
SD = 6.99 
M = 14.17,  
SD = 10.88 -3.458 .000 
S3.3 
(480ms – 560ms) 
M = -1.5,  
SD = 8.19 
M = 7.25,  
SD = 8.38 -4.1124 .000 
S4.1 
(130ms – 210ms) 
M = 12.84,  
SD = 14.74 
M = 28.83,  
SD = 17.98 
-3.6536 
 .000 
S4.2 
(340ms – 430ms) 
M = 2.52,  
SD = 18.41 
M = 18.41,  
SD = 15.29 -5.6284 .000 
S4.3 
(440ms – 600ms) 
M = 2.87,  
SD = 9.21 
M = 21.81,  
SD = 13.4 -7.658 .000 
S5 
(180ms – 290ms) 
M = 22.2,  
SD = 16.23 
M = -13.46,  
SD = 22.33 6.1751 .000 
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Figure 1. Scenario Consequence Components 
(A) Localisation of source dipoles shown schematically in the transparent glass brain. Short lines in 
each source indicate the orientation of the primary component of the respective regional source. 
Source labels: 1 = S1 Occipital Lobe; 2 = S2 Occipital Lobe; 3 = S3 Occipital Lobe; 4 = S4 Cingulate 
Cortex; 5 = S5 Frontal Lobe. (B) Global field power (blue scale) and residual variance (red scale). (C) 
Source waveforms of source dipoles derived from the grand average data. Averages for each 
scenario conditions overlaid (low-consequence = blue; high-consequence = red). Empty rectangles 
indicate statistically significant (p < .05) increase for source amplitudes in more consequential 
scenario conditions, while filled rectangles indicate statistically significant (p < .05) decrease for 
source amplitudes in more consequential ones. Numbers of source waveforms correspond to (A). 
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3.1.2 Advice 
 
For the advice perception-related components associated with the advice 
stimuli six regional source dipoles were fitted to describe the 3-dimensional source 
currents (see A, in Figure 2.1, Figure 2.2, and Figure 2.3). Again, three sources were 
located in the occipital lobe. The central source (S1 [x: 9.3, y: -79.3, z: 11.4], 17) 
peaked at 105ms. Two secondary sources, occupying lateral sources (S2L [x: -32.8, 
y: -84.3, z: -21.5], 18, and S3R [x: 14.2, y: -64.9, z: -6.9], 19/18) peaked at 244ms 
and 293ms respectively. A fourth source was located in the contralateral temporal 
lobe (S4 [x: -39.6, y: -34.6, z: 17.8], 41), peaking at 188ms. The fifth source was 
located in the anterior cingulate cortex (S5 [x: 7.0, y: 32.9, z: 14.4], 24), and peaked 
at 195ms. A last source was located in the ipsilateral temporal lobe (S6 [x: 35.6, y: 
2.4, z: -26.3], 38), peaking at 246ms. The grand-average model was tested for all 
conditions, and the residual variances were similar in all low- (all 10%, congruent 
10%, incongruent 10%, unclear advice 11%) as well as high-consequence advice 
conditions (all 13%, congruent 13%, incongruent 12%, unclear advice 12%) (see B, 
in Figure 2.1, Figure 2.2, and Figure 2.3 respectively). 
 
Following the same approach as the perception components above, the 
individual source waveforms for each advice condition in both consequence levels 
were obtained using the grand-average model, in order to evaluate the differences 
between them. The average source waveforms with time intervals showing 
statistically significant deviation (p < 0.05) between the different conditions are 
shown in Figure 2.1, Figure 2.2, and Figure 2.3. 
 
Consequence 
 
 Analyses showed that a number of time intervals in various source dipoles 
resulted in significant results when comparing the recorded amplitudes for the two 
scenario conditions. For the congruent advice conditions, four source dipoles showed 
significant differences. The time interval (160ms to 260ms) located in the occipital 
lobe (S1) showed that the low-consequence scenarios resulted in a larger decrease of 
amplitude than the high-consequence ones, t = -3.078, p = .010. During a similar 
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interval (180ms to 270ms) for the source located in the left occipital lobe (S2L) 
recordings also showed that the low-consequence scenarios resulted in a larger 
decrease in amplitude when compare to the high-consequence ones, t = -3.481, p = 
.005.  
 
 For the congruent advice conditions, results also showed significant 
differences between the scenario conditions for the sources located in the anterior 
cingulate (S5) and ipsilateral temporal lobe (S6). The interval in the former one 
(170ms to 240ms) showed that the high-consequence conditions resulted in a larger 
increase in amplitude than the low-consequence ones, t = -3.268, p = .007. For the 
latter source, a similar interval (180ms to 260ms) showed also that the high-
consequence scenarios resulted in a larger increase in amplitude than the low-
consequence ones, t = -2.711, p = .019. 
 
Table 3. Mean activity recorded of advice-perception components with significant differences 
between consequence conditions, for all types of advice 
Advice Source Consequence Scenario Analysis Low High t p 
Congruent 
S1 
(160ms – 260ms) 
M = -14.13,  
SD = 17.59 
M = -9.44,  
SD = 17.32 -2.395 .032 
S2 
(180ms – 270ms) 
M = -9.53,  
SD = 13.28 
M = -5.08,  
SD = 10.59 -3.448 .004 
S5 
(170ms – 240ms) 
M = 23.56,  
SD = 20.39 
M = 32.6,  
SD = 18.78 -3.268 .007 
S6 
(180ms – 260ms) 
M = 16.8,  
SD = 19.85 
M = 24.67,  
SD = 14.68 -2.711 .019 
      
Incongruent 
S1 
(160ms – 260ms) 
M = -9.87,  
SD = 24.08 
M = 2.41,  
SD = 25.99 -5.546 .000 
S2 
(180ms – 270ms) 
M = 22.37,  
SD = 20.45 
M = 30.86,  
SD = 25.96 -3.724 .003 
      
Unclear 
S1 
(160ms – 260ms) 
M = -9.01,  
SD = 26.94 
M = -0.17,  
SD = 29.27 -2.628 .022 
S5 
(170ms – 240ms) 
M = 21.41,  
SD = 16.79 
M = 31.44,  
SD = 15.71 -3.262 .007 
S6 
(180ms – 260ms) 
M = 14.66,  
SD = 17.08 
M = 26.31,  
SD = 14.5 -3.701 .003 
 
In the congruent advice condition, results showed significant differences for 
two of the sources located in occipital lobe. The one interval (S1, 160ms to 260ms) 
showed that the low-consequence condition resulted in a larger decrease in 
amplitude than the high-consequence one, t = -5.546, p = .000. On the other hand, 
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the similar interval (180ms to 270ms) at the lateral source (S2L) showed that the 
high-consequence scenario resulted in a larger increase in amplitude than the low-
consequence one, t = -3.724, p = .003. 
 
 Finally, for the no-advice conditions, three separate sources showed 
significant differences between the two scenario conditions. For the source located in 
the occipital lobe (S1) an early time interval (160ms to 260ms) showed that the low-
consequence scenario resulted in a larger decrease in amplitude than the high-
consequence one, t = -2.628, p = .022. The other two sources showed similar 
differences, in terms of localisation and time interval, as those observed for the 
congruent advice condition. The interval (170ms to 240ms) for the source located in 
the anterior cingulate (S5) showed that the high-consequence scenario resulted in a 
larger increase in amplitude than the low-consequence one, t = -3.262, p = .007. 
Similarly, the time interval (180ms to 260ms) located in the ipsilateral temporal lobe 
(S6) showed that the high-consequence scenarios resulted in a larger increase in 
amplitude than the low-consequence ones, t = -3.701, p = .003. 
 
 
Advice 
 
 When looking for the significant differences between the three advice 
conditions as presented for each of the scenario conditions, analysis showed that 
there were no significant differences between them. 
 
 
Interaction between Consequence and Advice 
 
 Further analysis showed that there was no significant interaction between the 
type of advice given and the scenario conditions in which they were received, when 
looking at the recorded activity before and after the presentation of the wires. 
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Figure 2.1. Difference between the consequence scenario conditions for the advice-perception 
components when presented with congruent advice 
(A) Localisation of source dipoles shown schematically in the transparent glass brain. Short lines in 
each source indicate the orientation of the primary component of the respective regional source. 
Source labels: 1 = S1 Occipital Lobe; 2 = S2 Occipital Lobe; 3 = S3 Occipital Lobe; 4 = S4 Temporal 
Lobe; 5 = S5 Cingulate Cortex; 6 = S6 Temporal Lobe. (B) Global field power (blue scale) and 
residual variance (red scale). (C) Source waveforms of source dipoles derived from the grand average 
data. Averages for each scenario conditions overlaid (low-consequence = blue; high-consequence = 
red). Empty rectangles indicate statistically significant (p < .05) increase for source amplitudes in more 
consequential scenario conditions, while filled rectangles indicate statistically significant (p < .05) 
decrease for source amplitudes in more consequential ones. Numbers of source waveforms 
correspond to (A). 	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Figure 2.2. Difference between the consequence scenario conditions for the advice-perception 
components when presented with incongruent advice 
(A) Localisation of source dipoles shown schematically in the transparent glass brain. Short lines in 
each source indicate the orientation of the primary component of the respective regional source. 
Source labels: 1 = S1 Occipital Lobe; 2 = S2 Occipital Lobe; 3 = S3 Occipital Lobe; 4 = S4 Temporal 
Lobe; 5 = S5 Cingulate Cortex; 6 = S6 Temporal Lobe. (B) Global field power (blue scale) and 
residual variance (red scale). (C) Source waveforms of source dipoles derived from the grand average 
data. Averages for each scenario conditions overlaid (low-consequence = blue; high-consequence = 
red). Empty rectangles indicate statistically significant (p < .05) increase for source amplitudes in more 
consequential scenario conditions, while filled rectangles indicate statistically significant (p < .05) 
decrease for source amplitudes in more consequential ones. Numbers of source waveforms 
correspond to (A). 	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Figure 2.3. Difference between the consequence scenario conditions for the advice-perception 
components when presented with unclear advice 
(A) Localisation of source dipoles shown schematically in the transparent glass brain. Short lines in 
each source indicate the orientation of the primary component of the respective regional source. 
Source labels: 1 = S1 Occipital Lobe; 2 = S2 Occipital Lobe; 3 = S3 Occipital Lobe; 4 = S4 Temporal 
Lobe; 5 = S5 Cingulate Cortex; 6 = S6 Temporal Lobe. (B) Global field power (blue scale) and 
residual variance (red scale). (C) Source waveforms of source dipoles derived from the grand average 
data. Averages for each scenario conditions overlaid (low-consequence = blue; high-consequence = 
red). Empty rectangles indicate statistically significant (p < .05) increase for source amplitudes in more 
consequential scenario conditions, while filled rectangles indicate statistically significant (p < .05) 
decrease for source amplitudes in more consequential ones. Numbers of source waveforms 
correspond to (A). 	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3.2 Decision Components 
 
Movement-related: Choice 
 
For the last part of the analysis relating to the EEG recordings, four regional 
source dipoles were fitted to describe the source currents (see A, in Figure 3.1 and 
Figure 3.2). One source was located in the occipital lobe (S1 [x: 17, y: -60.4, z: -
3.1], 19), peaking at -1,000ms. The second source was located in the anterior 
cingulate cortex (S2 [x: 10.3, y: -0.4, z: 35.2], 24) and peaked at -55ms. The third 
source was located in the contralateral primary motor cortex (S3 [x: -27.1, y: -23.2, 
z: 59.6], 4) and peaked at -6ms. The final source was located in the frontal lobe (S4 
[x: -17, y: 50.8, z: 23.3], 10), peaking at -850ms. The grand-average model was 
tested for all conditions, and the residual variances were similar in all low- (all 32%, 
congruent 30%, incongruent 30%, unclear advice 35%) as well as high-consequence 
advice conditions (all 35%, congruent 38%, incongruent 30%, unclear advice 36%) 
(see B, in Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 respectively). 
 
To evaluate the differences between the three advice conditions for both 
consequence levels, individual source waveforms for each were obtained using the 
grand average model. The average source waveforms with time intervals showing 
statistically significant deviation (p < 0.05) between the different conditions are 
show in Figure 3. Analysis of the selected Bereitschaftspotential parameters was 
performed, using a three-way ANOVA for repeated measures at both low- and high-
consequence scenarios, factoring in all three advice types. The focus was on 
particular time intervals, prior to the participants’ voluntary movements, identifying 
their commitment to a particular choice through movement-related potentials (see C, 
in Figures 3.1 and Figure 3.2 respectively). 
 
Consequence 
 
 The analysis for the last component focused on the processes leading up to 
the commission of a decision, describing the activity from deliberation to choice. 
Results showed that there were a number of source dipoles where the scenario 
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conditions resulted in significant differences at various time intervals for each of the 
different types of advice.  
 
 In the congruent advice condition, results showed a prolonged period where 
the scenario conditions resulted in a significant effect on the activity recorded for the 
source located in the occipital lobe (S1). Over three almost-continuous time intervals 
(S1.2: -730ms to -650ms, S1.3: -620ms to -520ms, and S1.4: -510ms to -370ms) 
recordings showed that the low-consequence conditions resulted in a larger increase 
in amplitude when compared to the high-consequence ones, t = 2.944, p = .012, t = 
3.291, p = .006, and t = 4.02, p = .002. A time interval closer the button press (-
300ms to -190ms) in the same location showed that the low-consequence condition 
still resulted in a larger increase in amplitude than the high-consequence one, t = 
3.11, p = .009. 
 
 For the same congruent advice condition, two further differences were 
recorded at different intervals for the source dipole located in the frontal lobe (S4). 
An early interval (-1200ms to -1080ms) showed that the low-consequence scenario 
resulted in a lager increase in amplitude than the high-consequence one, t = 2.298, p 
= .04. Similarly, a later interval (-720ms to -620ms) showed a similar difference 
between the two scenario conditions, t = 4.740, p = .000. 
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Table 4. Mean activity recorded for movement components with significant differences 
between consequence conditions, for all types of advice 
Advice Source Consequence Scenarios Analysis Low High t p 
Congruent 
S1.2  
(-730ms – -650ms)  
M = 25.69,  
SD = 37.3 
M = 11.94,  
SD = 31.39 2.944 .012 
S1.3  
(-620ms – -520ms)  
M = 31.7,  
SD = 35.57 
M = 13.96,  
SD = 36.98 3.291 .006 
S1.4  
(-510ms – -370ms)  
M = 29.16,  
SD = 35.25 
M = 12.19,  
SD = 31.27 4.02 .002 
S1.5  
(-300ms – -190ms)  
M = 15.65,  
SD = 35.81 
M = 0.03,  
SD = 28.06 3.11 .009 
S4.1  
(-1200ms – -1080ms)  
M = 6.69,  
SD = 8.68 
M = 0.19,  
SD = 9.48 
2.298 
 .04 
S4.2  
(-720ms – -620ms)  
M = 20.23,  
SD = 17.3 
M = 3.07,  
SD = 13.47 4.74 .000 
      
Incongruent 
S1.1  
(-870ms – -790ms) 
M = 19.92,  
SD = 27.36 
M = 5.32,  
SD = 19.92 3.133 .009 
S1.2  
(-730ms – -650ms) 
M = 20.07,  
SD = 28.77 
M = 4.56,  
SD = 23.08 4.114 .001 
S1.4  
(-510ms – -370ms) 
M = 3.58,  
SD = 31.35 
M = -11.61,  
SD = 25.94 5.297 .000 
S1.5  
(-300ms – -190ms) 
M = -9.55,  
SD = 31.31 
M = -23.66,  
SD = 25.33 3.263 .007 
      
Unclear 
S1.1  
(-870ms – -790ms) 
M = 16.49,  
SD = 28.67 
M = 0.63,  
SD = 24.65 2.331 .038 
S4.1  
(-1200ms – -1080ms) 
M = 9.12,  
SD = 9.11 
M = -2.14,  
SD = 12.43 2.875 .014 
 
For the incongruent advice condition, results pointed to significant difference 
between the scenario conditions only for the source located in the occipital lobe (S1). 
Two early time intervals (S1.1: -870ms to -790ms, and S1.2: -730ms to -650ms) 
both showed that the low-consequence conditions resulted in a larger increase in 
amplitude than the high-consequence ones, t = 3.133, p = .009, and, t = 4.114, p = 
.001. On the other hand, when looking at two later intervals nearer the button press 
(S1.4: -510ms to -370ms, and S1.5: -300ms to -190ms), recordings showed that the 
high-consequence conditions resulted in a larger decrease in amplitude when 
compared to the low-consequence ones, t = 5.297, p = .000, and, t = 3.263, p = .007. 
 
Finally, recordings for the conditions where the advice was unclear showed that 
significant differences between the scenario conditions were observed at two source 
dipoles. An early interval (-870ms to -790ms) for the source dipole located in the 
occipital lobe (S1) showed that the low-consequence condition resulted in a larger 
increase in amplitude than the high-consequence one, t = 2.331, p = .038. For the 
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source located in the frontal lobe (S4) analysis for an early interval (-1200ms to -
1080ms) showed again that the low-consequence condition resulted in a larger 
increase in amplitude when compared to the high-consequence one, t = 2.875, p = 
.014. 
 
Advice 
 
Further analysis was carried out separately for both scenario conditions, to 
look at significant difference between different types of advice. When looking at the 
low-consequence scenarios, advice conditions were associated with statistically 
significant differences in a number of source dipoles. Recordings for the source 
dipole located in the occipital lobe (S1) showed that differences between the types of 
advice were observed for a number of time intervals. A difference was observed for 
an early interval (-550ms to -400ms), F (2, 24) = 9.030, p = .001, which showed a 
larger increase in amplitude for the congruent advice condition, a significant 
decrease for the incongruent advice condition, and finally a negative increase for the 
unclear advice one. 
 
A later interval (-350ms to -200ms) in the same source showed that a 
difference between the types of advice still persisted, F (2, 24) = 8.200, p = .002. But 
contrasts revealed that the congruent advice condition resulted in significant larger 
increase in amplitude when compared to the incongruent, F (1, 12) = 11.923, p = 
.005, and unclear advice, F (1, 12) = 9.402, p = .01, ones. Differences were still 
observed for the interval just prior to the button press (-170ms to -40ms), F (2, 24) = 
16.943, p = .000, where the congruent advice resulted in a larger increase in 
amplitude than the incongruent one, F (1, 12) = 27.375, p = .000, and the unclear 
advice one resulted in a significant negative increase, F (1, 12) = 25.627, p = .000. In 
the interval just following the button press (40ms to 130ms) the significant 
difference, F (2, 24) = 4.134, p = .029, was observed for the larger increase in 
amplitude when choosing based on congruent advice when compared to the unclear 
advice, F (1, 12) = 5.927, p = .031. 
 
For the source located in the limbic lobe (S2) one time interval (-700ms to -
600ms) showed significant differences between the types of advice available, F (2, 
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24) = 10.359, p = .001. Contrasts revealed that the incongruent, F (1, 12) = 23.322, p 
= .000, and unclear advice, F (1, 12) = 19.997, p = .001, resulted in a larger increase 
in amplitude when compared to the congruent advice condition. 
 
Recordings for the source dipole located in the frontal lobe (S4) revealed 
three separate time intervals with significant differences between the advice 
conditions. Differences for the interval prior to the button press (-760ms to -680ms), 
F (2, 24) = 3.702, p = .04, showed that the unclear advice resulted in a larger 
increase in amplitude when compared to the incongruent one, F (1, 12) = 6.292, p = 
.027. When looking at the interval just after the button press (50ms to 130ms), F (2, 
24) = 6.27, p = .006, contrasts revealed that the congruent advice resulted in a larger 
decrease in amplitude than the unclear advice, F (1, 12) = 8.952, p = .011. A later 
interval after the button press (350ms to 470ms) pointed to further differences, F (2, 
24) = 8.741, p = .001, where the unclear advice resulted in a larger increase in 
amplitude when compared to the congruent, F (1, 12) = 10.963, p = .006, and 
incongruent, F (1, 12) = 18.787, p = .001, ones. 
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Table 5. Mean activity recorded for movement components with significant differences 
between advice conditions, for both consequence scenario conditions 
Consequence 
Scenario Source 
Advice Analysis 
Congruent Incongruent Unclear F (2, 24) p 
Low 
S1.1 
(-550ms – -400ms) 
M = 29.84, 
SD = 35.11 
M = 5.86, 
SD = 30.41 
M = -8.08, 
SD = 24.56 9.030 .001 
S1.2 
(-350ms – -200ms) 
M = 17.08, 
SD = 36.08 
M = 5.86, 
SD = 30.41 
M = -15.5, 
SD = 26.83 8.200 .002 
S1.3 
(-170ms to -40ms) 
M = 15.75, 
SD = 28.85 
M = -8.77, 
SD = 29.23 
M = -17.77, 
SD = 35.48 16.943 .000 
S1.4 
(40ms – 130ms) 
M = 11.34, 
SD = 28.71 
M = 10.03,  
SD = 31.66 * 
M = -4.86, 
SD = 34.07 4.134 .029 
S2.1 
(-700ms – -600ms) 
M = 7.74, 
SD = 21.5 
M = 27.05, 
SD = 27.3 
M = 26.56, 
SD = 20.4 10.359 .001 
S3.1 
(-760ms – -680ms) 
M = 0.47,  
SD = 17.23 * 
M = 4.74, 
SD = 21.52 
M = -6.27, 
SD = 10.86 3.702 .04 
S3.2 
(50ms – 130ms) 
M = -15.04, 
SD = 18.06 
M = -7.63,  
SD = 15.74 * 
M = -2.38, 
SD = 20.81 6.27 .006 
S3.3 
(350ms – 470ms) 
M = 0.9, 
SD = 19.06 
M = 1.88, 
SD = 18.23 
M = 12.8, 
SD = 18.28 8.741 .001 
       
High 
S1.1 
(-550ms – -400ms) 
M = 12.74, 
SD = 31.71 
M = -7.97, 
SD = 23.97 
M = -15.48, 
SD = 26.34 6.517 .005 
S1.2 
(-350ms – -200ms) 
M = 2.5, 
SD = 28.15 
M = -22.26, 
SD = 25.82 
M = -18.51, 
SD = 30.27 5.386 .012 
S1.3 
(-170ms – -40ms) 
M = 1.01, 
SD = 29.36 
M = -18.2, 
SD = 30.11 
M = -16.68, 
SD = 35.13 5.345 .012 
S1.4 
(40ms – 130ms) 
M = 11.86, 
SD = 30.39 
M = -1.7, 
SD = 27.27 
M = -5.86, 
SD = 35.76 7.100 .004 
S3.1 
(-760ms – -680ms) 
M = 5.24,  
SD = 18.43 * 
M = 11.92, 
SD = 25.88 
M = -2.45, 
SD = 14.42 4.178 .028 
S3.2 
(50ms – 130ms) 
M = -12.42, 
SD = 16.63 
M = -5.05,  
SD = 19.53 * 
M = -2.64, 
SD = 20.58 4.24 .026 
S3.3 
(350ms – 470ms) 
M = 3.65, 
SD = 15.27 
M = 2.71, 
SD = 25.27 
M = 13.59, 
SD = 16.72 4.628 .02 
* No significant differences were observed for those recordings when compared to the other 
conditions. 
 
For the high-consequence conditions, the source dipoles located in the 
occipital lobe (S1) and in the frontal lobe (S3) showed intervals of significant 
difference between the types of advice presented. An early interval (-550ms to -
400ms) in the occipital lobe showed significant differences, F (2, 24) = 6.517, p = 
.005, where the incongruent, F (1, 12) = 4.917, p = .047, and unclear advice, F (1, 
12) = 9.809, p = .009, resulted in a larger increase in amplitude when compared to 
the congruent advice condition. For a later interval (-350ms to -200ms) in the same 
source, F (2, 24) = 5.386, p = .012, the differences pointed to the continuing trend, 
where the incongruent, F (1, 12) = 9.314, p = .01, and unclear advice conditions, F 
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(1, 12) = 4.908, p = .047, resulted in a larger increase in amplitude than the 
congruent one. 
 
Recordings at the same source dipole (S1) for the interval just prior to the 
button press (-170ms to -40ms), the differences showed, F (2, 24) = 5.345, p = .012, 
that the incongruent, F (1, 12) = 11.609, p = .005, and unclear advice conditions, F 
(1, 12) = 5.154, p = .042, resulted in a larger increase in amplitude when compared 
to the congruent advice one. On the other hand, differences in the interval just after 
the button press (40ms to 130ms), F (2, 24) = 7.100, p = .004, showed that the 
congruent advice condition resulted in a larger increase in amplitude than the 
incongruent, F (1, 12) = 15.354, p = .002, and unclear advice, F (1, 12) = 9.623, p = 
.009, ones. 
 
Analysis for the source dipole located in the frontal lobe (S3) revealed three 
separate time intervals with significant differences between the types of advice, 
similar to those observed for the low-consequence scenario condition. Differences in 
the early interval prior to the button press (-760ms to -680ms), F (2, 24) = 4.178, p = 
.028, showed that the incongruent advice conditions resulted in a larger increase in 
amplitude than the unclear advice ones, F (1, 12) = 7.118, p = .02. When looking at 
the interval just after the button press (50ms to 130ms), F (2, 24) = 4.24, p = .026, 
contrasts revealed that the congruent advice resulted in a larger decrease in 
amplitude than the unclear advice, F (1, 12) = 5.927, p = .031. A later interval after 
the button press (350ms to 470ms) pointed to further differences, F (2, 24) = 4.628, p 
= .02, where the unclear advice resulted in a larger increase in amplitude when 
compared to the congruent, F (1, 12) = 9.92, p = .008, and incongruent, F (1, 12) = 
6.596, p = .025, ones. 
 
Interaction between Consequence and Advice 
 
Analysis for the movement-related decision components showed that there 
was no significant interaction between the type of advice given and the scenario 
conditions in which they were received, when looking at the recorded activity before 
and after the presentation of the wires. 
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Figure 3.1 Difference between the advice conditions for the movement components when presented 
in the low-consequence scenarios 
 (A) Localisation of source dipoles shown schematically in the transparent glass brain. Short lines in 
each source indicate the orientation of the primary component of the respective regional source. 
Source labels: 1 = S1 Occipital Lobe; 2 = S2 Cingulate Cortex; 3 = S3 Primary Motor Cortex; 4 = S4 
Frontal Lobe. (B) Global field power (blue scale) and residual variance (red scale). (C) Source 
waveforms of source dipoles derived from the grand average data. Averages for each advice 
condition overlaid (congruent = red; incongruent = blue; no-advice = green).  Empty rectangles 
indicate statistically significant (p < .05) increase for source amplitudes in the no-advice conditions, 
while filled rectangles indicate statistically significant (p < .05) decrease for source amplitudes in the 
no-advice ones. Numbers of source waveforms correspond to (A). 
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Figure 3.2 Difference between the advice conditions for the movement components when presented 
in the high-consequence scenarios 
(A) Localisation of source dipoles shown schematically in the transparent glass brain. Short lines in 
each source indicate the orientation of the primary component of the respective regional source. 
Source labels: 1 = S1 Occipital Lobe; 2 = S2 Cingulate Cortex; 3 = S3 Primary Motor Cortex; 4 = S4 
Frontal Lobe. (B) Global field power (blue scale) and residual variance (red scale). (C) Source 
waveforms of source dipoles derived from the grand average data. Averages for each advice 
condition overlaid (congruent = red; incongruent = blue; no-advice = green Empty rectangles indicate 
statistically significant (p < .05) increase for source amplitudes in the no-advice conditions, while filled 
rectangles indicate statistically significant (p < .05) decrease for source amplitudes in the no-advice 
ones. Numbers of source waveforms correspond to (A). 	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3.3 Reaction Times 
 
Analysis of the reaction times showed that the advice conditions were 
associated with significant differences (F (1.176, 14.109) = 16.396, p = .001), while 
the scenarios conditions did not show any significant differences (F (1, 12) = 0.149, 
p = .707).  There was no significant interaction between both independent variables 
(F (2, 24) = 2.232, p = .129). Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of 
sphericity had been violated for the main effect of advice, χ2 (2) = 13.283, p = .001. 
Therefore degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of 
sphericity (ε = .588).  
 
When looking at the significant difference for the low-consequence scenarios 
(F (1.276, 15.308) = 20.560, p = .000), tests again showed that the assumption of 
sphericity had been violated for the main effect of advice, χ2 (2) = 9.227, p = .01; 
thus, the degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of 
sphericity (ε = .638). Recordings showed a significant increase in response times 
following congruent advice (M = 1034.629, SD = 175.677), when compared to 
incongruent advice conditions (M = 1229.242, SD = 226.007), F (1, 12) = 40.709, p 
= .000, r = 0.88, and a further significant increase when looking at unclear advice 
conditions (M = 1414.665, SD = 229.684), F (1, 12) = 7.993, p = .015, r = 0.63. 
 
Table 6. Mean (SD) response times for each advice condition for both consequence levels 
Consequence 
Scenario 
Advice 
Congruent Incongruent Unclear 
Low 1034.629 (175.677) 1229.242 (226.007) 1414.665 (229.684) 
High 1073.163 (206.175) 1227.783 (218.186) 1359.733 (221.772) 
 
Similarly, the assumption of sphericity was violated for the main effect advice in the 
high-consequence scenarios, χ2 (2) = 14.272, p = .001, therefore correcting again the 
degrees of freedom using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (ε = .579). 
Results for the high-consequence scenarios pointed to significant differences (F 
(1.158, 13.899) = 9.675, p = .006), with a significant increase in response time after 
congruent advice (M = 1073.163, SD = 206.175), when compared to incongruent 
advice conditions (M = 1227.783, SD = 218.186), F (1, 12) = 28.400, p = .000, r = 
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0.84, and a further increase when compared to the unclear advice ones (M = 
1359.733, SD = 221.772), F (1, 12) = 11.694, p = .005, r = 0.7. 
 
Figure 4. Interaction graph for the mean response time for the advice conditions in both 
consequence scenarios 
 
 
The results for the differences in reaction times were overlaid with the 
significant differences in amplitudes observed for the movement-related sources (see 
Figure 4). 
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3.4 Qualitative Data 
 
 After completing the decision paradigm, participants filled out a post-task 
questionnaire (see Appendix D). These responses provide a qualitative insight into 
the decision-making processes and individuals’ experience during the experiment. 
They provided an overall narrative, to compliment the findings from the 
neurocognitive analysis. 
 
 When asked about how confident they felt about solving the task (Q.1), 
participants stated that they felt quite confident (Avg. 7 on a scale of 1-10) in their 
ability, even if they did not find a pattern to solve it (“I felt confident about my 
logical ability to find patterns, then that quickly diminished as I was never seeing a 
pattern arise.”). When asked about particular strategies (Q.2), individuals described 
various attempts, which reflected a prolonged search effort to find a solution (“I felt 
patterns occurring and would try and follow them. Then they would change and I 
would try and follow the new pattern.”). 
 
 In terms of their main concern and feelings of anxiety (Q.3), individuals did 
not state any particular preference for any particular scenario, as they were focused 
on making the right choice (“Consciously I didn’t as I was too focused on trying not 
to blink and working out the pattern.”). When asked about their decisiveness and any 
last-moment doubts about their decision (Q.4), participants said that they 
occasionally found themselves re-considering their choice, especially following 
repeated mistakes in previous decisions (“Sometimes yes, because a few incorrect 
answers made me to rethink the strategy I used before with correct answers.”).  
 
 There was an overall split between those seeing time or accuracy as their 
main concern (Q.5), while most agreed that time was a driver at the beginning until 
they settled into the task and tried solving the pattern (“The time was an issue at the 
start as it did not sound very long and I felt this would cause problems in my 
accuracy, but actually the time was fine so I would say accuracy was my main 
focus.”). In relation, when asked if more time would have allowed them to solve the 
task (Q.6), the majority stated that it would not have made a difference, as the 
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changing pattern involved renewed effort to figure out a strategy (“Because it 
seemed that there was more than one strategy one could use so more time would not 
help.”). 
 
 Most participants stated that they perceived the task as not being solvable 
(Q.7), due to the changing pattern and level of difficulty (“No, it was very difficult.  
In fact I still think it was a random choice.”). When further asked about if they had 
figured out a possible solution (Q.8), they continued to point to the insolvability 
(“No, it was very difficult.  In fact I still think it was a random choice.”). 
Nonetheless, despite the difficulty of the task, participants still felt pressured to be 
fast as well as accurate (Q.9), as a combination of their feeling of frustration and the 
negative feedback (“Because I had done badly in the first section I wanted to do 
better in the second section.”). 
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4. DISCUSSION 
 
 The results from this experiment were consistent with previous findings, 
further lending support to the propositions around the individual decision-making 
stages identified through the particular decision paradigm. Each of the three advice 
conditions – congruent, incongruent and unclear – resulted in significantly different 
response times, while activity leading up to the response showed particular 
differences of this in various brain regions. The scenario conditions, similar to 
previous experiments, did not play a significant role when looking at the overall 
decision-making process, as attention shifted to the available advice. In terms of the 
advice, the observed differences were in line with expectations, but the results did 
not provide sufficient ground on which to draw distinct activation maps between 
both more complex information conditions.  
 
 When exploring these findings in more detail, the focus will first be on the 
recordings for the initial perception components, describing the scenario and advice 
presentation. The processes leading up to the implementation will be described next, 
identifying the cognitive activity corresponding to each condition and how it was 
reflected in the behavioural response in each decision. These measures were 
considered to map out how factors regarding available information and scenarios lay, 
and how these corresponded to the behavioural and qualitative measures. 
 
4.1 Context Information 
 
 While the analysis pointed to significant differences between the two 
scenario conditions, these were mostly observed in the brain regions corresponding 
to visual processing. Relating again to the experiment design, these particular 
differences needed to be considered in terms of the complexity of the images used, 
rather than the contextual information they represented. Identifying activity located 
in the occipital lobe the high-consequence scenarios resulted in stronger and 
prolonged activation, which reflected the expected variations based on stimuli 
characteristics. This activity cannot be directly accredited to the operational 
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conditions, and were limited in terms of basic visual-processing differences between 
the images. These shortcomings were not directly related to the decision-making 
process, as the images served as a contextual trigger to place individuals in the 
particular operational situations. So the significant differences, despite those also 
observed in the posterior cingulate cortex and the frontal lobe, could not be 
confidently related to activation due to the low- or high-consequence environments 
as such. 
 
4.2 Advice Information 
 
 For activity relating to the presentation of task-relevant information, as 
advice given when faced with the choice between the two wires, the analysis looked 
again at the effect the scenario conditions had on this processing, but further 
included comparisons between the three types of advice.  
 
Scenario 
 
 Some differences were observed for the sources located in the occipital lobe 
at very early time intervals, but they were not consistent across all three advice 
conditions. Visually, there were no differences between the scenarios, and as 
highlighted above, drawing direct conclusion from any differences in visual 
processing was not without flaws. Similarly, although some differences were 
observed for the other two sources, these again were not consistent for all types of 
advice. Overall, as findings indicated in previous experiments, individuals did not 
show any particular difference at this stage in terms of processing relating to the 
contextual situation they were receiving the advice in. While activation in the limbic 
lobe would point to differences between the scenario consequences (Nieuwenhuys, 
Voogd, & van Huijzen, 2008), findings did not allow for the clear differentiation, 
due to the early activation and large standard deviations. Further, no additional 
stimuli relating to the scenarios was provided at this stage, so any conclusions drawn 
would relate to the prolonged activation relating to the previous stimuli. 
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Advice 
 
 When comparing the effect the three types of advice had on brain activity at 
this stage, results showed that there was no difference between them for any of the 
scenario conditions. In terms of visual processing, no differences were expected, 
seeing as all stimuli contained similar written information, without any variation in 
terms of basic characteristics. Based on the experimental premise, there were 
expectations regarding activity for the different types of advice, with stronger 
activation in the prefrontal cortex as well as temporal lobe (Kanwisher & Wojciulik, 
2000; Habib, Nyberg, & Tulving, 2003); neither of which was observed in this 
experiment. 
 
 One explanation for this relates to the short time window analysed, which 
looked at the immediate response after stimuli presentation. While visual processing 
is completed early, more complex processes would occur only after the information 
had been processed. In the current set-up, these late activations would already fall 
within the range of individuals’ response times, and thus overlap and be directly 
observed as decision-related components. This would be further compressed, 
considering the repetition and habituation effect of the task. With this in mind, it was 
best to look at the activity directly preceding individuals’ choice, to get a better 
understanding of any possible differences based on advice or the scenarios in which 
it was received.  
 
4.3 Decision-related components 
 
The key phase identified in the decision paradigm which corresponded to the 
decision-making processes was the one just prior to individuals pressing the mouse 
button, as they deliberated about the available information and their commitment to 
implementing a particular choice. 
 
 Significant differences were observed between the scenario conditions, 
mainly in the source located in the occipital lobe (S1). These differences, at various 
time intervals, were observed for all three advice conditions. As highlighted above, 
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this activity was prolonged and related to the presentation of the stimuli, considering 
the overlap it had when considering the average response times. At the same time, 
differences were also observed in the source located in the frontal lobe (S4), where 
the low-consequence scenarios resulted in stronger activation for the congruent and 
unclear advice conditions. These differences were not consistent across the types of 
advice, and were observed at early time intervals (1200ms-1000ms and 720ms-
620ms before button press), just after the presentation of the advice stimuli. This 
pointed again to an overlap with the perception-related activity, relating to the 
evaluation phase, rather than the deliberation and implementation phases. Seeing as 
there were no clear differences between the scenario conditions, and no clear 
conclusions were drawn about the activity following the presentation of that stimuli, 
it was again difficult to confidently draw any conclusions about the differences 
observed prior to individuals’ choice. 
 
 When looking at the way individuals processed the advice they received, 
results showed significant differences in a number of sources in the brain. For both, 
low- and high-consequence conditions, recordings for the source located in the 
occipital lobe showed a prolonged positive amplitude for the congruent advice, 
compared to a prolonged negative amplitude for the incongruent and unclear advice. 
When considering the basic characteristics of the stimuli, there was no reason to 
expect any significant difference in terms of visual processing, seeing as all three 
types of advice consisted of very similar written information. 
 
For the source located in the anterior cingulate cortex, results showed a 
significant difference in activity, where the incongruent and unclear advice resulted 
in an earlier and larger increase in activity, when compared to the congruent advice. 
This pointed to higher attentional effort required to process that type of advice 
(Posner & Petersen, 1990). Incongruent advice required additional ‘translation’ of 
information before it could be used in a meaningful way to solve the task at hand. 
The unclear advice required similar processing, while it possibly served more as a 
cue to switch to an individual problem-solving strategy (Monsell, 2003). Based on 
predictions, we expected to see also a significant difference between these two 
conditions, as each required a different cognitive process. This was not the case in 
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this experimental set-up, but possible reasons for this related to the limitations of the 
measures taken, relating to the precise localisation. 
 
 Directly describing individuals’ preparation to press the button, activity in the 
contralateral primary motor cortex pointed to differences between the advice 
conditions. This activity corresponded to the organisation of the motor cortex and 
enabled the monitoring of movement (Coles, 1989), which showed that congruent 
and incongruent advice resulted in an earlier activation than the unclear advice. 
Especially when comparing both more effortful advice conditions, results showed 
that the unclear advice reflected a stronger readiness potential (Coles, Gratton, 
Bashore, Eriksen, & Donchin, 1985; Coles, Gratton, & Donchin, 1988; De Jong, 
Wierda, Mulder, & Mulder, 1988), with a later increase than the other two 
conditions. The incongruent advice, on the other hand, resulted in an early positive 
amplitude, and a sustained activation and increase prior to making a choice. While 
individuals were ready to move ahead into an implementation of their choice when 
they received some type of advice, when processing their own strategy, activation 
was delayed and movement-related activity reflected a stronger readiness potential. 
While the differences are within a narrow time-frame, when compared with the 
differences in response times, they do suggest again an insight into the differences in 
cognitive processing on a cognitive level. 
 
Response Times 
 
 The behavioural measures recorded, describing the time it took individuals to 
process the advice information, deliberate about it and reach a decision on which 
wire to cut, showed a significant increase from the congruent, to the incongruent and 
finally the unclear advice condition, for both of the consequence scenarios. 
Individuals made significantly faster decisions when presented with clear advice, 
while it took them longer to make a choice when they had to translate the advice 
first. This was in line with the cognitive measures taken, showing prolonged activity 
for the more complex advice, resulting in a delay in response. 
 
Similarly, when being presented with unclear advice, participants needed to 
process that cue and then apply their own strategy, which resulted in longer response 
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times. This delay corresponded individuals’ task descriptions, where they would try 
different solution patterns and needed to re-frame their strategy following an 
incorrect choice. While the cognitive measures did not provide sufficient grounds on 
which to explain the differences in response times between the two more complex 
advice conditions, the overall trend in increase delay was in line with expectations. 
 
4.4 Experiment Design 
 
While the decision paradigm continued to provide insight into different 
processes at the different stages of decision-making, it did not allow for the 
confident identification of distinct source activation relating to the advice processing. 
The use of EEG for this goal was limited by the spatial resolution of the source 
dipoles, making it unable to isolate processing relating to each of the individual 
types of advice. The expectations about differences in terms of response were 
present, but any conclusions were limited. Nonetheless, the temporal resolution 
allowed for the clear differentiation in terms of activation, duration and change of the 
evoked potentials; prior to and following the stimuli at the individual decision-
making stages.  
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5. CONCLUSION 
  
The experiment showed how cognitive processing and behavioural responses 
were influenced by varying levels of clarity of information. While there was a clear 
difference in both, delay in response time as well as activation in brain regions 
corresponding to this choice implementation, there was no clear distinction in terms 
of complex information processing and individual strategy implementation. Again 
issues were raised regarding the confidence of localisation possible with EEG 
measurements. It was not possible to definitively point to variations between these 
fundamentally different processes, but the results did point to the need to look in 
more detail into how information complexity results in delay, as described through 
the neurocognitive measurements available. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter VII 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
General Discussion 
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An insight into thoughts about actions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The thesis set out to look at how information is received (input), processed 
(deliberation) and used to make a choice (output) in forced-choice and time-
constrained situations. Considering the various factors that cause individuals to delay 
decision-making, the two explored in this research relate to (1) the potential 
emotional consequence of making an incorrect choice, and (2) engaging in redundant 
deliberation when lacking meaningful task-related information. Furthermore, this 
was set out in an experimental framework, incorporating insights from a neurological 
level, with the goal of advancing our understanding of the validity of mapping 
unique processes within particular regions of the brain. These measures, in addition 
to behavioural, quantitative and qualitative descriptions, provided a more in-depth 
insight into how information and environmental conditions affect cognitive 
processing in experimental forced-choice situations. 
 
 This chapter provides a general discussion of the main findings and 
implications of this study. Before outlining the conclusions and contributions of the 
thesis, it is important to provide a brief summary of the results, for both 
neurocognitive and behavioural measures, based on the various iterations of the 
forced-choice paradigm utilised. This follows the experimental development, aimed 
at identifying individual stages around the evaluation of information, the deliberation 
of alternatives and the implementation of a choice (Gollwitzer, Heckhausen, & 
Steller, 1990). 
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1. Summary of Results 
 
 The first experiment (Chapter II) provided bases on which to frame basic 
decision-making processes, in order to isolate and identify distinct brain activation. 
Findings showed that emotion, as influenced by task conditions, has an effect on 
neurocognitive processing during decision-making. The scenarios with lower 
negative outcomes resulted in stronger and more prolonged activation for 
components describing the preparation prior to and implementation of a decision. 
More surprisingly, results showed that individuals engaged in redundant deliberation 
within those situations where meaningful information was unavailable. This 
deliberation yielded differences in response times between the scenario conditions, 
where individuals responded slower during those scenarios with less consequential 
outcomes. However, rationally, in none of the decision-making tasks information 
was available on which to base one’s judgement or choice preference. Finally, the 
findings from this initial study raised some questions about the decision paradigm’s 
design and effect on participants’ performance, which were addressed in the next 
two experiments. 
 
 Questions about the effect of feedback on response times were addressed in 
the second experiment (Chapter III), by examining heightened or lowered sense of 
confidence as a possible mediating variable for the variations found in response 
times. Repeated positive or negative feedback on individuals’ decisions did not show 
to have an effect on their response times during this particular decision paradigm. 
Moreover, the results between the scenario conditions were similar to those in the 
first experiment, with faster responses found during the more consequential 
scenarios than the less consequential ones. This reiterated the important role that the 
operational conditions played during the decision task, where individuals were 
influenced by the environmental conditions irrespective of their confidence 
perceptions. 
 
 Another question raised related to the effect information loading had on 
cognitive processing and response times. The results showed that individuals were 
engaged in fast processing and evaluating of the information presented, and 
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subsequently quickly switched to implementation of a choice; both of which 
occurred faster within the more consequential scenarios. The third experiment 
(Chapter IV) analysed the effect that the simultaneous presentation of both scenario 
context and choice alternatives had on response times. Results showed that the 
differences observed previously did not hold up in this design of the decision 
paradigm, as more information had to be processed and evaluated within a similar 
time-frame. Moreover, there were no differences between the scenario conditions, 
illustrating once again the early activation observed in Experiment 1, when 
incorporating neurocognitive measurements, as this version of the task did not allow 
for an early/prior evaluation and deliberation.  
 
 After clarifying some of the questions related to the initial findings and the 
overall validity of the decision paradigm, the final two experiments assessed the 
effect of additional information on the decision-making process. These added a 
dimension on which to assess variations in evaluation, deliberation and 
implementation of decisions, incorporating different levels of clarity and relevance 
of the information available during the task. 
 
 One experiment (Chapter V) was designed around established findings 
relating to the Reverse Stroop Effect, looking at attentional focus as a reference point 
during the decision-making process. The emphasis was around the effect that 
meaningful information along different levels of complexity had on cognitive 
processing, and comparing this against conditions absent of any information. Results 
pointed to a shift of emphasis during the decision task, as expected, where the 
information variations had an effect on brain activation and response times, while 
scenario conditions did not affect performance. Response times for congruent 
information were shortest, while there were no differences between the times for the 
decisions made based on incongruent information or where information was lacking 
entirely. While distinct processing stages were identified along the lines of the basic 
decision-making model, no clear differentiation was possible between the 
information conditions in terms of activated brain regions and distinct 
neurocognitive processes. 
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 The last experiment (Chapter VI) focused on more complex variations in 
processing by analysing differences in the clarity of task-relevant information, as 
well as the need to identify superfluous information. Results were in line with 
expectations, with a trend for response times being increasingly longer when more 
complex information was made available, while task-irrelevant information resulted 
in the longest response delay. These variations also mapped onto the basic decision-
making model, identifying individual stages of neurocognitive processing and their 
effect on brain activation, based on individual components, and subsequent response 
times. Similar to the previous experiment, the scenario conditions did not have an 
effect on response times, once again highlighting the importance of available 
information, rather than the operational setting in which it is received. This was 
carried over in the two last experiments, even when considering conditions with no 
or superfluous information. 
 
 The outline of these general results provides an overview of the individual 
findings and their relationship within the thesis. They point towards the comparative 
framework on which to further expand the research into fundamental neurocognitive 
processes, and how these interact in similar forced-choice decision environments. 
Therefore, it is important to highlight how the key conceptual findings from each of 
the experiments contribute to the existing theoretical and applied areas of research. 
Finally, some additional methodological weaknesses of the current studies and 
improvement for future work will be discussed. 
 
2.1 Emotion 
  
 In the first instance, emotional affect, as influenced by the varying levels of 
consequential conditions in the operational settings, had an effect on decision-
making when no other information was available on which to base any evaluative 
judgements. This supported the Somatic Marker Hypothesis (Damasio, 1994), which 
states that emotional feelings are biasing factors that drive behaviour (Craig, 2008). 
In the present studies, more emotional scenarios led to faster decision 
implementation. This was in opposition to the expectations of heightened anticipated 
regret leading to decision delay (Zeelenberg, van Dijk, Manstead, & van der Pligt, 
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2000; Anderson, 2003; Lipshitz, 2005). However, when additional information was 
presented, emotional affect did not play a role in the decision process, as cognitive 
demands produced the observed variations in decision delay.  
 
 These findings further contribute to studies highlighting the complex role that 
emotions play in decision making (Pfister & Böhm, 2008) by identifying whether 
emotions are simply an aid to cognition, by helping individuals to weigh decisions 
correctly, or whether the role they play is more fundamental to the decision process. 
To reiterate, results from the initial experiment reported within this thesis pointed to 
a deeper implication of emotions in line with the primacy of affect (Zajonc, 1980; 
Kinsbourne, 1988). However, latter results reported in Chapter V and VI 
(Experiments 4 & 5) indicated that the premise that emotions and regulatory feelings 
have stronger effects on cognitions than vice versa (Panksepp, 1998) did not hold 
true in this particular decision paradigm. 
 
 These findings do not question established ideas about the effect emotion has 
on decision making and their overall role within cognitive processing. On the 
contrary, they are in line with current ideas around their complex influence in 
problem-solving (Naqvi, Shiv, & Bechara, 2006) and their effect on neurocognitive 
processes (Davidson & Irwin, 1999; Davidson, 2003). Despite this, it was not the 
goal of this thesis to explore and identify the complexities of how emotion influences 
decision making in forced choice environments. These were included in the current 
studies due to a recognition of the need to incorporate considerations about affect 
within decision making (Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003; Mosier & Fisher, 2009); and 
served to create a reference point and as a method through which to induce 
increasingly complex cognitive demands. 
 
2.2 Information 
 
 The decision-paradigm designed in the current thesis focused on heightening 
performance pressure, where deciding “well” meant deciding expeditiously. Time 
was therefore of the essence, and the design required individuals to decide within a 
time frame, based on Johnson-Laird and Shafir’s basic interaction model (Johnson-
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Laird & Shafir, 1993), deemed appropriate for the problem at hand. Within these 
conditions, the predominant focus assessed the role information plays in decision-
making in a forced-choice environment, through an assessment of reasoning and its 
influence on task performance at a neurocognitive level. 
 
 In line with expectations about information processing, results from this 
framework confirmed the different effects observed when clear or complex 
information is presented to individuals. Furthermore, different behavioural responses 
were observed when individuals were processing either task-relevant or superfluous 
information. These results provide a confident reference point on which to frame 
proposals around the identification of unique decision-making stages (Gollwitzer, et 
al., 1990) and how these were affected by information. Ultimately, these references 
provided an additional level of explanation for the differences in behavioural 
measures, reflected in the response times for each task condition, based on the 
variations in consequential affect and information availability. 
  
 On a neurological level, as set out by contributions within the area of 
decision neuroscience (Fellows, 2004; Gold & Shadlen, 2007), the goal was to 
advance our understanding of the validity of mapping these unique processes within 
regions of the brain. Based on the particular decision paradigm, distinct processes 
included those observed for:  
1) simple information, directly identifying the value of the input; 
2) more complex information, requiring more cognitive effort to identify the 
validity of the input; 
3) the absence of any information, which led to the activation of an individual 
problem-solving strategy; and,  
4) superfluous information, which required the recognition of this input as task-
irrelevant, and the subsequent shift to an individual problem-solving strategy. 
Each of these resulted in differences in terms of brain activation and response times, 
in line with expectations. Additionally, one might have expected to find differences 
in source localisation, considering that the more complex types of information lead 
to different cognitive processes. On the one hand, one required making sense of the 
information at hand, while the other two required individuals to move past the absent 
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or superfluous information, onto deliberation under uncertain conditions. This 
particular decision paradigm did not point to differences in localisation, based on the 
available recordings of brain activation. 
 
 While questions about the attentional differences in each condition have been 
addressed in previous studies (Posner & Petersen, 1990; Rugg, 1995; Ward, 1999; 
Luck, Woodman, & Vogel, 2000), and results from this thesis were in line with those 
findings, it was difficult to draw concrete conclusions about the similarities observed 
in the localised activation results. These findings may point to the fact that despite 
the differences found, all three types of information still resulted in similar 
activation. However, as mentioned previously, the data did not make it possible to 
draw any clear conclusion. Furthermore, there were some overall methodological 
issues that needed to be highlighted, to better understand the limitations within these 
findings and to provide a realistic scope provided by this framework.  
 
 
3. Methodology 
 
 The inclusion of neurological measures to the study of decision making was 
aimed at identifying the fundamental and basic processes at play within a meaningful 
framework, building on their ability to identify influential factors. In this particular 
paradigm, the goal was to contribute knowledge beyond the area of traditional 
decision-making, incorporating cognitive processes usually observed within the 
naturalistic decision-making perspective, and induced by the unique environmental 
characteristics. 
 
 Keeping in mind the complex and time-compressed nature of these 
environments, the focus was on drawing insight into these processes using electro-
encephalographic (EEG) data. With the advantage of having a high temporal 
resolution, EEG techniques provide a more detailed picture of the decision-making 
process as a whole, by combining measurements of reaction time and identification 
of event-related potential (ERP) components. These provide a time-locked reference 
point from which to assess the effect of the particular advice or scenario stimuli on 
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brain activation, and subsequent activation relating to the decision-making process. 
But these advantages come at the cost of diminished localisation of these sources, 
which confounded some of the conclusions drawn about the observed brain activity. 
This was particularly true of the inferences drawn with regards to which regions of 
the brain were activated by particular stimuli and during individual decision-making 
stages when information was available processed. 
 
 The brain is a single, integrated, and highly dynamic system. Thus, especially 
when dealing with complex cognitive and emotional events, all references to 
localisation need to be understood in that context. While this thesis combined EEG, 
behavioural and qualitative measures, it did not include any details around functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), subjects with brain lesions, or experiments 
incorporating transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). These techniques have been 
included in other studies when drawing conclusions about localised activity, as they 
have a much greater spatial resolution than EEGs. While remaining conscious of the 
limited correlational evidence in terms of source localisation and specific differences 
for the observed activation, and in particular when trying to differentiate between 
variations around complex information processing, the current results nevertheless 
provided sufficient evidence to illustrate the validity of applying this approach to an 
analysis of basic decision-making processes. 
 
3.1 Visual Processing 
 
 One weakness highlighted within the individual experiments pointed to the 
vision-related activation described for each particular stimulus. The design, focused 
on setting operational context using different images to represent a unique scenario, 
did not allow meaningful conclusions to be drawn from the recordings relating to the 
presentation of the stimuli. Differences were observed between the individual 
consequence conditions, but it was not clear whether these related to the stimuli used 
or the context they represented. More meaningful conclusions could have been 
drawn if simple text was used to represent the context, avoiding any differences 
relating to the visual complexity of the stimuli. Additionally, this might have 
heightened participants’ immersion in the contextual settings, drawing from their 
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own imagination to place themselves in the particular operational scenarios. This 
would also lower the activation observed in the visual-processing regions, potentially 
raising activation in other areas relating to the emotional differences induced by the 
task. While visual processing was not a priority within this decision paradigm, this 
issue served as a reminder about the difficulty of confidently drawing correlational 
conclusions from neurological measures and related cognitive processes. 
 
3.2 Decision-making Stages 
 
Similarly, other shortcomings related to the limited insight gained into more 
specific processes identified during individual decision-making stages. Additional 
studies which focus on those unique processes should be developed, in order to 
further identify neurocognitive activation and isolate those regions. Building on the 
framework presented in this research, a number of processes were observed, and 
more specific experiments would further advance any potential insight. 
 
 One possible experiment would look more closely into details around frame-
shifting activity (Monsell, 2003), in conditions were individuals had to apply their 
own decision strategy. This would be based on a version where the order of the 
decisions and how often positive feedback followed negative feedback (and vice-
versa) are pre-set. This would allow focusing on the effect the need to reconsider 
ones choices would have on cognitive processing. Significant differences between 
those responses following correct vs. incorrect feedback would point to individuals’ 
active re-assessment (i.e. frame-shifting) of their strategy. Each task would require 
its own configuration (or schema) in order to reach a specific goal, where the shift 
would involve discarding a previous schema and establishing a new one; this 
difference in response time between switch and non-switch trials is known as switch 
cost (Rogers & Monsell, 1995). 
 
Activation in the prefrontal lobe in some of the experiments hinted to this 
process, in line with previous findings around frame-shifting (Coulson, 2001; 
Nagahama, et al. 2001; Rubia, Smith, Brammer, & Taylor, 2003), reflected in the 
ability to respond flexibly to the changing demands (Ruff, Allen, Farrow, Niemann, 
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& Wylie, 1994; Heilman, 2005; Picton, Stuss, Alexander, Shallice, Binns, & 
Gillinghman, 2007). Previous research has also pointed to this switch cost within the 
Stroop Test, changing from easy to hard and back (Allport, Styles, & Hsieh, 1994), 
where the cost relates more to the suppression of the old task, rather than the setting 
up of the new one. A re-design of the decision paradigm would make it possible to 
compare these conditions, isolating the evaluation and implementation stages, in 
order to look at unique differences. Additionally, this design would also allow for the 
identification of processing immediately following feedback. Expectations here 
would focus on executive functions in sources located in the anterior cingulate and 
its role in error detection (Carter, Braver, Brach, Botvinick, Noll, & Cohen, 1998), 
and look at activity relating to behavioural adjustment (following incorrect choices), 
resulting in greater activity for negative feedback in the prefrontal cortex (Kerns, 
Cohen, MacDonald, Cho, Stenger, & Carter, 2004). 
 
 Similarly, considering the possibilities of developing further research into the 
particular decision-making stages, one expansion would see the focus on learning 
within a task. Creating a solvable version of the decision paradigm, where 
individuals can move from a level of novices to experts, through the training of 
solution patterns. This would allow looking into fundamental aspects of the 
development of expertise within a task, in particular when focusing on the 
recognition-primed decision model (Klein, 1993; Ericsson, Charness, Feltovich, & 
Hoffman, 2006). Such design would map onto the basic decision-making model, 
looking at activity during the learning phase, moving onto the recognition and 
targeting of the solution pattern, and finally the implementation of decisions. This 
would advance the current framework one step further, not only identifying the 3-
stage decision-making model, but also incorporating the active targeting of attention 
and cognitive processing to a solvable task. 
 
 Beyond these concrete examples, the findings within this thesis demonstrate 
the potential of applying this methodological approach to the focused research 
around decision-making. While some weaknesses remain, in terms of the reliable 
drawing of conclusions about more complex processes as well as the ability to 
isolate unique processes within particular task conditions, the findings 
overwhelmingly point to the potential of adding neurological measurements. As 
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highlighted above, it is important to recognise from the beginning the limitations, 
and design clear and simple experiments, focused on basic factors, in order to slowly 
build a more complete picture of interrelated brain activity and a continuous 
narrative of the cognitive decision-making process. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
 The key findings from this thesis reflect its contribution as a framework 
piece, bringing together a number of research areas, in order to provide an additional 
comparative level of research. Addressing some fundamental aspects of decision-
making, identifying factors characteristic to forced-choice environments in situations 
of high-risk and uncertainty, the thesis combines different measurements to present a 
richer narrative about the cognitive processes and how they are affected. 
Recognising that the prime challenge in these environments lies in the need to 
choose between two equally (un)attractive options, under conditions of high time 
pressure and significant risk, results here contribute to the fundamental 
understanding of the interplay between performance pressures and information, and 
how these affect individuals’ response. 
 
 As observed in the basic decision paradigm, when individuals had 
information available to make a choice, then emotion did not influence their 
response. This was also valid with superfluous information, where the deliberation 
about the decision still had no meaningful point of reference. More effortful 
information resulted in similar activation, even when one piece of information was 
meaningful to the solution of the task and the other one was not. The EEG 
measurements provided a good temporal resolution, at the expense of some spatial 
accuracy, focusing on the narrow time window and the particular experimental 
design around the key decision-making stages. This demonstrated that further 
contributions could be made towards basic decision-making, using this as an 
additional measure of insight. Some questions do remain about the methodological 
confidence, but results point to some clear differences in terms of information 
processing and neurocognitive descriptions to behavioural measures. The key 
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challenge here remains, as with all approaches aimed at advancing more in-depth 
insights, to confidently unfold the individual processes, before putting them back 
together within the dynamic and complex framework they were taken from. 
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Appendix A 
Experiment 1 (Chapter II) 
Picture Rating Task 
	  
Examples	  of	  the	  picture	  rating	  task	  participants	  completed	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  decision	  making	  
task.	  	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  OR	  	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  OR	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
“How	  emotional	  did	  you	  perceive	  the	  scenario	  represented	  by	  the	  image	  to	  
be?”	  
	  
	  
	   	   	  
Not	  At	  All	   Low	   High	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  OR	  	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  OR	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  “How	  affected	  would	  you	  feel,	  knowing	  that	  your	  wrong	  decision	  allowed	  the	  
device	  to	  go	  off	  in	  this	  scenario?”	  
	  
	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Not	  At	  All	   	   	   	   	   	   Extremely	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Appendix B 
Experiment 1 (Chapter II) 
Attitude Scales 
	  
Impulsivity	  Questionnaire	  
Please	   indicate	   on	   a	   scale	   of	   1	   to	   5	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   you	   agree	   or	   disagree	   with	   the	  
following	  statements,	  where	  1	  =	  strongly	  disagree	  and	  5	  =	  strongly	  agree.	  
	  
1.	  I	  plan	  tasks	  carefully.	  	  
2.	  I	  do	  things	  without	  thinking.	  	  
3.	  I	  make-­‐up	  my	  mind	  quickly.	  	  
4.	  I	  am	  happy-­‐go-­‐lucky.	  	  
5.	  I	  don’t	  “pay	  attention”.	  	  
6.	  I	  have	  “racing”	  thoughts.	  	  
7.	  I	  plan	  trips	  well	  ahead	  of	  time.	  	  
8.	  I	  am	  self	  controlled.	  	  
9.	  I	  concentrate	  easily.	  	  
10.	  I	  save	  regularly.	  	  
11.	  I	  “squirm”	  at	  plays	  or	  lectures.	  	  
12.	  I	  am	  a	  careful	  thinker.	  	  
13.	  I	  plan	  for	  job	  security.	  	  
14.	  I	  say	  things	  without	  thinking.	  	  
15.	  I	  like	  to	  think	  about	  complex	  problems	  
16.	  I	  change	  jobs.	  
17.	  I	  act	  “on	  impulse.”	  
18.	  I	  get	  easily	  bored	  when	  solving	  thought	  problems.	  
19.	  I	  act	  on	  the	  spur	  of	  the	  moment.	  
20.	  I	  am	  a	  steady	  thinker.	  
21.	  I	  change	  residences.	  
22.	  I	  buy	  things	  on	  impulse.	  
23.	  I	  can	  only	  think	  about	  one	  thing	  at	  a	  time.	  
24.	  I	  change	  hobbies.	  
25.	  I	  spend	  or	  charge	  more	  than	  I	  earn.	  
26.	  I	  often	  have	  extraneous	  thoughts	  when	  thinking.	  
27.	  I	  am	  more	  interested	  in	  the	  present	  than	  the	  future.	  
28.	  I	  am	  restless	  at	  the	  theater	  or	  lectures.	  
29.	  I	  like	  puzzles.	  
30.	  I	  am	  future	  oriented.	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Appendix B 
Experiment 1 (Chapter II) 
	  
Assessment	  &	  Locomotion	  Questionnaire	  
	  
Please	   indicate	   on	   a	   scale	   of	   1	   to	   6	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   you	   agree	   or	   disagree	   with	   the	  
following	  statements,	  where	  1	  =	  strongly	  disagree	  and	  6	  =	  strongly	  agree.	  
	  
Assessment	  
1.	  I	  never	  evaluate	  my	  social	  interactions	  with	  others	  after	  they	  occur.	  
2.	  I	  spend	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  time	  taking	  inventory	  of	  my	  positive	  and	  negative	  characteristics.	  
3.	  I	  like	  evaluating	  other	  people's	  plans.	  
4.	  I	  often	  compare	  myself	  with	  other	  people.	  
5.	  I	  don't	  spend	  much	  time	  thinking	  about	  ways	  others	  could	  improve	  themselves.	  
6.	  I	  often	  critique	  work	  done	  by	  myself	  or	  others.	  
7.	  I	  often	  feel	  that	  I	  am	  being	  evaluated	  by	  others.	  
8.	  I	  am	  a	  critical	  person.	  
9.	  I	  am	  very	  self-­‐critical	  and	  self-­‐conscious	  about	  what	  I	  am	  saying.	  
10.	  I	  often	  think	  that	  other	  people's	  choices	  and	  decisions	  are	  wrong.	  
11.	  I	  rarely	  analyze	  the	  conversations	  I	  have	  had	  with	  others	  after	  they	  occur.	  
12.	  When	   I	  meet	   a	  new	  person	   I	   usually	   evaluate	  how	  well	   he	  or	   she	   is	   doing	  on	   various	  
dimensions	  (e.g.,	  looks,	  achievements,	  social	  status,	  clothes).	  	  
	  
Locomotion	  
1.	  I	  don't	  mind	  doing	  things	  even	  if	  they	  involve	  extra	  effort.	  
2.	  I	  am	  a	  "workaholic".	  
3.	  I	  feel	  excited	  just	  before	  I	  am	  about	  to	  reach	  a	  goal.	  
4.	  I	  enjoy	  actively	  doing	  things,	  more	  than	  just	  watching	  and	  observing.	  
5.	  I	  am	  a	  "doer“.	  
6.	  When	  I	  finish	  one	  project,	  I	  often	  wait	  awhile	  before	  getting	  started	  on	  a	  new	  one.	  
7.	  When	  I	  decide	  to	  do	  something,	  I	  can't	  wait	  to	  get	  started.	  
8.	  By	  the	  time	  I	  accomplish	  a	  task,	  I	  already	  have	  the	  next	  one	  in	  mind.	  
9.	  I	  am	  a	  "low	  energy"	  person.	  
10.	  Most	  of	  the	  time	  my	  thoughts	  are	  occupied	  with	  the	  task	  I	  wish	  to	  accomplish.	  
11.	  When	  I	  get	  started	  on	  something,	  I	  usually	  persevere	  until	  I	  finish	  it.	  
12.	  I	  am	  a	  "go-­‐getter.	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Appendix B 
Experiment 1 (Chapter II) 
	  
Need	  For	  Closure	  Questionnaire	  
Please	   indicate	   on	   a	   scale	   of	   1	   to	   5	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   you	   agree	   or	   disagree	   with	   the	  
following	  statements,	  where	  1	  =	  strongly	  disagree	  and	  5	  =	  strongly	  agree.	  
	  
1.	  I	  think	  that	  having	  clear	  rules	  and	  order	  at	  work	  is	  essential	  for	  success.	  
2.	   Even	   after	   I've	   made	   up	   my	   mind	   about	   something,	   I	   am	   always	   eager	   to	   consider	   a	  
different	  opinion.	  
3.	  I	  don't	  like	  situations	  that	  are	  uncertain.	  
4.	  I	  dislike	  questions	  which	  could	  be	  answered	  in	  many	  different	  ways.	  
5.	  I	  like	  to	  have	  friends	  who	  are	  unpredictable.	  
6.	  I	  find	  that	  a	  well	  ordered	  life	  with	  regular	  hours	  suits	  my	  temperament.	  
7.	  When	  dining	  out,	  I	  like	  to	  go	  to	  places	  where	  I	  have	  been	  before	  so	  that	  I	  know	  what	  to	  
expect.	  
8.	   I	   feel	  uncomfortable	  when	   I	  don't	  understand	  the	  reason	  why	  an	  event	  occurred	   in	  my	  
life.	  
9.	  I	  feel	  irritated	  when	  one	  person	  disagrees	  with	  what	  everyone	  else	  in	  a	  group	  believes.	  
10.	  I	  hate	  to	  change	  my	  plans	  at	  the	  last	  minute.	  
11.	  I	  don't	  like	  to	  go	  into	  a	  situation	  without	  knowing	  what	  I	  can	  expect	  from	  it.	  
12.	  When	  I	  go	  shopping,	  I	  have	  difficulty	  deciding	  exactly	  what	  it	  is	  that	  I	  want.	  
13.	  When	  faced	  with	  a	  problem	  I	  usually	  see	  the	  one	  best	  solution	  very	  quickly.	  
14.	  When	  I	  am	  confused	  about	  an	  important	  issue,	  I	  feel	  very	  upset.	  
15.	  I	  tend	  to	  put	  off	  making	  important	  decisions	  until	  the	  last	  possible	  moment.	  
16.	  I	  usually	  make	  important	  decisions	  quickly	  and	  confidently.	  
17.	  I	  would	  describe	  myself	  as	  indecisive.	  
18.	  I	  think	  it	  is	  fun	  to	  change	  my	  plans	  at	  the	  last	  moment.	  
19.	   I	   enjoy	   the	   uncertainty	   of	   going	   into	   a	   new	   situation	   without	   knowing	   what	   might	  
happen.	  
20.	  My	  personal	  space	  is	  usually	  messy	  and	  disorganized.	  
21.	  In	  most	  social	  conflicts,	  I	  can	  easily	  see	  which	  side	  is	  right	  and	  which	  is	  wrong.	  
22.	  I	  tend	  to	  struggle	  with	  most	  decisions.	  
23.	  I	  believe	  that	  orderliness	  and	  organization	  are	  among	  the	  most	  important	  characteristics	  
of	  a	  good	  student.	  
24.	  When	   considering	  most	   conflict	   situations,	   I	   can	   usually	   see	   how	  both	   sides	   could	   be	  
right.	  
25.	  I	  don't	  like	  to	  be	  with	  people	  who	  are	  capable	  of	  unexpected	  actions.	  
26.	  I	  prefer	  to	  socialize	  with	  familiar	  friends	  because	  I	  know	  what	  to	  expect	  from	  them.	  
27.	   I	   think	   that	   I	   would	   learn	   best	   in	   a	   class	   that	   lacks	   clearly	   stated	   objectives	   and	  
requirements.	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28.	  When	  thinking	  about	  a	  problem,	   I	  consider	  as	  many	  different	  opinions	  on	  the	   issue	  as	  
possible.	  
29.	  I	  like	  to	  know	  what	  people	  are	  thinking	  all	  the	  time.	  
30.	  I	  dislike	  it	  when	  a	  person's	  statement	  could	  mean	  many	  different	  things.	  
31.	  It	  is	  annoying	  to	  listen	  to	  someone	  who	  cannot	  seem	  to	  make	  up	  his	  or	  her	  mind.	  
32.	  I	  find	  that	  establishing	  a	  consistent	  routine	  enables	  me	  to	  enjoy	  life	  more.	  
33.	  I	  enjoy	  having	  a	  clear	  and	  structured	  mode	  of	  life.	  
34.	  I	  prefer	  interacting	  with	  people	  whose	  opinions	  are	  very	  different	  from	  my	  own.	  
35.	  I	  like	  to	  have	  a	  place	  for	  everything	  and	  everything	  in	  its	  place.	  
36.	  I	  feel	  uncomfortable	  when	  someone's	  meaning	  or	  intention	  is	  unclear	  to	  me.	  
37.	  When	  trying	  to	  solve	  a	  problem	  I	  often	  see	  so	  many	  possible	  options	  that	  it's	  confusing.	  
38.	  I	  always	  see	  many	  possible	  solutions	  to	  problems	  I	  face.	  
39.	  I'd	  rather	  know	  bad	  news	  than	  stay	  in	  a	  state	  of	  uncertainty.	  
40.	  I	  do	  not	  usually	  consult	  many	  different	  opinions	  before	  forming	  my	  own	  view.	  
41.	  I	  dislike	  unpredictable	  situations.	  
42.	  I	  dislike	  the	  routine	  aspects	  of	  my	  work	  (studies).	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Appendix C 
Experiment 2 (Chapter III) & 3 (Chapter IV) 
 
 
Task Experience 
	  
1.	  Based	  on	  the	  trials	  you	  just	  completed,	  what	  percentage	  did	  you	  get	  correct?	  
0%	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   100%	  
	  
2.	  During	  the	  previous	  trials,	  I	  was	  concentrating	  hard	  on	  solving	  the	  task.	  
Disagree	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Agree	  
	  
3.	  During	  the	  previous	  trials,	  I	  figured	  out	  what	  the	  solution	  was.	  
Disagree	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Agree	  
	  
4.	  Based	  on	  the	  feedback	  I	  received,	  I	  revised	  my	  strategy.	  
Disagree	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Agree	  
	  
Looking	  at	  the	  statements	  below,	  please	  indicate	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  they	  describe	  your	  experience	  
of	  this	  set	  of	  trials.	  
5.	  I	  felt	  stressed.	  
Disagree	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Agree	  
	  
6.	  I	  felt	  anxious.	  
Disagree	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Agree	  
	  
7.	  I	  felt	  under	  pressure	  to	  act	  quickly.	  
Disagree	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Agree	  
	  
8.	  I	  felt	  under	  pressure	  to	  be	  accurate.	  
Disagree	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   Agree	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Appendix D 
Experiment 2 (Chapter III) & 3 (Chapter IV) 
 
Post-Task Questionnaire 
 
Participant ID :  Age:  
Date:  Gender:  
 
Please read the questions below and answer them truthfully. 
 
1. On a scale of 1 to 10 (i.e. 1 = not at all, and 10 = very), how confident did you feel 
about completing this task and why? 
 
 
 
2. Did you try out a strategy when solving the task? If so, what was it? 
 
 
 
3. Did you feel more or less anxious and concerned during the more emotional 
scenario conditions (e.g. school, market place)? Why? 
 
 
 
4. Did you find yourself reconsidering your choices at the very last moment, before 
pressing the mouse button? If so, why? 
 
 
 
5. Where you more concerned by the limited time available or the need to be 
accurate and why? 
 
 
 
6. Do you think that you would have been able to solve this task if you had more 
time available? Why? 
 
 
 
7. Did you feel the decision task was solvable? As such, did you find it too easy or 
too difficult and why? 
 
 
 
8. What did you think was the correct solution for the decision? 
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Appendix E 
Experiment 4 (Chapter V) & 5 (Chapter VI) 
 
Post-Task Questionnaire 
Participant ID :  Age:  
Date:  Gender:  
 
Please read the questions below and answer them truthfully. 
1. On a scale of 1 to 10 (i.e. 1 = not at all, and 10 = very), how confident did you feel 
about completing the task and why? 
 
 
2. Did you try out a strategy when solving the task? If so, what was it?  
 
 
3. Did you feel more or less anxious and concerned during the more emotional 
scenario conditions (e.g. school, market place)? Why?  
 
 
4. Did you find yourself reconsidering your choices at the very last moment, before 
pressing the mouse button? If so, why?  
 
 
5. Where you more concerned by the limited time available or the need to be 
accurate, and why?  
 
 
6. Do you think that you would have been able to solve the task if you had more time 
available? Why?  
 
 
7. Did you feel the decision task was solvable? As such, did you find it too easy or 
too difficult and why?  
 
 
8. What did you think was the correct solution for the decision?  
 
 
9. Did you feel pressured to improve your performance, by the instructions give prior 
and during the experiment?  
 
10. Do you have any further comments to add, regarding the task or the overall 
experiment? 
 
